

**PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE: A HETEROGENEOUS
APPROACH**

by

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BA, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul 2003

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
University of Pittsburgh in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

University of Pittsburgh

2011

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

College of Arts & Sciences

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University of Pittsburgh, 2011

ABSTRACT:

While often seen and presented as a panacea for the aging populations of Europe to maintain a functioning welfare state, immigration provokes a very strong public opposition from the host society and substantive inter-group tensions. To tackle this issue in greater detail, in this dissertation, I explore how immigrant groups with different ethnic backgrounds are categorized by members of the host society and the implications of these classifications on attitudes towards immigration and on European Union integration.

Specifically, I challenge the assumption of people's perception of immigrants as a homogenous group as evidenced by the widespread use of a single survey question inquiring about support for overall immigration. I argue that public's perception of immigration is highly heterogeneous, resulting in a hierarchical categorization of immigrants mainly based on cultural similarity cued by ethnicity. I further argue that economic considerations are important but they mainly motivate opposition to immigration of ethnic groups that are perceived culturally similar. However, prejudice and symbolic considerations are the primary cause of opposition to immigrants that are perceived culturally different.

I provide strong evidence for the applicability of this model with German General Social Survey data from the year 2006, original in-depth interviews and survey experimental data with an embedded newspaper priming and list experiment that I collected in Berlin between 2007 and 2009.

With a rigorous triangulation of methods, I not only show that cultural similarity has a direct and indirect impact on immigration attitudes, but I also demonstrate how this relationship is suppressed by social desirability bias –the respondent’s aspiration to give socially desirable answers to “look good” to the researcher-.

Finally, regarding the implications of my theory on attitudes towards the EU, I find that separating immigration attitudes by ethnic group reveals that fear of EU enlargement is actually a far more important motive of Euroskepticism than it has been shown so far. Also, when social desirability bias is accounted for, the perceptions of cultural threat due to an enlarged Europe play a much larger role in explaining EU attitudes than conventional survey data suggest.

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PREFACE

Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my father, Retired Chief Major of the Turkish Armed Forces, Mustafa Cengiz Yavçan, who left this world too early to see me become a PhD. I will always be grateful to him for raising me as an open minded, strong, hard working, energetic, fearless, and independent woman in constant search for truth and for making the completion of this work possible

Acknowledgements

I was very fortunate to have an incredible committee whose members always believed in me, provided unconditional academic and emotional support and challenged me to improve my skills and to produce this dissertation. Each of them were great mentors and as well as great friends to me. They patiently put up with my last minute recommendation letter requests, they empowered me with constant feedback and encouragement when I was overwhelmed with the amount of work, and they all provided me with wonderful shoulders to cry on and generous hands to get strength from.

I would like to start by thanking my chair Steve Finkel for all of the above and always thinking about my best interest, being demanding but always fair, and providing me a wonderful family in Pittsburgh with his wife Müge Kökten Finkel and his handsome little son Deniz Allen Finkel.

I would also like to thank Jon Hurwitz from the bottom of my heart first for being an incredible friend and confidante and second for being a wonderfully meticulous critique of my work. Without his generous help, my original field work would not have been possible.

I am very grateful to Alberta Sbragia, who was there for me from the beginning until the end, who saw me and helped me grow into who I am by being a perfect role model both with her academic and personal life. She is the reason I came to Pitt and graduate as a PhD.

I owe special thanks to Martin Schain for being a great mentor during the years I lived in New York City, for embedding me in the institutional structure of New York University and quite generously allowing me to use his office for three years.

I would also like to thank the University of Pittsburgh, European Union Center of Excellence for providing generous support for my dissertation fieldwork and Schmiedl

Matrketforschung GmbH for conducting my survey instruments. Of course the administrative staffs at the University of Pittsburgh especially in the Department of Political Science and University Center for International Studies as well as New York University deserve special thanks for making my life easy by always straightening my paperwork.

A number of people have been quite important for designing, improving on and implementing my cognitive interviews and survey experiments in Germany. Professor Elizabeth Parks-Stamm from NYU introduced me the intricacies of experimental design and gave me a head start with programming, Professor William Jacoby from Michigan State University gave me great ideas on multidimensional scaling and allowed me to implement earlier versions in his class at ICPSR, my dear friend Betül Zerdeli helped me greatly with fixing the little nuances of the back and forth translation of the survey instrument between German and English so that my concepts did not get lost in translation. I should also thank perfect strangers that I met at coffee shops and university libraries in Berlin for taking the earlier versions of the surveys and allowing for a free pre pre-test.

I could not walk this long and arduous road if it were not for my great friends across the world but especially at the University of Pittsburgh. First, I would like to thank my wonderful friend Stacy M. Bondanella Taninchinev for being a wonderful, slightly older and considerably wiser sister to me. Her impeccable selfless personality, unconditional love and intellectual support did not leave me much to finish this program. I would also like to thank my great friends Dan London and Lisa Pohlman London for being incredibly loving and giving friends and inspiration to my work and in my life. I would also like to thank my dear friend Galina Zapryanova for being a constant source of motivation and fun. I would like to thank Professor Louise Comfort for being a wonderful host and friend and an inspiration for my life.

I would like to thank some very special friends I knew I could always count on with both academic and personal issues, who were also always eager to review my work and give constructive feedback: Aaron Abbarno, Kate Floros, Yasemin Irepoglu, Brandon Myers, Carolina Garriga Phillips, Dana Adriana Puia and Dan Tirone.

I am also thankful that I was blessed with great friends as Will Daniel, Kristen Coopie Allen, Güneş Ertan, Karen Lautanen, Galip Rıdvanogullari, Gökem and Gizem Saka, Cristina Saucedo, LJ Zigerell embellishing my miserable PhD life with unforgettable and fun memories.

I would also like to thank my friend Baris Sarer for introducing me the “Pomodoro” time management system, which was of great help to refurbish my productivity and motivation during hard times. I also owe thanks my dear friends, inspiring professors, and colleagues Yeşim Arat, Faruk Birttek, William Brustein, Betül Demirkaya, Angie Hartman, Marina Henke, Kemal Kirişçi, Belkız Kızıl, Marilia Mochel, Silesia Patricia Oliveira, Zeki Sarıgil, Amy Erica Smith, and Zeynep Somer Topçu.

I am grateful to the student friendly coffee shops in Pittsburgh, New York City and Berlin for generously providing me an office space with internet and power supply in return for the purchase of a 3\$ café latte.

I am also grateful to my very close friends across the world, Aylin Girgin Özbiliş, Naime Göker, Vildan Önpeker Çerçi, and Özge Gokbayrak Barçin for their continuous emotional support.

Finally I would like to thank my family starting with mother Hale Yavçan who always believed in me, inspired me, nurtured me with the greatest love, affection, immaculate morals, integrity, and motivation, provided great assistance to solving all my problems allowing me to

focus on my studies. I would also like to thank my little sister Seda Bahar Yavçan for being a great friend, wonderful confidante, and a major source of joy in my life.

I would also like to thank my dear husband Cenk Ural who tirelessly, patiently and lovingly helped me along the process, encouraged me at the times of despair, always managed to cheer me up and my second family Serap and Tahsin Ural for their love and support.

1.0 INTRODUCTION: WHY WRITE THIS DISSERTATION? ITS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE

“British jobs for British Workers”

Gordon Brown, British Prime Minister June 2007

“Multiculturalism is dead, totally...We feel tied to Christian values. Those who don't accept them, don't have a place here.”

Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, October 2010

“What I hear from voters is not concern that immigrants come from another country. It is that, they are Muslim. Voters fear Islam, not the people.”

Hilbrand Nawjin Dutch Minister of Immigration and Intergration, 2006

What explains public opposition to immigration? Who opposes immigration and who supports it? How are immigrants perceived and categorized by the host society? Are some immigrants more desired than others? What is the role of individuals' perceived cultural similarities with these immigrants, their levels of prejudice, symbolic concerns, and economic concerns in relation to immigration? Do these variables explain host society's attitudes towards the immigration of different ethnic or religious groups differently? Do these attitudes get affected by issue specific measurement biases such as socially desirable responding? And what are the implications of a refined theoretical framework explaining

opposition to immigration, on public attitudes towards other policies such as Euroskepticism? These are some of the questions I will answer in this dissertation.

The Eurostat report on population projections in Europe suggests immigration as the sole source of population increase by 2015¹. The EU in 2005 had an overall net gain from international migration of 1.8 million people, which accounted for almost 85% of Europe's total population growth that year. Der Spiegel reported in 2000 that Germany needs more than 300,000 immigrants per year just to maintain its population size. In other words, declining birthrates of native Europeans require large scale immigration of young workers to join the workforce so that the functioning of the welfare state can be maintained and labor shortages in a variety of sectors can be offset.

However, while presented as a panacea for the aging populations of Europe as well as the United States for economic reasons, clashes with existing immigrants and fearing the prospects of future immigration create major social conflicts and public discontent across the industrialized world. Without doubt, some of these tensions are a result of actual value conflict between the host society and immigrants who arrive with different cultural and religious baggage, as evidenced by many events. A recent example is the Danish cartoon crisis becoming a debate about freedom of speech vs. respecting religious freedoms. On the other hand, some of this conflict is a result of pure misconceptions of these groups about each other as evidenced by a long research tradition illustrating the mitigating role of intergroup contact. Therefore, the marked opposition of the host society to immigration despite these potential benefits from and need for immigration constituted a major puzzle

¹ Eurostat 2008. From 2015, Deaths Projected to Outnumber Births in the EU27.
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=STAT/08/119>

for scholars as well as policy makers, directing them towards understanding this important phenomenon.

At times capitalizing on this discontent for political gains, at times creating it, policymakers are not shy about resorting to anti-immigrant discourse, as several recent developments demonstrate. In his speech on June 6th 2007, the Prime Minister of the UK, Gordon Brown launched his “British jobs for British workers” campaign, and blamed immigrants for the rising unemployment rates in Britain². In July 2010, succeeding a hostile discourse towards the Roma, French President Nicholas Sarkozy adopted a policy of mass deportation of this group of immigrants from France³. Around the same time, across the Atlantic, the passage of the immigration reform law in Arizona allowed, according to many critics, arbitrary racial profiling and spurred considerable controversy⁴ while more recently hearings conducted by Congressman Peter King charged Muslim immigrants with not sufficiently cooperating with law enforcement in the fight against terrorism—despite hard data, surveys and expert testimonies to the contrary⁵.

In Germany on the other hand, the quoted statement of the German Chancellor targeting a group of immigrants’ lack of willingness to integrate as a result of their “Muslimness” came only shortly after German Central Bank Director Sarrazin’s comments on blaming Turkish immigrants for contributing to the economy as nothing but fruit and

² <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1553710/British-workers-for-British-jobs-says-Brown.html>

³ http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/30/world/europe/30france.html?_r=1

⁴ <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/28/us-usa-immigration-arizona-reaction-idUSTRE66R5XB20100728>
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-04-23/politics/immigration.faq_1_arizona-immigration-law-reform-sb1070?_s=PM:POLITICS

⁵ <http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/06/congressmen-disagree-over-premise-of-hearing-on-radicalization-of-muslim-america/>

vegetable sellers and dragging down the education system with their poor intelligence⁶. Both of these expressions of frustration with immigrants stirred a major discussion in Germany, and in fact both conceptually followed the idea of a German *Leitkultur* (leading culture) publicly debated first by Friedrich Merz in the year 2000⁷.

Looking at the other side of the coin, not all welcome these problematic remarks. In fact, most of these statements also receive strong reactions by the public and policymakers such as the ones leading up to the forced resignation of Sarrazin from SPD, numerous leaders, journalists and civil rights organizations publicly condemning Sarkozy, or the chain of protests against the Arizona immigration law in the US. All in all though, these statements and following series of reactions further increases the importance of immigration and immigrants in the public and political discourse, creating linkages with a variety of policy realms.

Without a doubt, immigration constitutes one of the major policy challenges the European continent faces in the 21st century, and increasing levels of public reaction to immigration is a key part of this challenge. About 50% of Europeans and Americans see immigration as a problem rather than an opportunity, and this highly politicized public discontent leads to major social and political consequences.


In particular, public discontent with immigration manifests itself in terms of support for extreme-right parties (as well as center-right parties that own the issue in their manifestos such as the CDU in Germany) and high levels of Euroskepticism, as well as lower preference for welfare spending when people see out-groups as the recipients. It has

⁶ <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,652637,00.html>

⁷ "Der Kopf zählt, nicht das Tuch", Zeit 30/1998

also been shown to lead to actual violent intergroup conflicts across Europe,⁸ as well as increasing numbers of reports of discrimination,⁹ not to mention a constant debate on how to reconcile the perceived and actual cultural and value laden differences between natives and immigrants under the umbrella of tolerance, multiculturalism and a common European or American identity.

Table 1 Percentage of people who see immigration as an "important and extremely important threat"



Graph generated using Transatlantic Trends Topline Data from 2005-2006

Not surprisingly, this heated debate goes hand in hand with a major public opposition to immigration. About 50% of Europeans and Americans see immigration as a problem rather than an opportunity. Currently, about 70 percent of natives in these

⁸ For a review of the cases and explanations for conflict between immigrants and natives see Dancygier 2010.
⁹ see EU MIDIS

countries indicate that immigration into their respective countries should be further restricted. Table 1 illustrates the percentage of people who think immigration into their country is an important or very important threat in eight European states and the US, according to Transatlantic Trends Survey of 2005-2006. It is quite striking that, except for the Dutch, approximately 70 percent of all Europeans and Americans think that immigration constitutes a major threat for their country. Moreover, the levels of this perception of threat are quite uniform across all countries in the survey.

Faced with this conventional puzzle of overwhelming public opposition to immigration in Europe despite potential economic gains from it, scholars have focused on the realistic and symbolic considerations to explain why some people oppose immigration while others do not. And the conventional answer they provide suggests that immigration attitudes are predominantly informed by symbolic concerns of European publics such as prejudice, feelings of cultural threat, and protecting their cultural unity against multiculturalism (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sniderman et al. 2000; McLaren, 2003). Economic concerns, on the other hand, have been found to be minimally influential in informing opposition to immigration (Citrin et al. 1997; Lahav, 2004; and Givens, 2004).

In this dissertation, I take a step beyond this conventional answer by questioning one of the underlying but rarely contested assumptions of these explanations: the perception of immigrants as a homogeneous group. I argue that the exclusive focus on independent variables explaining immigration attitudes result in a lack of precision in understanding the very dependent variable, manifesting itself by the majority of studies examining immigration attitudes with a single survey question, “Do you support immigration?”

Are immigrants perceived as a homogeneous group by publics? Several studies indicate that people especially perceive immigrants from outside of the European Union as a major threat. An immigrant group that is consistently singled out in debates of integration and multiculturalism with its high visibility and different religious practices is Muslims. Surveys conducted between 2000 and 2010 indicate that about at least 25% of Germans hold exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants, and that this ratio is consistent across years, with increasing numbers of former Easterners opposing immigration.¹⁰ Furthermore, about 60% of random sampled 2,411 Germans polled as part of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung foundation asserted that four million Muslims in Germany should have their religious practices “significantly curbed.” However, even though there are clear indications of people’s inclination to separate immigrant groups from each other, little is said about if and how opposition to Muslim immigration differs from opposition to other groups.

Therefore, in this dissertation I suggest exploring people’s attitudes towards immigration and focus on Germany, with its substantial populations of several groups of immigrants. Why do some people support immigration, while others oppose it? Are some immigrant groups more preferred than others? Do people have the same reasons for their exclusivist attitudes towards all immigrant groups, or do their attitudes get informed differently for different immigrant groups?

I adopt an interdisciplinary approach to these questions combining conceptual and methodological approaches to out-group attitudes of multiple disciplines. In particular, I

¹⁰ For further information see European Social Survey and Transatlantic Trends survey immigration related polls

combine the political science approaches to immigration attitudes—analyzing them in relation to their political consequences with methods yielding to large scope generalizations- with theoretically more nuanced and, measurement wise, more sensitive approaches of social psychology yielding to causally sound results despite limitations in applicability in other contexts. With addressing immigration attitudes in conceptually and methodologically interdisciplinary and rigorous way, I will contribute to the growing literature on out-group relations with a refined understanding of the meaning and contents of the concept of “immigration” for the public.

This dissertation primarily aims to contribute to the creation of the missing interdisciplinary link between the literatures of social psychology and political science. In particular, I suggest a differentiation among immigrants when explaining public opinion towards immigration in Germany, a country where this differentiation is expected to prevail in the presence of immigrant groups with multiple ethnic and religious backgrounds. I also propose exposing this framework to a triangulation of methodological tests including cognitive interviews, a large-N survey and an experimental design with a representative sample. Borrowing from existing psychology literature, I expect people’s opinions to be primarily informed by “perceived cultural similarity,”\ when it comes to their attitudes toward different immigrants. I anticipate that incorporating this concept into my analysis will go a long way toward accounting for the inconsistent explanatory power of economic and symbolic considerations in the literature.

Furthermore, by looking at the effects of measurement biases, this study will add to our understanding of better ways of capturing attitudes about these sensitive topics. Finally, I will explore how my theoretical framework applies to attitudes towards EU integration

and enlargement in an attempt to show the actual implications of people's immigration attitudes on issues beyond inter-group relations.

1.1 ARGUMENT IN BRIEF:

In my dissertation, I explore how immigrant groups with different ethnic backgrounds are categorized by members of the host society and the implications of these classifications on attitudes towards immigration, and on support for the European integration. I challenge the assumption of people's perception of immigrants as a homogenous group as evidenced by the widespread use of a single survey question inquiring about their support for overall immigration. In particular, I argue that considering the existence of many different immigrant groups in a country, each different from one another and from the host society at different degrees, people are generally aware of these differences and use shortcuts to categorize them. Therefore, in order to understand the underlying mechanisms for public opposition to immigration, first these immigrant categorizations should be identified and the hierarchies of immigrants should be revealed.

In particular, I propose perceived cultural similarity as the main explanation for this hierarchical order of immigrant groups and lay out the cognitive and emotional micro mechanisms of its activation of cultural threat and prejudice. Specifically, I expect culturally similar perceived groups preferred more, and culturally different ones excluded more. I suggest ethnicity as an accessible cue for people to conceptualize this

categorization based on cultural similarity. In other words, clustered around ethnic groups, immigrants will be evaluated based on their cultural similarity to the host society in terms of their lifestyle, values, and religious practices. At this point, separating immigrant groups into different categories/ethnic groups is detrimental for understanding why some groups are favored or opposed more than the others, and I expect cultural similarity to account for this hierarchy.

In addition to illustrating how immigrants are categorized in people's mind and which ones are preferred more, differentiating them will serve a second purpose. I argue that the host society also has different reasons for opposing these different immigrant groups, which is also a function of cultural similarity, but this time in relation to its interaction with economic and symbolic concerns.

Specifically, I argue that when people consider members of culturally similar groups as a prospective immigrant, their attitudes will be informed by rational materially-based concerns such as their personal economic conditions, the state of the nation's economy, unemployment or the skill level of the immigrant. However, when culturally different groups are considered, I expect this dissimilarity to trigger symbolic threats and high levels of anxiety, thereby inhibiting materially based rational calculations. In particular, I argue that people's opposition to culturally different immigrant groups should be a function of their symbolic concerns such as prejudice and cultural threats these groups invoke.

While the primary purpose of this dissertation is to formulate a better explanation of immigration attitudes, there is a secondary measurement issue with which I am also concerned. I aim to show how immigration opinions are suppressed by social desirability

bias—the respondent’s aspiration to give socially desirable answers to the survey interviewer—leading to systematic biases by hiding the impact of prejudice and contributing to less differentiation across immigrant groups. Upon detecting and illustrating the impact of this bias, I hope to explore ways to eliminate it in order to provide a complete and refined picture of public opinion towards immigration.

Finally I will demonstrate how opposition to immigration relates to attitudes towards other policies, such as European integration. I argue that people’s immigration and EU attitudes are closely linked, and that for a nuanced understanding of this relationship people’s opposition towards immigration should be differentiated based on the ethnicity of the prospective immigrant group. And their propensity to respond to questions on the culturally threatening consequences of enlargement in a socially desirable way needs to be eliminated as well.

In addition to the interdisciplinary theoretical approach I bring in into answering opposition to immigration, I combine commonly used methodological approaches from multiple disciplines in empirically testing my assertions. Considering the cross-cutting queries about out-group attitudes across various disciplines, the lack of an in depth study combining the methods of these different approaches creates a major dearth in political behavior. To address this gap, I start with an exploratory qualitative approach to better understand what people understand from the word “immigrant” and how they are categorized using a method called in depth cognitive interviews.

Upon probing the plausibility of my assertions in terms of my theoretical framework, I empirically test them with a large N survey conducted with a random sample of Germans, allowing for a high external validity for my analysis. Using a multilevel

modeling framework to account for this heterogeneous understanding of immigrants, but also illustrating the contaminating impact of social desirability bias, I move to ways to address this question in a more internally valid causal structure. For this purpose, I implement an original experimental design, with better measurement of these groups, and a manipulation based differentiation of them, thereby also reducing the social desirability bias. In other words, this dissertation differs from previous studies in further creating and taking advantage of an interdisciplinary link both theoretically and methodologically.

1.2 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION:

This dissertation consists of seven additional chapters. In the current chapter I have presented the research question and briefly outlined my theory. In Chapter 2, I discuss the existing literature on immigration attitudes, social desirability bias, and Euroskepticism in more detail and explain how my study complements and expands on previous research.

In Chapter 3, I present my theory of the sources and determinants of public opposition to immigration and specifically the hierarchical ranking of immigrant groups. For this, I will illustrate the main and interactive effect I expect cultural similarity to have on immigration attitudes. Next, I lay out my theory in greater detail and derive testable hypotheses about the hierarchical perception of immigration and why economic and symbolic concerns should work differently for groups at different levels of this hierarchy. Subsequently, I lay out the ways in which I expect the social desirability bias to operate in

relation to attitudes towards immigration. Finally, I will present the implications I expect to find in relationship to attitudes towards the European Union.

Chapter 4 presents a preliminary analysis probing the plausibility of my assertions generated in chapter 3. In order to achieve that, I illustrate the results of the cognitive interviews I conducted in Berlin with 27 Germans both from former East and West. By asking follow up questions after the important survey questions, these interviews designed to understand the overlap between the measures of concepts researchers use and the respondents have in mind when they consider them. I use this method to explore the meaning of immigration, the way immigrants are categorized, the adjectives associated with them and the extent to which respondents feel culturally similar to these groups.

Upon exploring the meaning of immigration for Germans and the ways they are categorized, in Chapter 5 I present the results of the first set of statistical tests of the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3. Upon restating the hypotheses, I discuss the coding and operationalization procedures using German General Social Survey (ALLBUS), questioning Germans regarding their attitudes towards the immigration of different groups of immigrants. Following the description of the multi level model I am specifying to analyze this data, I present the results of these tests and discuss their implications for the theoretical framework.

Chapter 6 presents an experimental research design conducted in Germany with a representative sample of 208 respondents to account for the shortcomings of the existing data sources both in terms of people's heterogeneous attitudes towards immigrants and the impact of social desirability bias. Instead of the immigrant categories employed by the ALLBUS survey, this experiment inquires about categories and stereotypes prominent in

German society, which I obtained from in-depth cognitive interviews. Also instead of asking respondents about all immigrant groups at the expense of increasing the impact of social desirability, through experimental manipulation every respondent is questioned about her attitudes towards a single immigrant group. By priming economic and symbolic concerns separately, this experiment will also demonstrate the differences between opposition to different immigrants ensuring better causality.

Finally, the last empirical chapter explores the implications of my theories of the non-homogeneous perception of immigrant groups and social desirability bias I illustrated in earlier chapters on EU integration and enlargement attitudes. With a separate battery of EU attitude items I added to my survey experiment, I examine to what extent people's immigration and Euroskepticism are linked together and the additional information differentiating prospective immigrant groups provides. To be able to better account for social desirability bias regarding the role of immigration on EU attitudes, I also employ a "list experiment". By asking respondents to express their agreement with a list of items rather than specific items, this commonly used unobtrusive tests measures sensitive concepts associated with out-group attitudes, such as blatant prejudice. I apply this method in illustrating the symbolic threats immigration pose in relation to EU integration, and illustrate the impact of concerns about culturally threatening consequences immigration as grounds for opposing EU enlargement.

The last chapter concludes the dissertation with a summary of the theoretical and empirical findings and a discussion of their implications for both academic research and policymakers. I also discuss the limitations of this study and the possible ways in which

the project can be extended in the future in order to enhance our knowledge and understanding of the phenomena in question.

2.0 CHAPTER 2: WHAT HAS BEEN SAID SO FAR ON IMMIGRATION

ATTITUDES?

2.1 THE EXISTING LITERATURE IN RELATION TO THIS PROJECT

In the introduction, I laid out the puzzle and the main questions this dissertation will address differently than the existing ways. I also hinted where and how I expected to find these answers. In this chapter, I will lay out the scholarly debate on immigration attitudes in detail, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses, illustrate the ways in which my proposed research diverges from existing research, and fill in the gaps in this literature.

I will first approach this literature in terms of its similarities and differences from different realms of public opinion in order to illustrate how, in particular, out-group attitudes compare to the general framework of attitudinal research. By doing this, I hope to demonstrate how the literature of out-group attitudes benefited from this larger framework. Yet, I will also point out to the ways in which this specific literature was constrained by its general assumptions, and specifically evaluate the consequences of some of its relatively superficial approaches. Finally, I will propose a mechanism to address these issues with a special consideration on improving existing measurement issues.

Therefore, I will evaluate the scholarly research on immigration attitudes in both political science and social psychology. With this I hope to lay out the theoretical and methodological approaches of both in understanding opposition to immigration. I will review this literature with a specific focus of their strengths and potential in addressing various smaller parts of this puzzle and then merge them in my theoretical framework in an attempt to improve on their limitations. In doing this, I will specifically focus on two dimensions of this puzzle: the measurement of attitudes towards immigration, and issue specific measurement issues biasing the existing results.

Finally, I argue below that the remedy I suggest for curing some of these measurement issues has considerable implications for estimating the effect of immigration attitudes on other attitudes and policy preferences such as support for extreme right parties, income redistribution/welfare spending, and support for globalization. Of those multiple public policies immigration attitudes are shown to be linked to, I will focus on public support for European Union integration and enlargement and illustrate the implications of my theoretical framework on this issue area. I will therefore provide a review of the literature on public opinion towards the European Union before addressing the potential contributions of my approach to immigration attitudes.

2.2 SCHOLARLY WORK ON IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES IN RELATION TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC OPINION LITERATURE

2.2.1 Economic and Symbolic Considerations compared

In answering why people oppose immigration, and in its focus on various explanatory variables to explain it, the literature on immigration attitudes shares many similarities with other areas of public opinion. As in the cases of voting behavior and political participation, economic approaches appear important to theorizing on this topic. Existing literature on comparative studies of public opinion illustrate that self-interest or instrumental calculations are an important element of the individual belief system and are expected to influence people's attitudes.

Sears and Funk (1990) define self interest as “the short to medium term impact of an issue on the material wellbeing of the individual's own personal life”. Applied to immigration and framed as “modernization losers theory” (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), the proponents of this approach suggest that those whose material losses exceed the benefits of immigration will be more likely to have restricting attitudes towards immigration.

According to this model, being unemployed, belonging to the working class or having low education are proxies for pointing out “losers” of modernization. In view of that, those groups are the segments of society most prone to competition in the labor markets due to the arrival of the immigrants. For instance, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find that low skilled or low educated workers are more likely to hold restrictive attitudes

towards out-groups due to labor market competition they have to endure. Framed as “realistic threat theory”, literature in social psychology (Coser 1956, Duckitt 1994) also explored the impact of these considerations but found rather limited explanatory power when their models controlled for more symbolic considerations (Zarate et al. 2004; Schneider 2008).

Following the limited explanatory power of individual self interest variables, scholars turned to sociotropic considerations as a way to understand people’s opposition to immigration. First formalized by Kinder and Kiewet (1981), these considerations are based largely on national interest rather than individual self interest. Applied to immigration literature, this would suggest that people who are concerned about macroeconomic indicators in their countries—especially high unemployment rates—are likely to have more restrictive opinions on immigration.

As in the other areas of public opinion research, sociotropic considerations are also found to be influential in understanding people’s attitudes towards out-groups (Givens and Luedtke 2004, Lahav 2004). For instance, Citrin and his collaborators illustrate in a series of articles that in the United States, personal economic circumstances play little role in opinion formation, but beliefs about the state of the national economy, anxiety over taxes, and generalized feelings about major immigrant groups (Asians and Hispanics in this case) are primary determinants of opposition to immigration (Citrin et al. 1997). Lahav (2004) and Givens (2004), on the other hand, apply this approach to the European context and find that people’s perception of the national economy has significant effect on their attitudes toward immigration.

While having these similarities, public opinion towards immigration also differs from public opinion about other topics in significant ways. First of all, the issue of unstable, inconsistent or non attitudes addressed by Converse is less of an issue for immigration attitudes (Converse 1964). Lahav (2004) illustrates that public attitudes are informed, stable, and not randomly biased when it comes to the subject of immigration, based on data from member states of the European Union. She further argues that, as opposed to other areas of public opinion regarding the issues related to the EU, there is a predictable and systematic attachment to immigration issues that expose a European public fairly informed on the issue (Lahav 2004).

While unstable attitudes seem less of a challenge for immigration attitudes, there are additional challenges specific to this research realm. The second difference relates to this issue, which is about overcoming difficulties in revealing the individual's existing attitudes on sensitive issues and related measurement biases. This challenge is similar to the literature on tolerance and prejudice in that, in order to deal with issues of social desirability, researchers search for subtle ways of tapping these attitudes. Yet, as will be addressed in detail in the following section, these attempts remain limited, thus leaving their conclusions vulnerable to threats posed by social desirability biases.

The third and more visible difference emerges from the limited explanatory power of economic models to account for public opposition to immigration, which in turn justifies a move to social psychology approaches on inter-group relations. This line of theorizing is quite similar to symbolic politics approach of Sears and Funk (1990) at its departure—owing to its emphasis on cognitive and affective considerations—except it delves deeper into the ideas of national identity, cultural threat, and prejudice.

The theory of social psychology that is applied most often to explain attitudes towards immigration is social identity theory. Accordingly, social groups provide their members with an identification of themselves in social terms (Taijfel and Turner 1986). These identifications are, to a very large extent, relational and comparative: they define the individual as similar to or different from, as “better” or “worse” than, members of other groups (Hogg 2000). To maintain a positive social identity the in-group tries to perceive itself as better than the out-group, a process that carries an explicit assumption of out-group degradation and bias. This is the very mechanism by which attitudes towards immigration are expected to be informed.

One way scholars have attempted to tap this in-group identification, which is expected to lead to out-group bias, is through people’s identification with a national identity. In trying to explain attitudes about immigration in European Union member states, Luedtke (2005) found that the role of a strong identification with the nation state as opposed to Europe is the strongest predictor for opposition to immigration. Confirming these findings, in their analysis of individual and county-level aggregate data from 20 European countries, Sides and Citrin (2007) show a strong effect of cultural and national identities, and a preference of cultural unity as opposed to a weaker effect of economic threat on public opinion towards immigration.

In their refined approach to the role of nationalism, Blank and Schmidt proposed a differentiation between feelings of nationalism and patriotism (Blank and Schmidt 2003). In fact, an earlier attempt to conceptualize pride as a different concept than exclusionist nationalism was one by Sniderman and Piazza (2002). In their analysis of prejudice among the African American community in the United States, authors found that while African-

American pride encourages African-Americans to be more responsive to the needs and interests of fellow African-Americans, it does not lead them to be intolerant and prejudiced against non-African-Americans. This differentiation was even more pronounced in Blank and Schmidt's (2003) work about Germany. The authors illustrate that both in East and West Germany, while nationalism—an exclusivist belief in national superiority—was associated with greater intolerance towards minorities, patriotism—pride in being a member of the national group—actually predicted higher levels of tolerance/lesser levels of out group devaluation.

The second way of conceptualization of group identification is through the idea of cultural threat. As a natural outgrowth of the merger of social identity theory and self-categorization theory, people who feel that their culture is threatened are expected to show hostile and exclusionist attitudes toward out-groups. Theoretically, this is due to their desire to protect their community from a “symbolic invasion.” McLaren (2003) and Kessler and Freeman (2005) find evidence that people who feel threatened by the immigrants culturally are much more likely to oppose immigration than those who do not, controlling for the effect of utilitarian and sociotropic considerations.

Closely related to the cultural threat perspective, an extensive literature evaluates the role of prejudice on attitudes towards immigration. Prejudice as defined as the “readiness to respond negatively to members of a group by virtue of their membership of the group,” is expected to lead to anti-immigrant sentiment (Sniderman et al. 2000, Kinder and Sanders 1996). In addition to a blatant prejudice, scholars applied the idea of subtle prejudice in the case of the United States to Western Europe and suggest the use of a subtle prejudice scale. They illustrate that, just like in the case of the US, given the availability of

a valid justification subtly prejudiced people in Europe are as restrictive as bigots towards immigration (Pettigrew 1997).

2.2.2 The Assumption of Immigrants Being Perceived as a Homogeneous Group

As the literature review illustrates repeatedly, perceived symbolic/cultural threat—motivated by social identity concerns—provides a better explanation for exclusionary behavior regarding immigration than any other theory. Recent theorizing attempted to point out the different ways these symbolic concerns can be differentiated and can have separate effects on immigration attitudes. Yet, efforts to differentiate across multiple symbolic considerations of the host society have not yet spilled over to a differentiated analysis of immigrants, and this is where this project contributes to the literature on immigration in a major way.

Part of the reason why many studies submitted this idea that immigrants are perceived as a homogeneous group is due to the limitations in data resources. Most surveys only inquire about immigration attitudes in general without differentiating across immigrants. However, even when disaggregated items are available, researchers often reaggregate them into an overall scale of immigration attitudes as argued by Ford (2010), which is only justifiable if we can accept that these items are just different measures of the same underlying construct. While consistent with the out-group homogeneity approach of social psychology (Mullen and Hu 1989), this still is a dubious assumption given the historic diversity of migration flows in these recipient European countries also evidenced by a number of scholars (Sides and Citrin, Ivarsflaten 2005).

In fact, of the few studies that made this differentiation, the results mostly suggest an awareness of such diversity as well as an explicit differentiation in people's attitudes. One such comparison is made between immigrants from EU member states and non-EU/Third World immigrants by Echabe and Castro (1996). In their analysis of reactions to immigrants in Spain, authors find not only that non-EU/Third World immigrants are much more negatively evaluated than immigrants from EU member states, but also different dimensions were accountable for their negative evaluation than those of EU member state immigrants (Echabe and Castro, 1996). Accordingly, Spaniards have stronger emotional reactions such as contempt, rage, and envy towards Third World immigrants than towards European Union immigrants.

In another analysis of British attitudes towards immigration, Dustman and Preston (2007) illustrate that the relative importance of the three factors—namely welfare, labor, and racial concerns—differs according to the ethnic origin of the immigrant population concerned. In particular they suggest that the dominant racial factor is particularly strong for the Asian and West Indian population, much less strong for the European population, and does not have any explanatory power for Australians and New Zealanders (Dustman and Preston 2007). A more recent study of immigration attitudes in Britain suggest that there is a clear hierarchy in people's attitudes towards immigrants which manifests itself as a preference for white groups (Ford 2010).

Sniderman et al. (2000, 2004) explore the role of prejudice on out-group attitudes and also differentiate between different immigrant groups in multiple European countries. While they find almost no differences across immigrant groups in the case of Italy, they do find some differences across immigrant groups in the Netherlands. Still, they suggest that

perceived threat to Dutch culture is the strongest predictor of hostility whether or not the member of the minority group is Muslim. One difference of this result from the previous ones is that cultural threat explains hostility to minorities in general, but its effect on the question of immigration is not explored, even though one would expect them to be closely correlated.

While limited in number, these studies make a case for a differentiated understanding of immigration. In other words, this evidence is consistent with my expectation regarding immigration positions being affected by the heterogeneity of immigrant groups and suspicions regarding the possible biases ignoring this heterogeneity would introduce. Nevertheless, while illustrating this potential heterogeneity, these studies do not explore the reasons or the consequences of this heterogeneity in a systematic way, which is what I aim to accomplish with this project.

Therefore, the first contribution of this project therefore lays in the way it addresses these potential problems related to this homogeneity assumption. First, I hope to explain how immigrants are positioned in a person's mental map followed by trying to understand the reasons for this placement/hierarchy of immigrants. In doing this, I will seek to answer the following questions: Who are these relevant immigrant groups and how are they categorized in people's mind? After a long experience with the influx of diverse group of immigrants, especially to the former West, do Germans differentiate across immigrant groups or do they see them as an aggregated, homogeneous group? And what accounts for the categorization of immigrants from most to least preferred? This way I will be able to illustrate that not all immigration is unwanted, and that some immigrant groups—those that come less to mind as immigrants—are in fact more favored than other groups.

My contribution to the literature however, does not stop at addressing this differentiation/categorization of immigrant groups in Germany. I further investigate different causal mechanisms this categorization triggers in informing people's opposition to these groups. In other words, upon categorizing them, do people oppose these groups due to the same reasons? Or are there different mechanisms in place for different groups that remain hidden if immigrants are analyzed as a homogeneous group? This particular query will also elucidate the actual importance of symbolic variables and economic variables in relation to different immigrant groups. This way I will illustrate that the impact of symbolic variables shown in the existing studies is indeed inflated once all immigrant groups are taken into consideration.

In the theory section I will address these questions in greater detail and at the end of the empirical analysis, I will be able to point to better refined models and models that account for immigration attitudes for every immigrant group—not only mostly thought ones.

2.3 THE IGNORED THREAT OF SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS (SDB)

The previous section illustrated the literature on immigration attitudes, the way opposition to immigration has been measured, and important factors accounting for this opposition. In an attempt to illustrate this dissertation's contribution, it also proposed an improved way of measuring people's exclusion of out-groups based on the way these groups are categorized. This project takes a second direction in addressing another measurement issue inherent to the existing literature.

As mentioned earlier, one major challenge of the researchers focusing on public opinion towards immigration is overcoming difficulties in revealing existing attitudes on sensitive issues and related measurement biases. In both survey and experimental research, more often than not respondents are assumed to reveal their true attitudes when answering questions. Yet, the validity of this assumption is only rarely challenged. Especially considering the sensitive nature of concepts related to the measurement of immigration and symbolic variables that heavily motivate opposition to immigration, this assumption seems highly dubious.

The question then becomes "Are people really willing to admit that they dislike certain out-groups today just as they did couple decades ago?" And if not, is this likely to pose any threats to the validity of findings of the existing literature. In addressing this very question, Sears et al. (2000) suggest the days of revealing blatant racist attitudes are over—and social desirability issues should be extensively addressed to achieve a reliable model of immigration. This is precisely where the second focus of this dissertation project lays in. However, before illustrating the ways in which I hope to improve this measurement issue,

it is necessary to illustrate what social desirability exactly means and how the existing literature has dealt with it.

Marlowe and Crowne define social desirability bias as the need of people to respond to the survey questions in culturally sanctioned ways (Marlowe and Crowne 1964). In other words, respondents are so concerned to “look good” either to the researcher or the interviewer that they distort their answers to meet this goal (Paulhus 1991). The main threat socially desirable responding poses is that instead of revealing their true attitudes, respondents provide answers they believe to be socially desirable because of societal pressures to conform to particular social norms (Heerwig and McCabe 2008). This kind of response has found to have biasing effects on research on sexual conduct, church attendance, voter turnout and income as well as socially sensitive topics such as racial preferences, out-group attitudes and prejudice. (For a review of these see Newhagen 2004, and Heerwig and McCabe 2008.)

Social desirability bias takes on different directions for different topics and sometimes even for different demographics. Scholars illustrate that respondents who rely on socially- desirable responding—mainly due to their need for approval—tend to underreport their income, illicit drug use, abortion, prejudiced attitudes, and overstate their voter participation, racial tolerance, and religious attendance (Paulhus 1991). For example, while female respondents tend to underreport frequency of sexual conduct, research illustrated that male respondents tend to over report it. Scholars also suggest that educated respondents are more aware of the societal norms than the uneducated. In order to be placed in a favorable light in the eyes of the researcher, they try to appear “well adjusted, unprejudiced, rational, open minded, and democratic” and thus tend to resort to socially

desirable responding more often than the uneducated (Jackman 1973; Phillips and Clancy 1991, Heerwig and McCabe 2008).

When it comes to the immigration attitudes, many scholars argue that survey research on socially sensitive topics like race, minority attitudes, and prejudice suffer disproportionately from socially desirable reporting. This is mainly due to people's reluctance to respond to openly racist questions affirmatively (Sigall and Page 1971; Kuklinski and Cobb 1997, Heerwig and McCabe 2008). Many studies point to the possibility that social desirability may overshadow their results.

Regarding out-group attitudes, the impacts of social desirability bias has been addressed by utilizing additional scales to measure sensitive subjects such as race and prejudice. A line of research first initiated by Pettigrew and his collaborates tried to minimize social desirability bias on measuring prejudice. They suggested that questions measuring blatant prejudice required respondents to openly accept racism and therefore proposed a new concept called subtle prejudice. They suggested that, those who find it hard to agree with the blatant prejudice items have an easier time accepting the subtle prejudice items.

For instance, a “subtle” prejudice question would ask:

Do you agree with the following? It is just a matter of some people not trying hard enough. If West Indians would only try harder they could be as well off as British people. (strongly agree to strongly disagree)

On the other hand a “blatant” prejudice question would ask:

Do you agree with the following? West Indians come from less able races and this explains why they are not as well off as most British people. (strongly agree to strongly disagree)

Furthermore, when their out-group attitudes are questioned, given that they find valid justifications, the subtle prejudiced people signify preferences as discriminatory as blatantly prejudiced ones (Pettigrew et al 2007).

Nevertheless, despite major threats this bias poses, attempts to examine the actual impact of this bias remains limited. Thus, a reliable analysis of immigration attitudes necessitates a specific focus on the existence and implications of social desirability bias. Only then can the validity of the suggested relationships and findings can be assured. This bias may affect the causal relationships in our models due to people's reluctance to accept being prejudiced or opposing immigration. Most importantly, this bias may prevent people from revealing that they have different attitudes towards different immigrants, which is the core argument of this project. Therefore, it is essential to address this bias and illustrate the ways in which it affects immigration attitudes.

The first step in doing this should be first to establish that there is a social desirability bias effect on immigration attitudes, then to illustrate the magnitude of this effect, and finally to suggest a new method that would eliminate this effect. My second major contribution to the study of immigration attitudes lies in the way I address the impact of this bias in a way never done before: by bringing in novel methods from the social psychology literature, such as using a social desirability scale and employing randomized experiments. I suspect this bias to contaminate explanations of immigration attitudes in general, and the differentiation of immigrants in particular.

2.4 THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES AND EU ATTITUDES

Immigration attitudes are shown to have important implications on policy preferences on a number of critical issues, such as voting behavior especially related to extreme right parties and European referenda (Givens, 2004; Hix, 2006), welfare/social spending, public attitudes towards globalization (Scheve and Slaughter 2001), tolerance and discrimination (Dancygier 2010), as well as European Union/integration related policies. Therefore, upon laying out a heterogeneous model of immigration attitudes which contends the undifferentiated perception of immigration attitudes, and illustrating the impact of social desirability bias on this model, I will turn to the possible implications of my findings on EU attitudes. Given the critical role of immigration attitudes in explaining people's preferences regarding the EU, there is reason to believe that a heterogeneous understanding of immigration attitudes may improve our understanding of EU attitudes. These implications may manifest themselves in terms of providing an improved causal story both because of the ethnicity of the immigrant in question being brought in, and removal of the shadow of social desirability bias.

Following the dearth of studies on EU public opinion in the early years of integration, the increasing need to replace the so called "permissive consensus" with a politics more responsive to the public led to a burgeoning literature in the last decade. Theorizing of a self-interest model of public opinion emerges first by Gabel and Palmer (Gabel and Palmer 1995). The self interest approach emphasizes the role of utilitarian cost-benefit calculations in forming people's preferences (Gabel 1998, Dalton and

Eichenberg 1998, Tucker et al. 2002). Many scholars analyzed people's support for the EU focusing on the individual level as well as national level economic variables, the role of intra EU trade, possible benefits from EU structural and Common Agricultural Policy funds, as well as benefiting from the new employment opportunities (Gabel 1998a, Eichenberg and Dalton 1993, Gabel and Palmer 1995). This research illustrated that income, education, and occupation play an important role in informing individuals' preferences regarding the EU. The reason for that was, for those individuals who are better off economically, the EU project is a much more beneficial and desirable process than for the poorer, less educated, and lower class. People's perceptions regarding how much their country benefited from being a member of the EU is also shown to have important impact on EU attitudes.

Another line of theorizing focused on the more symbolic, value-based and identity related explanations of support for the EU. This work has emphasized the role of national perspectives (Deflem and Pampel 1997), ideology (Marks and Hooghe 2004), religion (Nelsen and Guth) and xenophobia (De Master and Le Roy 2000, McLaren 2000). Some of those scholars stressing the role of symbolic variables suggest that, when people feel threats to the nation-state or to its cultural integrity, they develop reservations against the EU (Christin and Trechsel 2002, McLaren 2002). These scholars measure this feeling of "cultural threat" via variables capturing exclusionary attitudes towards out-group. As they argue, an exclusivist behavior is actually a manifestation of protection of the in-group as an extension of social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Seeing immigration attitudes as distinct from national identity, De Vreese and Boomgarden (2005) further explicate this argument by suggesting that Europeans holding negative attitudes towards immigrants will

show greater readiness to categorize others in general, which is likely to yield unfavorable evaluations of these out-groups. Even though the exact reasoning is not clarified, immigration attitudes appear to be the most important predictor of support for the EU (McLaren 2002, Marks and Hooghe 2000, de Vreese and Boomgarden 2005).

These results are consistent with studies that model support for EU enlargement in that, while economic considerations play a minor role in informing attitudes towards enlargement, immigration attitudes and perceptions of cultural threat have a major explanatory power (Freeman, McLaren 2007). Theoretically, it is intuitive how fear of out-groups leads to fear of EU enlargement. Yet EU integration, with all the different issue areas it encompasses, is a process which includes but goes beyond inclusion of new member states into the union. Hence, the causal link between immigration attitudes and integration is less direct. It is either that people only think of immigration via enlargement when they are asked about EU integration, or that they take the EU as a proxy of globalization in a way that threatens the unity of their community culturally, and fear of immigration is a proxy for a more overarching attitude. Unfortunately, with the assumption of a homogeneous understanding of immigration by the public, the existing literature does not address this question adequately, which is what the following theoretical chapter hopes to explicate in detail.

3.0 CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 HETEROGENEITY OF IMMIGRANTS

The departure point for this dissertation is the skepticism that, for the majority of people, immigrants are a homogeneous group. Like many other European states, Germany, and especially the former West, has a long experience with the influx of immigrants. Historically, the flow of immigration into Germany was diverse right from the beginning. Aside from the earlier immigration waves of ethnic Germans, Russians and Jews before World War II, since the late 50s Italians, followed by Spaniards, Greeks, Turks and Yugoslavians in the 60s arrived in Germany as the so called “Guest Workers”. A more recent wave of immigrants arrived in late 80s and 90s from Eastern Europe and Russia and most recently from Romania.

As a result, the current citizenship breakdown of ten largest groups of foreigners in Germany is as follows:

Table 2 Citizenship of Foreigners ¹¹ As of 31 December 2008

Turkey	1,688,370
Italy	523,162
Poland	393,848
Greece	287,187
Croatia	223,056
Russian Federation	188,253
Serbia and Montenegro (former)	177,330
Austria	175,434
Bosnia and Herzegovina	156,804
Serbia	136,152

As evidenced by Table 3.1, currently in Germany there are a variety of groups of immigrants.

In addition to their objectively large numbers, consistent reference to these groups in the media and by policy makers is made in relation to their different characteristics, unemployment rates, and levels of integration into the German society. More specifically, certain groups of immigrants –especially those of Muslim origin- have been depicted as harder to integrate with lower education and employment rates than the rest of the immigrants.ⁱ As Tucci illustrates not only are immigrants in Germany subjected to negative stereotyping due to the ongoing political debate on how much immigration Germany can tolerate, but they have also suffered outright racist attacks on repeated occasions over the last 15 years. The victims of these attacks have also been ethnically differentiated, with

¹¹ Table generated using the population statistics of German Statistics Bureau
<http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/>

hundreds of Turkish immigrants and asylum seekers being victimized by severe hate crimes by right-wing extremist groups (Bade 1994).

Historical and current depictions of immigrants aside, several sociologists and psychologists argue that European populations are aware of major ethnic and religious differences across immigrants and allow this differentiation inform their diverse preferences. For instance, Wasmer and Koch argue that in developing attitudes toward equal civil rights for immigrants, the German population makes clear distinctions between different groups of foreigners, favoring Italians over Turks and Turks over Asylum Seekers. In the US, Brader et al. illustrate that people are much more inclined to perceive harm and less inclined to support immigration of Hispanics as opposed to Russians. Ford illustrates that for the British, there is a hierarchy of immigrants, which also informs people's attitudes towards these groups.

The social psychology literature on out-group homogeneity bias suggests that out-groups are seen more similar to each other than they actually are. However, this does not suggest what qualifies a group an out-group. Can all the immigrants be considered a single homogeneous out-group as is most often assumed? Can Germans be completely unaware of the diverse ethnic, national, and racial characteristics of immigrants arriving into their country?

I suggest that, while out-group homogeneity bias exists, ethnic groups constitute separate units of out-groups. While one may expect the majority to see a Polish immigrant as similar to other Poles, it is a gross exaggeration to suggest that Germans see Polish immigrants as very similar to Turks and Italians. " Following the idea that ethnic and racial cues are potent and affect ridden symbols in many societies" (Mackie and Smith

2003; Sears 2001), I argue that different immigrants trigger distinct reasoning mechanisms for exclusion, and that the ethnic background of the immigrant *does matter*. In order to explain this differentiation I will borrow the idea of “cultural similarity” from this literature and apply it to the German context.

3.2 CULTURAL SIMILARITY

Attempts for a heterogeneous understanding of immigrants are very limited in the literature. Most studies explain attitudes towards immigration in general, without specifying the ethnic background or the nationality of the immigrants. I argue that this lack of specificity runs two serious risks. In terms of measurement, what scholars have submitted as general explanations of immigration attitudes may well be a function of the dilution of the dependent variable that occurs when all immigrants are bundled together.

In terms of theory, when asked about their position on immigration, people may be thinking mostly about certain immigrants having certain concerns in mind, and less about others about which they have different (or no) concerns. Intuitively, one would expect such a differentiation in people’s cognitive thinking; it is possible that attitudes toward a certain group of immigrants are informed by one set of considerations while attitudes toward another immigrant groups are informed by a different set. In fact, of the few studies that made this differentiation, the results suggest the existence of such a differentiation in people’s attitudes.

I suggest that part of the reason for the findings in the literature illustrating large effects for perceived cultural threat and prejudice could partly result from this lack of differentiation across immigrant groups. In other words, when asked about immigration attitudes while researchers ask about all immigrant groups, most respondents think about a particular immigrant group. As cognitive interviews will illustrate below in chapter 4, these groups do differ from one individual to the other, with people thinking most frequently about immigrants who are perceived most culturally different from the majority. This omission is problematic for the competing explanations of the immigration attitudes and hints at major unreliability in the findings of extant research.

Instead, I propose that different immigrant groups will evoke opposition from the majority population due to different reasons. Culturally similar immigrant groups, such as EU immigrants or East European immigrants that are thought of secondarily as an “immigrant,” are omitted from the explanations inadvertently. I therefore suggest that a systematic bias results to the extent that symbolic threat is less of an issue for these groups.

In order to explain the differentiation of immigrants, I use the concept of “perceived cultural similarity”. The idea of “cultural similarity” has been extensively employed in multiple disciplines for explaining attitudes on issues such as perception of consumer goods, intercultural friendship formation, foreign policy actions, and tourists’ intentions to visit a country (Morris and Harraq 1990; Hunter and Walker, 1996; Geva and Hanson, 1999; Kudo and Simkin, 2003; Neg et al. 2007). The most relevant literature for immigration attitudes is the applied social psychology literature on intercultural relationships between immigrants and members of host societies.

Several social psychology approaches analyze out-group attitudes with a potential to illuminate multiple dimensions of public attitudes towards immigration and the basis for categorizing immigrants. The intergroup bias refers generally to the systematic tendency to evaluate one's own membership group (the in-group) or its members more favorably than a non-membership group (the out-group) or its members. And the basis for this unfavorable opinion is grounded in the differences from the in-group (Bryne 1971; Schwarz et al.1989). Therefore, taking a step beyond the dichotomous in-group vs. out-group categorization, in the presence of multiple out-groups, it is intuitive to suggest their categorization based on these perceived differences. And it is also sensible to expect more exclusion of culturally different groups, compared to similar groups.

This may seem contradictory with the main out-group homogeneity-variability bias theory in that individuals tend to perceive out-groups as similar to each other (more homogeneous) and their own group more heterogeneous. However further research in this literature showed that perceptions of variability of out-groups is contingent on a number of factors such as the relative group size and group contact (Mullen and Hu 1989). One of the more important factors that affect this variability is the perception of threat: groups that pose a higher level of cultural threat will be perceived in a more differentiated way (Stephan 1977). In other words, the expectation that the host society will single out culturally different groups and place them in a different position than the groups that do not pose such threat is consistent with this theory.

Social psychologists also focus extensively on the effects of intercultural relationships on personality and individual's emotions within the framework of acculturation attitudes. The majority of this work investigates the role of perceived cultural

similarity on immigrants' adjustment and integration into the host society (review Rohman et al. 2008). This line of work illustrates that immigrants' country of origin and how differently they perceive themselves culturally from the society they are living in has major impact in their willingness to integrate and ease of interaction with the members of host society (Redmond and Bunyi 1993; Galchenko and van de Vijver 2003).

While these studies evince that cultural similarity is influential in shaping exclusionary attitudes, research on more politically relevant attitudes among members of host societies remains more limited. One exception is Kosic et al.'s (2005) analysis illustrating how perceived differences lead to more assimilationist than integrationist immigration policy preferences.

Two recent political science studies address the heterogeneity of immigration attitudes with large-N survey samples and hint at cultural similarity as a possible explanation. In his analysis of British attitudes towards immigration, Ford illustrates that there is an ethnically based hierarchy of immigrant in which culturally proximate, white groups are less opposed than more distinct non-white groups (Ford 2010). Americans also differentiate across immigrants and evaluate culturally similar white groups more favorably than Hispanic groups (Brader et al 2009).

Hence, I argue that people are aware of the differences across immigrants and associate different levels of threat with their arrival or existence; this is the basis for the hierarchical ordering informing their exclusivist attitudes. Therefore, perceived similarity – defined the out group's perceived sameness to the in-group in terms of culture, appearance, lifestyle, mentality, values, religious orientation, and family life – is the basis of this categorization. I therefore expect the cultural similarity assessments of individuals

(as summarized in the ethnic background of immigrants) to influence both the cognitive and affective component of attitudes, with different groups triggering different levels of anxiety. In other words, I argue that cultural difference acts as a trigger that leads to more exclusionary attitudes.

Therefore, I suggest that in the presence of multiple immigrant groups, the immigrant group in question is first placed on a map by the individual based on how similar it is to the host society. Based on this placement, the individual articulates the reasons for his or her position on the issue namely immigration. Thus,

Hypothesis 1: *The less culturally similar a given immigrant group is perceived, the more an individual will oppose immigration by members of that group.*

One may argue that rather than cultural difference causing feelings of cultural threat, the relationship can be reversed such that a general sense of cultural agitation and “invasion” may instigate and lead individuals to view immigrants differently. For instance, Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) argue that exaggerating group differences in terms of culture is an expression of subtle prejudice.

Coenders et al, illustrate with a rigorous statistical analysis that they are actually different dimensions of out-group attitudes. This is consistent with the theoretical framework I suggest in that, “perceiving cultural differences may be a *conditio sine qua non* for forms of prejudice, but perceptions of cultural differences *per se* are not an

expression of prejudice (Coenders et al.2001). Furthermore, expressing an evaluation of difference can merely be an observation of objective reality.

I argue that this is unlikely both theoretically and methodologically. First, even people who are not culturally threatened by immigrants may evaluate their perceived similarity. In other words, people's perceptions of differences across immigrants can simply be the observation of actual differences. Also, the perception that a group poses cultural threat by definition requires an initial evaluation of cultural differences. In their critique of Pettigrew and Meertens (1995), Coenders et al. (2001), illustrate with a rigorous statistical analysis that cultural difference perceptions and prejudice are statistically and substantively different dimensions of out-group attitudes. Moreover, they argue that "perceiving cultural differences may be a *conditio sine qua non* for forms of prejudice, but perceptions of cultural differences *per se* are not an expression of prejudice (Coenders et al.2001).

Furthermore, empirically, if cultural threat were to come first in this relationship, this would lead to seeing every immigrant group culturally different and opposing them equally. The reason why some groups pose more threat than the others stems from difference evaluations. The following parts of this analysis will clearly illustrate that this is not the case and that cultural similarity perceptions differ from one group to another.

In addition to previous studies hinting at the direct effect of cultural similarity in informing immigration attitudes (Ford 2010), I suggest that "perceived cultural similarity" may also play an interactive role. In particular, I propose that the cultural threat and anxiety triggering effects of cultural similarity or difference assessments may interfere with

the rationally calculated, sober reactions to immigration. In other words, perceived differences may also act as a suppressor of the effects of cost-benefit calculations or evaluation of more realistic threats in opposing immigration.

Three different approaches within the social psychology literature dealing with cultural similarity provide some insights into this indirect effect. The first, integrated threat theory, suggests that cultural dissimilarity is one of the major sources of perception of high level of threat (Rokeach 1960, Stephan and Stephan 2000). Scholars also illustrate that this high level of threat is likely to become a trigger for stereotyping and higher levels of prejudice (Stephan and Renfro, 2002)

A second approach, the concordance model of acculturation on the other, illustrates that the perception of cultural dissimilarity instigates different acculturation attitudes as the different groups are seen as hard to integrate into the majority culture and thus pose a cultural threat (Rohman et al. 2006, 2008). In their study with 202 German host society members and 151 Turkish and Italian immigrants, Rohman et al. (2006) illustrate with a path analysis how perceived cultural distance leads to different levels of cultural threat. They show that people feel more threatened if they perceive differences between their own acculturation attitudes and the other group's attitudes than if they perceive a consensus between these attitudes. In another study investigating German host society members' attitudes towards Italian and Polish immigrants, Piontkowski et al. (2002) find that higher levels of discordance between one's own acculturation attitudes and those perceived in the respective out-group are associated with higher levels of perceived threat and lower levels of perceived enrichment.

Another perspective on intergroup relations , intergroup anxiety theory, suggests that cultural dissimilarity systematically leads to higher anxiety towards the dissimilar out-group and to fear and expectations of conflict. This fear in turn is also shown to trigger prejudice (Bourhis and Dayan, 2004). Hence, prejudice drives from the assumption that out-group member's beliefs differ from those held by the in-group (Rokeach, 1960)

All the aforesaid theories of social psychology suggest and provide evidence that perceptions of cultural difference are a major trigger of prejudice toward out-groups. The path leading first to cultural threat and then prejudice can pass through more “sociological” factors, such as issues of integrating immigrants, or more “emotional” factors, such as anxiety. Either way, perceived cultural difference is expected to trigger symbolic threats and prejudicial evaluations of the out-groups. Therefore, with regards to attitudes towards immigration, a link that is neither much explored nor rigorously tested by social psychologist or political psychologists, I expect the following relationships.

For an immigrant group that is perceived highly different from the host society, symbolic concerns, prejudice, feelings of cultural threat are more likely to be activated promptly, thus hindering the accessibility of economic calculations. In the absence of the necessary conditions for a sober and rational calculation, prejudice-related factors will become more influential in informing attitudes:

Hypothesis 2: For immigrants perceived as culturally similar, economic threat will inform people's attitudes toward immigration more than symbolic variables.

Whereas for the groups that are more similar to the host society, such activation of symbolic threats such as values or lifestyles is expected to be much weaker, allowing for economic considerations to surface. In the absence of symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety, discordant acculturation attitudes, respondents will be able to perform sober, rational calculations of their preferences:

Hypothesis 3: For immigrants perceived as culturally different, symbolic variables will inform people's attitudes towards immigration more than economic threat.

In addition to the interaction with economic and symbolic concerns, cultural similarity may affect immigration attitudes in another way. As suggested earlier, culturally different groups are expected to trigger anxiety and overshadow economic calculations. Similarly, these groups may also lead to difference in the host society with regards to the processing of information and more specifically of the content of the information about them.

Research on political tolerance suggests that anxiety is more likely when disliked political groups are portrayed in a threatening, rather than reassuring context (Marcus et al. 1995). Therefore, a second way cultural similarity (and its byproduct, anxiety) can affect out-group attitudes is by interacting with the favorable vs. unfavorable context in which they are portrayed. In other words, the increased level of anxiety posed by the culturally different group could be heightened by the unfavorable context they are portrayed in. On

the other hand the lack of such anxiety and heightened level of threat for the culturally similar groups will enable the favorable context/information about these groups to be more easily cognitively processed, creating a mitigating factor.

Similarly, one of the main tenets of the research on in-group favoritism and out-group bias is the relative ease of associating the out-groups with negative stereotypes as opposed to in-groups with positive stereotypes (Gaertner and McLaughlin 1983). Cultural similarity is theorized in this project as a way to hierarchically order these out-groups. Therefore, culturally different immigrant groups should not only illicit higher levels of anxiety, but also make it easier for the in-group member to associate and retain negative information about these groups. Similarly, positive information about culturally similar groups should be retained more easily than different groups.

Although not hierarchically ordered based on their perceived cultural similarity, Brader et al (2005) also find differences across immigrant groups, in terms of the ease of retaining favorable information about them by the host society. Therefore, with regards to the interactive role of cultural similarity with the tone of the information on immigration attitudes I hypothesize the following.¹²

Hypothesis 4: *The negative information about a culturally different immigrant group will lead to more opposition than the negative information about a culturally similar group.*

¹² These two hypotheses require an experimental setting to be properly tested. Therefore this interactive effect of cultural similarity on immigration attitudes will be tested only in chapter 6, which lays out the results of my original survey experiment.

And

Hypothesis 5: *The positive information about a culturally similar immigrant group will lead to more support than the positive information about a culturally different group.*

3.3 SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS

In addition to explaining people's perceptions of different immigrants, I aim to identify the possible ways these attitudes and differentiation in attitudes are threatened by measurement biases. I am particularly interested in social desirability bias, which is believed to affect sensitive topics like prejudice, race, and immigration disproportionately. Before moving on to the methods to detect and measure this bias in a survey context it is necessary to lay out the causal mechanisms this bias is likely to effect a model on immigration attitudes.

In his review of literature on social desirability bias, Nederhof (1985) identifies a number of ways social desirability bias (SDB) is likely to influence our statistical models and resulting relationships. Accordingly, social desirability may be correlated with both dependent and independent variables, causing a spurious correlation between these variables. Or, social desirability can hide relationships by acting as a suppressor variable. And finally, social desirability can act as a moderator variable, although it may (or may not) be uncorrelated with either the independent or dependent variables.

I argue that when it comes to attitudes towards immigration social desirability bias is expected to have a number of consequences. The first part of this consequence will manifest itself in the pure underreporting of out group exclusion. In other words, concerned with appearing prejudiced, people with high social desirability may simply not admit that they are prejudiced. That is not to say that all individuals who feel compelled to give socially desirable answers are prejudiced. But of those prejudiced or exclusivist of immigrants, those who also have a high likelihood to give socially desirable responses may be systematically overlooked because of their tendency to underreport their exclusivist tendencies. Therefore, I expect people with high social desirability bias to indicate less opposition to immigration. As a result, I expect that;

Hypothesis 6: *People with a higher tendency toward socially desirable responses will be less likely to report opposition to immigration than people with a lower tendency toward socially desirable responses.*

I expect this bias to manifest itself in a second way, this time in relation to this differentiation of immigrants. In particular I suggest that even if respondents were to be asked about their attitudes towards different ethnic group of immigrants, I expect them to feel strong consistency pressures and to not address their differing preferences regarding the different groups. Therefore,

Hypothesis 7: *People with a higher tendency toward socially desirable responding will be less likely to report differentiated responses across different ethnic groups than people with a lower tendency to respond to survey questions in a socially desirable way.*

I further expect that those who hide their immigration attitudes should also hide their opinions on certain independent variables with sensitive contents. Thus, I expect people with higher likelihood of socially desirable responding to refrain from accepting their exclusive attitudes as well as prejudice thus suppressing the relationship between these two variables. That is to say, I expect the relationship between independent variables such as prejudice and immigration attitudes to be suppressed because of the high SDB prone individuals in the sample. Thus, I expect social desirability to have an interaction effect with different independent variables in my models. For instance;

Hypothesis 8: *For the individuals not prone to social desirability bias (low SDB group) the relationship between prejudice and opposition to immigration will be stronger than the high SDB group.*

Finally I expect social desirability to have an additional impact regarding the specific context I am testing the aforementioned assertions. Extant literature illustrates that in addition to holding more exclusivist attitudes, Germans from former East differ from those from former West in their out-group attitudes in significant ways. More specifically,

Westerners are shown to exhibit more complex, nuanced and multidimensional attitudes towards out-groups, whereas Easterners attitudes tend to elicit less dimensionality.

With regards to the impact of social desirability, I expect political correctness, valuing multiculturalism, diversity, and tolerance to be more engrained for Westerners. Specifically, for the former Easterners exhibiting intolerance is not considered unwelcome. I argue that part of the reason for the continued impact of being from the former East could be the lack of the political correctness norms that are widespread in the former West for East Germans. In other words, admitting to opposition to immigration may be simply more acceptable for the Easterners or not part of the definition of what is socially desirable, whereas it may indicate an expression of racist attitudes for Westerners, leading to reluctance to admit unfavorable out-group attitudes and biased responses. To sum up, because of different definitions of what is socially desirable in these two contexts, I expect this trait to function differently with regards to attitudes towards immigration. Therefore,

Hypothesis 9: Regarding attitudes towards immigration, the impact of social desirability bias will be larger for Westerners than for Easterners.

3.4 CASE SELECTION

Germany is the proposed venue for this project. According to Eurobarometer surveys, compared to other nations in the European Union, Germany still shows a high proportion of population who are not welcoming toward immigrants and who do not expect minority groups to enrich the country's culture (Tewey 2003). A more recent Transatlantic Trends Survey conducted in 2008 across a number of European states and the US confirms that these findings continue to be the case.

According to the 2006 census of German Statistics Office, the total population of Germany is about 82 million. Of these 82 million, 15.1% are German residents with immigrant background. 23% of those immigrants are from the current EU member states including the newer members and about 20% are exclusively from Eastern Europe, former Yugoslavia, and Russia. However the single largest ethnic immigrant group is from Turkey, which constitutes about 14% of those with immigrant background.

Germany is the perfect case for testing the hypotheses of this project for multiple reasons. First, there are multiple groups of immigrants in Germany which can be easily placed on a continuum of cultural similarity to and economic competition with the host society. In addition to Italian and Turkish immigrants that arrived as guest workers many decades ago, there is also a surge of immigrants coming from Eastern Europe, Russia and especially neighboring Poland. So, it qualifies as an appropriate case due to the multiplicity of immigrants with different ethnic backgrounds of differing similarity to the majority population.

Furthermore, Germans had years of coexistence with immigrant groups in which to develop certain opinions about the immigrants, associate them with certain characteristics and develop common stereotypes. In addition, the issue of immigration is extremely salient, suggesting the existence of stable attitudes. Germany is an excellent case also allowing us to test the reasons for a possible differentiation across immigrant groups especially one resulting from perceived cultural similarity. For instance, with their analysis of German Social Research Survey data from the year 2000, Wasmer and Koch (2003) illustrate that as far as equal rights are concerned, German public makes clear distinctions between different groups of foreigners and that whether or not foreigners are perceived “culturally alien” has a lot to do with this differentiation.

Sniderman et al. (2004) suggests that it is hard to know whether the perceived similarities are purely prejudice related or indicative of real value conflict. While it seems very hard to differentiate between the two, this endeavor is not fully hopeless either. Significant insights into this question can be gained through testing the impact of different kinds of contact with these immigrant groups. Were we to find that contact reduces a group’s perceived cultural dissimilarity, we could point out the part of the perception that is due to prejudice rather than real conflict. The former division of East and West Germany will most likely provide us with the tools to get at this relationship. For instance, Wasmer and Koch (2003) illustrate that while ideology is more powerful to explain support for multicultural rights among former west populations, contact has much higher effect among former East populations.

Significant differences between East and West attitudes, illustrated by many scholars, suggest that this kind of divide can provide new insights and allow for a

comparison of two contexts with different levels of economic development, while allowing controlling a multiplicity of aggregate level factors. For instance, departing from this phenomenon, Clark and Legge (1997) suggest that East Germans tend to fuse traditional racism with conservative values to express a racism argued by “symbolic” theorists while West Germans tend to separate the concepts. More importantly, they find that for West Germans ethnocentrism is a very strong factor explaining attitudes towards immigration, whereas for East Germans economic self-interest/ relative deprivation. Another set of findings by Heyder and Schmidt(2003) comparing ethnocentrism between East and West Germans further confirm the heterogeneity of the whole German sample with respect to the two regions and suggest analyzing data separately for the East and the West.

In sum, due to the existing immigrants from different ethnic backgrounds, their long-standing presence and coexistence with the host population and the avenues for former East and West comparisons, Germany is a very appropriate case for testing the theories of this project.

3.5 RESEARCH DESIGN: TRIANGULATION OF METHODS

In order to pursue the empirical analysis of this project I propose multiple methods. I start with cognitive interviews to probe the plausibility of my assertions regarding the heterogeneous understanding of immigrants, continue with post-analysis of existing survey data for a preliminary test of the hypotheses I stated, and end with an experimental study

allowing for an ideal illustration of the points raised. In doing this, I will employ a four step approach.

As a first and exploratory step into a larger test and analysis of my hypotheses about people's perceptions of heterogeneity of immigrants I will utilize cognitive interviews. Conducted with a small sample of German respondents both from the former East and West, these interviews will help me understand the meaning of "*immigrant*" and "*immigration*" for a respondent and probe the plausibility of this heterogeneity. I will also utilize these interviews as a pre-test of my improved prejudice scale also created to account for heterogeneity. The results of these interviews are reported in Chapter 4.

Upon illustrating and establishing the heterogeneous perception of immigration attitudes I will proceed to a robust test of my assertions with large-N survey data in Chapter 5. This step will entail the post-analysis of the recently released 2004 German Social Research (ALLBUS) survey data, conducted over 3000 random sampled respondents from both (former) East and West Germany. Analyzing this survey will enable me to generate an integrated model for explaining the role of immigrant groups and cultural similarity in relation to economic and symbolic variables at the same time. Furthermore, by modeling opposition for different groups separately I will be able to illustrate if my suggested interaction of cultural similarity with prejudice and economic concerns will hold. For the second stage of my analysis with ALLBUS, I will exclusively focus on social desirability effects and ways to detecting it. I aim to illustrate if this bias suppresses any of the previously established relationships and evaluate possible reasons for this affect.

For the final step for testing my hypotheses, I propose an experimental design which will minimize the SDB through experimental manipulations of immigrant groups.

Furthermore, instead of the immigrant categories employed by the ALLBUS survey, this experiment will inquire about immigrant categories with a priming experiment generated through the results of the in-depth cognitive interviews. With this analysis I will separately test my assertions in an experimentally controlled context with more rigor than the secondary analysis of survey data enables.

In the 7th and final empirical chapter of my dissertation, I aim to illustrate the impact of this heterogeneous understanding of immigration attitudes and closely related social desirability bias on a related public policy realm, namely European Union attitudes. In order to achieve this, I will utilize survey questions and a list experiment I embedded in my original data collection. In other words upon illustrating why we should differentiate across immigrants based on ethnicity for a better understanding immigration attitudes I will evaluate the implications of my findings for illuminating people's Euroskepticism and attitudes towards the EU enlargement.

Figure obtained from Federal Statistical Office in Germany and Naturalized immigrants are not incorporated into this table.

<http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article7222075/Tuerken-sind-die-Sorgenkinder-der-Integration.html>

4.0 CHAPTER 4: UNDERSTANDING PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRATION WITH COGNITIVE INTERVIEWS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapters, I pointed out to a rarely disputed assumption of several studies explaining immigration attitudes. I argued that by using a single survey item inquiring about immigration attitudes, these studies share the implicit assumption that immigration is perceived as an influx of one kind of immigrant group. In the previous chapter, I laid out a number of reasons why I think this assumption of homogenous immigrant group perceptions may be wrong. Following that I suggested that immigration is more likely to be perceived as a heterogeneous idea sensitive to the differences across prospective immigrants. Finally, I portrayed a detailed theoretical model accounting for this heterogeneity.

Nevertheless, before testing this detailed model, what the words “*immigration*” and “*immigrant*” refer to in people’s mind needs to be elicited. Therefore, as an exploratory step to a larger test and analysis of my hypotheses about people’s perceptions of heterogeneity of immigrants, I conducted cognitive interviews with a small number of German respondents in 2007. With these interviews I aimed to understand the meaning of

“immigrant” and *“immigration”* for a respondent and probe the plausibility of my previously discussed heterogeneity theory.

In the previous chapter, I pointed out to another measurement issue potentially inflicting existing studies on out-group attitudes, namely social desirability bias. I suggested the ways in which I expect this bias affect measurement of immigration attitudes and important explanatory variables such as prejudice. As a way to deal with these measurement issues, I will utilize the cognitive interviews in a second way: as a tool to generate a more reliable prejudice scale to be used at later stages, which would better represent the immigrants and also would be less susceptible to the social desirability bias.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will first reiterate my expectations from this exploratory analysis. Subsequently, I will describe cognitive interviewing as a method and illustrate its potential utility for the questions of this study. Next, I will illustrate the findings of my original data collection in Germany, with a focus on the issues of out-group heterogeneity, correction of measurement problems, and differences between the former Eastern and Western populations. In conclusion, I will evaluate the theoretical and practical implications of my findings and point out the ways in which they pave the way for the next stages of this dissertation project.

4.2 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXPECTATIONS FROM COGNITIVE INTERVIEWS:

Due to the exploratory purpose of this proposed field study, my hypotheses regarding this chapter are more loosely defined than the following rigorous empirical chapters. Nevertheless, while exploratory in essence, based on the theoretical framework from the previous chapter, I have specific expectations from the way immigration is understood in people's minds and the kinds of stereotypes associated with them.

More specifically, considering their coexistence with a number of different groups of immigrants over decades, when asked about their immigration preferences, I expect many people to have a differentiated/heterogeneous picture of an immigrant in their minds, rather than an abstract, all inclusive, homogeneous category of an immigrant.

I further expect this differentiation to be based on the ethnic/national background of the future immigrants. I believe this to be the case because ethnicity provides an easy cue to the people to categorize these immigrants and it historically constitutes one of the major ways of referring to out-groups in the continental Europe. Of those interviewed, I anticipate the majority of them openly refer to ethnic groups with the highest population presence and/or racial visibility in comparison with the host society. In other words, I expect certain groups especially those that constitute the majority of immigrants with noticeable cultural and ethnic differences from the host society, to be mentioned more than others.

In the German context in particular, I expect the noticeable immigrant group from Muslim countries with darker physical features, which also currently constitute the largest immigrant group, to come to mind first, followed by those from Eastern Europe and finally

more similarly perceived Western European ones. Finding a categorization of this kind will confirm my expectations regarding heterogeneity of immigrants and further my suspicions about the conclusions of some studies that assume a homogeneous understanding of immigration.

I will also ask respondents about how different they perceive the prospective immigrants both from the majority of the German population and from each other. I expect that they will state large differences between Germans and immigrants and also that they will be aware of the differences across immigrant groups of different ethnicities. Upon probing the plausibility of this heterogeneity assumption and understanding the meaning of “*immigrant*” and “*immigration*” for Germans via these cognitive interviews, I hope to proceed to test my specific hypotheses to account for this differentiation in the following chapters.

This chapter takes a second direction in improving the measurement of “prejudice” which is one of the major variables I will utilize to account for this differentiation. As mentioned earlier, one of the major challenges of the researchers focusing on public opinion towards immigration is overcoming difficulties related to revealing actual/sincere attitudes on sensitive issues and related measurement biases. A problem afflicting the few works that differentiate across immigrant groups is a lack of precision regarding the reliability of their explanatory variables and prejudice is the most central of these variables.

Numerous studies make an effort to measure prejudice in Europe and differentiate immigrants, but they utilize survey items used to measure prejudice towards racial minorities in the American context. Yet, these studies put limited effort into adopting this scale for Europe but directly export it into the European context before verifying if those

measures can actually travel across these two geographies easily.

For instance, Sniderman et al. (2000, 2004) employ an 8 item scale for measuring prejudice in Italy and the Netherlands to explain attitudes towards different immigrants. In deriving the list of personal attributes as common stereotypes of immigrants, they follow the thrust of recent measures of prejudice developed in the US by the National Race and Politics Study and the General Social Survey. Yet, several social psychologists point out that stereotypes are in fact context-specific and not all stereotypes are necessarily universal (Kelly and Hutson-Comeaux, 1999; Osland et al. 2000).

Given the history of immigration in Europe in general and in Germany in particular, the major ways immigrants are depicted in the media and in political discourse mainly refer to symbolic issues. In other words, while immigrants' unemployment rates or burden on welfare state are pointed out, more emphasis is put on their different lifestyles, lack of integration, conservatism regarding family relations, and Germany's lack of absorbing further immigration culturally. Nevertheless, these cultural items are missing from these US-exported scales.

I therefore argue that there is reason to suspect the validity of these studies using prejudice scales fit to the US context but may not apply to Europe or do not fully cover the range of stereotypes associated with immigrants in Europe. I will therefore utilize the cognitive interviews to pre-test the validity of these measurement scales and if necessary construct a more context aware prejudice scale. In doing this, in addition to testing the appropriateness of the stereotypical traits in the aforementioned scale, I will propose a few new items that I believe better correspond to the cultural focus on immigration in the German context. These additional items are mainly based on the way immigrants are

depicted in the media and a few expert interviews I conducted with elites and policy makers dealing with integration issues.

One of the prevailing methods for pre-testing the adjectives used in prejudice scales is by asking about them to a small sample population and allowing for respondents' unique descriptions with open ended questions. Hence, I propose asking respondents to come up with a list of stereotypical personality traits when they talk about "immigrants" as a way to improve this scale. While it is a common procedure in research on social psychology in explaining in-group attitudes towards the out-groups, this pretesting method has been largely ignored in the political science literature.

Finally, a context aware, reliable prejudice scale will play a pivotal role in testing my major hypotheses about the heterogeneity of immigration attitudes. Part of the reason why the limited numbered existing studies found no major differences across attitudes towards different immigrant groups could be their lack of precision with their measures of prejudice. In other words, if prejudice is not measured properly, it cannot be expected to have different impact on attitudes towards different immigrant groups.

4.3 COGNITIVE INTERVIEWING AS A METHOD

One of the fundamental challenges of every social science inquiry is to validate the overlap between what the researcher is hoping to gauge and what she ends up measuring at the end. In terms of survey research this challenge translates into what the surveyor hopes to measure when asking a survey question as opposed to what the respondent thinks of when

answering it. Cognitive interviewing is one of the pretesting tools available to comparative survey research to overcome this particular challenge. It has been used extensively especially in social psychology research for over 15 years to pretest questionnaires precisely for this reason (Hurwitz and Peffley 1997, Willis and Schecter 1997, Conrad and Blair 2004).

The cognitive interviewer's goal is to prompt the individual to reveal information that provides clues as to the types of retrieval from memory or types of decision processing (Willis 1999). In this study, I am adopting a verbal probing technique, which not only serves my purpose substantially in terms of understanding the way immigrants are categorized, but also provides a better control of the interviewing process with minimal training of the respondents.

Cognitive interviewing is a very straightforward and cost effective method in terms of its execution (Willis 1999). Interviewers meet with a small number of respondents individually and face to face and first ask them critical survey questions. The important questions are then followed up with in depth probes to reveal what the respondent thinks about when answering each question. These responses can then be used to validate the existing question, to improve it, or to generate alternative ways to address the concept.

For the purposes of this dissertation study, this critical question is the commonly used "immigration" question¹³ widely employed by scholarly research. Therefore, a small group of respondents are recruited and presented with this question measuring their

¹³ The commonly asked "immigration" question either reads or is a version of the following: "What is your opinion regarding immigration into our country?" The response categories presented are as follows: "Entry should be unrestricted" or "Entry should be restricted" or "Entry should be stopped completely"

immigration attitudes. Following their response, respondents are asked what groups came to their mind when answering this question in an attempt to understand the true meaning of the concept of an “*immigrant*” for every individual in the sample.

Despite my theoretical expectations regarding the heterogeneous understanding of immigrants, to be in content with the methodology and exploratory value of this process, while interviewing, the respondents were not encouraged to name certain immigrants more than others or to think of any group more than others a-priori. This is also necessary to minimize the potential for bias in cognitive interviewing due to leading probes, which is one of the common criticisms of this technique (Willis 1994). Therefore, in my interviews I employed a non-leading probing technique simply asking respondents to reveal the groups they think of when they answer the immigration question.

The best way to know if immigration is a heterogeneous concept and on what grounds immigrants are categorized is actually to let the participants name them rather than biasing them with pre-imposed categories. This way, one can have a valid list of immigrants to be included in future studies and surveys of immigration, that are generated by the members of the host society in this very cultural environment.

As suggested earlier, in addition to the heterogeneity of immigrants, the cognitive interviews were of further use in order to improve on the measurement of prejudice. Due to my suspicion of the existing stereotypical traits/adjectives used to tap prejudice in the European context, with these interviews I asked the respondents to evaluate the existing measurements and their perception of their accuracy in describing immigrants. Furthermore, I requested respondents to evaluate some additional stereotype items, which I believe are more context specific and are the usual suspects in Germany. Finally, I asked

the respondents to come up with their own stereotypical traits to describe immigrants in Germany in general, in addition to those already provided to them.

4.4 PARTICIPANTS

The 28 participants for these cognitive interviews were recruited from the database of a German survey firm –Schmiedl Marktforschung GmbH. All respondents were residents of the city and suburbs of Berlin. In order to ensure that opinions of the host society towards immigrants are properly tapped, those of immigrant origin were completely excluded from the study and only those with German born parents were allowed to participate. Special effort was given to drawing a sample somewhat representative of the overall population, which varied on the main demographical dimensions such as age, education, income and occupation. Of those who participated, 14 were women and 14 were men, the mean age was 43 with the youngest participant 18 years old and the oldest 58 with a standard deviation of 12.8. Sixteen of the participants had a high school diploma, 9 had higher education and 3 had a Master's degree. For a comparison with the former East and West, 11 of those recruited were born and raised in former East Germany.

4.5 PROCEDURE

4.5.1 The meaning of Immigration and Categorization of Immigrants

In order to reveal what people understand from the word of “*immigration*”, respondents were asked first whether or not they are supportive of immigration into Germany. Following the question on immigration, respondents were asked if they thought of any specific immigrant groups when answering the question. Following their answer, in order to tap if there is more than one group that they think of, respondents were also asked if there is a second group that they thought of when answering the question.

Accordingly, while only one third of the respondent stated they did not have a certain group in mind when answering the question, two thirds of the respondents specified a certain group (or groups) of immigrants suggesting the potential need for asking the immigration question for multiple groups. Among those who thought of a specific immigrant group(s) most listed the immigrants based on their ethnicity, whereas only two respondents did not differentiate across ethnic/nationality lines. However, even those two switched to an ethnic differentiation when asked what comes to their mind second when they answer the immigration question.

Table 1 illustrates the proportion of participants mentioning each category as either first or second group that comes to their mind when they think about immigration into Germany. When it comes to the most popular means of differentiation of immigrants, the mostly mentioned ethnic group was “*Turks*”. Of all 28 respondents, 43% mentioned

“*Turks*” as the immigrant group that comes to their mind when answering the question on immigration.

Table 3 Percentage of Participants Mentioning Each National Category

Rank	Category	Percentage
1	Turks	43
2	Arab/N. African	32
3	East European/Russian	21
4	Italian	11
5	Asian	07
6	Muslim(accumulated)	61
7	West European(accumulated)	21

Following “*Turks*”, “*Arabs*” were mentioned by 32% of the respondents. Altogether, 61% of all respondents mentioned a Muslim group as either “*Turkish, Arabic or Islamic*”. This also suggests that of those who categorized immigrants, about 90% mentioned that they thought of a Muslim group either as a primary or secondary immigrant group of reference when answering the immigration question.

Interpreted either way, the respondents’ categorization of immigrants evidently justifies first asking the immigration question by specific immigrant groups. Their responses also validate the suspicion that Muslim groups being seen as immigrants more frequently than other possibly leads to inflated effects of symbolic considerations in explaining immigration attitudes.

Table 1 also illustrates that, following the two predominantly Muslim groups; “*East European/Russian*” was the third most mentioned group with 21% of all respondents

referring them. This is not surprising given the recent influx of ethnic Germans, as well as immigrants from Poland and Russia into Germany during the last two decades. The frequent mention of this group as one of the categories also suggests that they should be included as a separate category when asking about immigration.

It is also interesting to note that only 11% of the respondents mentioned “*Italians*” as an immigrant group and only one respondent mentioned “*Greeks*”. This may be partly due to the demographics in the area thus the fact that there aren’t many Italian or Greek immigrants. Nevertheless, this result may also suggest that these groups do not really come to mind when people think about immigrants and immigration, in other words, they may not be seen as immigrants per se.

Furthermore, the fact that any West European group is mentioned so infrequently as a point of reference when forming attitudes towards immigration is consistent with my theoretical expectations regarding the heterogeneity of immigrants. As these groups are not thought of much less as immigrants, the main point of reference is culturally different immigrants, which I argue would instigate more symbolic concerns. In other words, to understand the levels and reasons of opposition towards West European immigrants, this group should be separately mentioned. Finally, this finding also suggests that in a future survey, they can be merged together as a West European immigrant group when tapping people’s opinions regarding their immigration.

As the abovementioned analysis illustrates, when asked about their position on immigration, different people have different immigrants in mind with most mentioning the Muslim groups. Also people tend to name more than one group of immigrants illustrating the potential heterogeneity of their perception of immigrants, which the following section

will illustrate in greater detail. Furthermore, almost all this differentiation is thought of along ethnic lines. Thus, while whether or not a respondent differentiates immigrants seems to have impact on the respondent's opposition to immigration, the majority of respondents thinking about the same group further poses threats to the reliability of the existing research. Yet, the multiplicity of these groups further confirms my expectation about the heterogeneous understanding of immigration, all of which justifies separate questions about the immigration of these different groups in future surveys.

4.5.2 Immigration attitudes and Heterogeneity of perception of immigrants

In this section I will illustrate respondents' position on immigration based on their responses to the actual immigration question. In doing this, I will explore how being from the former East and West Germany and having homogeneous and heterogeneous perceptions on immigration relate to exclusivist attitudes.

Many scholars suggest a difference in terms of immigration attitudes between the former East and the West Germany and the answers we gathered from these interviews suggest similar results (Bland and Schmidt 2003, Wasmer and Koch 2003 Tewey 2004). The consensus is that due to their lack of economic resources and lack of previous contact with immigrants, East Germans hold more exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants than West Germans. Figure 4.1 illustrates the immigration attitudes of respondents in my sample broken down to being from former East and West.




Figure 4-1 West and East German Immigration Attitudes Compared

Accordingly, a large majority of those with West German background in this sample suggested that immigration into Germany is a good or a very good idea. Only a small portion of 6% thought immigration is a bad idea. Regarding those with East German background, the supporters of immigration still constitute a majority however there is a large number of people who think immigration is a somewhat bad idea (about 18 %) or a very bad idea (about 9%).

While these numbers obviously cannot be generalized to the entire population, it is still worth mentioning that, consistent with the literature, the proportion of people who oppose immigration are considerably higher among the participants born and raised in former East than former West.

In addition to being from the former East and West, the perception of immigrants as a homogeneous vs. heterogeneous group may also be related to attitudes towards immigration. According to the respondents in this sample, there seems to be a link between categorizing immigrants as opposed to seeing them as an all-inclusive category and holding exclusionary attitudes towards them. Those who think of immigrants along ethnic lines tend to hold more negative attitudes towards them as compared to those who picture immigrants as a big uniform group in their minds. In other words, even the differentiation of immigrants itself seems to suggest a certain direction on immigration attitudes.




Figure 4-2 Homogeneous vs. Heterogeneous Attitudes Compared

As Figure 4.2 illustrates, only 8% of those who see immigrants as a uniform group oppose immigration, whereas 19% of those who categorize immigrants based on their

ethnic background hold negative attitudes towards immigration. These results indicate that having certain immigrant categories in mind and differentiating across them seems to go along with holding a more exclusivist position regarding immigration. Respectively, those who see immigrants as a whole without differentiating along ethnic lines seem to hold more favorable attitudes towards them.

While these findings may appear contrary to the literature on out-group homogeneity effect, where seeing members of out-groups very similar to each other is highly correlated with disfavoring out-groups (Vanbeselaere et al. 1991, Judd et al. 2005). Nevertheless, this does not have to be the case if actually a specific ethnic group is taken as an out-group rather than all immigrant groups altogether. Because the literature on out-group homogeneity effect also suggests that while out-group homogeneity bias leads to “they are all the same” assessments, it also leads to the tendency to see differences between separate groups as being much greater than they actually are, especially when some of those groups are seen as more threatening than others (Ackerman et al. 2006). Therefore, seeing differences across different ethnic immigrants may actually be correlated with more exclusivist attitudes.

4.5.3 How do immigrants differ from Germans and from each other

In addition to understanding what people think when answering an immigration question, with this project I was also interested in seeing how respondents think about immigrants in general. To that end, they were asked a number of additional questions regarding the way

they perceive immigrant as well as how much and in what regards they think immigrants differ from German society, from each other.

The cognitive interviews suggest that those who think of immigrants as only West European or as only Muslim groups tended to see them very similar to each other. Analyzed qualitatively while for some of the respondents this similarity had positive connotations for others it was a rather negative characteristic.

“Oh they are very similar to each other. They are all fun, they enjoy life. They are also quite lively, high in energy. They are all very family oriented, close knit and very sincere. I wish we were a bit like them.”

(Respondent #11)

“All Muslims are the same. They all have this temper, their skin color is very similar to each other, of course their language is the same. And their lifestyle, daily habits, culture, tradition. Also, they are used to other rules for the society, not our rules.”

(Respondent # 6)

Respectively, those who think of more than one group when asked about immigration, which is the majority of the respondents, argue that they are different from each other mainly in terms of “*culture*” and “*religion*”. This finding suggests that rather than their economic, educational or class standing; immigrants are categorized based on how they differ from each other based on their cultural background and the organized religion they belong to. Some examples are as follows:

“Well these immigrants are different from each other. First they look different. I think of Russians and Turks when I think about immigration. I think Russians are more European, more similar to Germans and they come here to work. The other ones have different outfits, and different traditions. I prefer Russians who are much more ambitious than Turks. Turks are more traditional and they are not willing to integrate like Russians.”

(Respondent # 24)

“Europeans are more ok, they are more similar to us. Muslims on the other hand, they are all very lazy and they all abuse our welfare state. The first wave that came in the 60s were hardworking, but their kids, their young wives mail ordered from Turkey, they are all lazy. They are all way too fertile, they keep having all these kids. They have no interest in learning the German language, they wear a headscarf, how backward. And they spend all their money building too many mosques.”

(Respondent #8)

In addition to the ways immigrants differ from each other, with another open ended question, respondents were also asked to indicate the ways immigrants differ from the majority of Germans. According to most of the respondents, immigrants were quite different than the majority of Germans and as the following examples illustrate, these differences manifest themselves in a number of ways mostly related to religion and culture.

“Well, East Europeans come here to work, they have no jobs back at home and they are similar to Germans. Muslims have different outfits, they are low education, traditional. And they are also very egoistical.”

(Respondent #7)

“Germans are kinder than immigrants. We are more helpful than they are, they only help themselves and each other, not us. We are kind speaking, they are all loud. Turks are the opposite of us on all these accounts.”

(Respondent #9)

“A group of immigrants, the ones from Western Europe are educated, some even have more knowhow than Germans. The second group, well I feel threatened by them, they are too different.”

(Respondent #12)

I grouped these comparisons under common themes and produced Table 4.2, which illustrates the proportion of respondents mentioning each difference.

Table 4 Percentage of Respondents Mentioning Each Difference

Rank	Category	Percentage
1	Religion	50
2	Culture	25
3	Lifestyle	21
4	Family (close ties)	14
5	Education	07

The respondents' answers suggest that immigrants' "*lifestyle*" and "*religion*" are the major cues that help Germans categorize immigrants. As table 5 illustrates, half of the respondents mentioned their "*religion*" as the major aspect making them different from the majority of Germans followed by "*culture*" and "*lifestyle*". "*Having closer family ties*" and "*low education*" come next in terms of mostly mentioned perceived difference of immigrants.

All in all, this first part of the cognitive interviews illustrate that not only are immigrants categorized based on ethnicity but they are mostly seen heterogeneous among themselves mainly about their culture and religion. This means of differentiation also used to compare them to the majority of Germans. Culture, religion, and lifestyle seem to be the major ways immigrants differ from the host society, which seems to support the initial expectations of this dissertation regarding the role of cultural similarity.

4.5.4 Building a Prejudice Scale: Stereotypes associated with Immigrants

The second part of this analysis pertains to the common stereotypes associated with immigrants. In addition to the immigrant groups respondents named, the stereotypes they associated with them give important clues about how these different immigrant groups are placed in their minds, and possibly different reasons people have in mind when opposing them as well.

As suggested earlier, the intention with these second set of questions is to generate an improved and content aware prejudice scale to be used in future research on immigration attitudes. For this purpose, upon being asked about their immigration attitudes, respondents were also asked about the common adjectives/ stereotypes they associate with immigrants. The stereotypical traits tested from earlier scales are: being lazy, abusing welfare, being criminal, and being selfish. The newly proposed traits, which are also being tested are: being culturally different, treating women badly, and being too conservative.

This part of the analysis is inspired by Hurwitz and Peffley (1997)'s work where African American respondents were asked to name their own adjectives to describe "Whites". For this study, the German interviewees were first presented with a list of stereotypes used to describe immigrants to be able to judge if a certain item is a good fit for a prejudice scale based on the distribution of respondents' answers. The list comprised of the adjectives directly exported from the US context as well as hereby suggested

stereotypes thought to be more context specific. Respondents were asked to pick the best location corresponding to their perceptions of immigrants on a double ended 7-item scale ranging from a positive adjective to a negative adjective. A sample item from the scale looks like as follows:

“Now I have a number of questions about immigrants in Germany. I will give you a 7 point scale and ask you to describe the characteristics of the majority of immigrants. Of course one personality trait cannot apply to everyone in a group. Therefore, please think of the majority of immigrants when answering these questions.

Where would you place the majority of immigrants on this scale, where 1 means “tends to be hard working” and 7 means “tend to be lazy”?”



There are a number of ways to determine if a prejudice scale properly measures attitudes. One way to assess if an item fits into a prejudice scale is to analyze whether or not people can locate themselves on a point other than the middle position on this item. In other words, if people have hard time agreeing the adjective accurately fits immigrants and consistently pick the middle category, this would indicate that the item fails to depict stereotypes in this context.

Regarding the 7 stereotypical traits I examined in this study, there is no significant difference across items regarding the frequency of the preference for the middle category. Approximately 7-8 respondents located themselves in the middle for every prejudice item, leading to inconclusive results regarding the fit of the prejudice items for this cultural context based on this criterion alone.

Alternatively, one can evaluate the mean of “self-placement” scores of all participants for every item separately. If the mean of an item is higher than the others, it indicates that people prefer higher values of this adjective to describe the out-group in question. Therefore, by ranking the mean scores, one can assess the overall differentiation capacity of the prejudice item for all participants. The ranking of the 7 stereotype items regarding their mean values is illustrated in Table 3.

Table 5 Ranking of the adjectives based on the mean scores of all respondents
(positive direction included)

STRONGEST =>	1	CULTURALLY DIFFERENT
	2	TREAT WOMEN BADLY
	3	CRIMINAL
	4	CONSERVATIVE
	5	LAZY
	6	SELFISH
WEAKEST =>	7	LIVE OFF WELFARE

As Table 4.3 illustrates, with regards to their mean scores, the three items added to the original scale perform very well in terms of their differentiation capacity. For the German respondents in this study “*being culturally different*”, “*treating women badly*”, “*being criminal*” and “*being conservative*” yield to higher scores and appear to be suitable descriptions of immigrants. On the other hand, the mean scores of the items “*being lazy*”, “*selfish*”, and “*living of welfare*” are only slightly different than the middle category, suggesting that they are not appropriate adjectives used to describe immigrants.

As illustrated earlier, the scale used for all these items was a double ended one, ranging from a positive adjective to its negative antonym. One might argue that this range of response categories threatens my results, in that stereotypes used to measure prejudice should take negative values. In other words, only the negative scores of a double ended score should be considered regarding the fit of the adjective for a stereotype scale. In fact, if many people pick a place towards the positive end to describe the out-group, this may suggest the adjective is not meaningful for immigrants. To address this issue, I generated a new subset of variables excluding all the positive scores for these items and recalculated their means. The results are presented in Table 4.4.

Table 6 Ranking of the adjectives based on the mean scores of all respondents

(positive direction excluded)

STRONGEST =>	1	CULTURALLY DIFFERENT
	2	TREAT WOMEN BADLY
	3	CRIMINAL
	4	CONSERVATIVE
	5	SELFISH
	6	LIVE OFF WELFARE
WEAKEST =>	7	LAZY

As Table 4.4 illustrates, when listed based on their mean scores with the positive direction excluded, there are no major changes to the way these items are ranked from strongest descriptors of immigrants to the weaker ones. Especially, the first four items,

three of which are suggested with this study, continue to be better stereotypes for immigrants. Respectively, the three low ranking adjectives from the means assessments including the positive direction continue to rank lowest even when only negative direction is concerned.

In addition to their means, the standard deviations of these items may also suggest how well they differentiate across individuals, with higher standard deviations from the mean, suggesting a wider range of answers.

**Table 7 Ranking of the adjectives based on the standard deviations of all respondents
for each adjective (positive direction excluded)**

STRONGEST =>	1	CULTURALLY DIFFERENT
	2	CRIMINAL
	3	TREAT WOMEN BADLY
	4	CONSERVATIVE
	5	SELFISH
	6	LAZY
WEAKEST =>	7	LIVE OFF WELFARE

Table 4.5 illustrates the results of this ranking based on the standard deviations for each stereotypical trait. Once again, the first four items from the previous lists continue to be stronger descriptions of immigrants, suggesting that they should be incorporated into a scale for a valid measurement of prejudice. Furthermore, these four items yield to a Cronbach's alpha of $\alpha = .79$ suggesting they would constitute a very good scale in terms of reliability.

In addition to signifying if they agree that the list of adjective applies to the immigrants in question, respondents were also asked if there were any additional adjectives they would use or heard other people use to describe immigrants that are not included in the previous list. With regards to additional adjectives that can be used to describe immigrants, 11 respondents believed that the previous list covered all possible adjectives and they did not propose additional descriptions. The remaining 17 respondents on the other hand suggested a number of new adjectives that they heard used or they themselves would use to describe immigrants.

The mostly mentioned adjective named by these respondents was “*the willingness to integrate*”. These respondents further evaluated that many immigrants resist integrating into German culture, learning the language and adapting to the German way of life and that therefore this item should be in the list of stereotypes. “*Willingness to integrate*” actually is a common stereotype category used in the social psychology acculturation attitudes literature but it was somehow omitted from the political science studies. Therefore, I will add this item to the original prejudice scale I implement in my original survey experiment, discussed in Chapter 6.

There were no other adjectives proposed by respondents as repeatedly as the “*willingness to integrate*”. Still some respondents proposed that immigrants are “*too many*”, “*arrogant*”, “*different looking*” and “*poor*” or that they “*value family ties too much*”, “*have a hierarchical family structure*”, and “*low education*”. Furthermore, while much rarer, some respondents suggested more positive traits for immigrants. Some of these traits include: being “*fun*”, “*friendly*”, and “*helpful*”.

These findings suggest there are better ways to capture the stereotypes respondents associate with immigrants in Germany than those used earlier by Sniderman et al. in multiple studies. A new and improved prejudice scale should incorporate the adjectives this study suggested, namely, “*being culturally different*”, “*treating women badly*”, and “*being conservative*”. These adjectives proved to be more relevant for people in this particular context than the commonly used items except for “*being criminal*”. Finally, proposed by many respondents, “*willingness to integrate*” should also be incorporated into the future prejudice scales. This improved scale in turn may be more susceptible to attitudes towards different immigrants separately.

4.5.5 East-West Differences and Prejudice

Going back to East vs. West comparison regarding this prejudice index, this sample suggests considerable differences between these two groups, which are consistent with the literature. In order to effectively compare the respondents from the former East and West, an additive prejudice scale was created, which consists of the agreement scores with these stereotypes. Following that, the sample was divided into two groups: Those born and raised in the former East vs. West. Graph 3 illustrates the distribution of respondents' prejudice scores for respondents with both backgrounds.




Figure 4-3 Prejudice Index Scores, East and West Compared

The left side of the graph indicates lower levels of prejudice and in fact favorable assessments of immigrants with regards to the stereotypical traits presented. Of those who rank low on the prejudice score, a great majority has a West German background whereas there are no respondents with an East German background. Respectively when those with high prejudice scores are examined on the right side of the graph, there are more respondents with higher prejudice scores from the former East than former West.

One of the common explanations to for the differences between former Easterners and Westerners both in terms of immigration attitudes and higher prejudice scores is Easterners' lack of contact with immigrants. As opposed to Westerners who were exposed to immigration since the 60's and had more chances to interact with them, historically the former East did not witness such high and diverse influx of immigrants. This explanation should be explored in greater detail in the following chapters.

Another explanation relates to the economic wellbeing and unemployment rates in former Eastern Länder being much worse than Western Länder. As opposed to high growth and employment rates of former West, the East is still economically worse off, despite the influx of development funds after the unification. Therefore, it is not surprising to see this relative deprivation to manifest itself in more exclusivist attitudes towards immigrants.

One may also argue that the differences between the former East and West are due to Westerners' reluctance to accept holding unfavorable out-group attitudes in an attempt to give socially desirable answers because of societal pressures particular to the West. While this can be part of the explanation for the differences, the fact that there are differences regarding every prejudice item separately, and particularly even for those that are much more subtle such as "willingness to integrate" than the blatant ones such as "lazy" suggests that social desirability is not the only answer to account for all the differences. All in all, the following chapters will address all these speculations to account for these differences.

4.6 CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I presented the results of the cognitive interviews I conducted in the summer of 2007 in Germany. My goal with these interviews was to probe the plausibility of my theory about the heterogeneous understanding of immigration laid out in the previous chapter. More specifically, I hoped to understand what immigration means to

Germans, who is considered an immigrant, as well as how immigrants are pictured and categorized in a German's mind.

My findings largely confirmed my expectations in that when asked what they understand from the word immigrant, a majority of German respondents mentioned specific immigrant groups mostly defined along ethnic lines rather than a homogeneous group of immigrants. In particular, Muslim immigrants, East European immigrants and West European immigrants seem to be the major lines of division people have when they think about immigration.

This chapter also provided evidence that there is need to assess the effect of both symbolic and economic variables in the light of a differentiated understanding of immigration. Most respondents not only named Muslim immigrants as the first group that came to their mind, but they also stated these immigrants as the most different from Germans culturally.

This finding suggests that the strong explanatory power of symbolic variables in explaining immigration in earlier studies may be largely inflated because of this very categorization bias. In other words, when those surveyed answer a question on immigration, most of them actually state their attitudes towards the immigration of these culturally different groups as opposed to all groups. It may be the case that opposition to less thought of groups such as Italians are more economically motivated, but because they are rarely the default group, economy seems to matter less in explaining opposition to immigration. While in the next chapter I will test my hypotheses regarding the heterogeneity of perceptions of immigrants and the interactive role of perceived cultural similarity with Large-N German Survey data, Chapter 6 will utilize a rigorous

experimental design to understand the exact causal mechanism the ethnicity of immigrant triggers.

These findings also suggest that there is need to differentiate immigrants for any scientific inquiry of opposition to immigration. Furthermore, given attitudes towards immigration is one of the key variables informing many other attitudes such as voting behavior, support for European Integration, labor market distributions, etc., this heterogeneity may have implications on how immigration attitudes are linked to these issues. It may be that only opinions towards certain immigrant groups may be the main motivation for opposing the EU, which Chapter 8 will analyze in greater detail.

I utilized the cognitive interviews in a second way for pre-testing the existing prejudice scales with German respondents. My results indicate that the US generated prejudice scales do not travel well to the German context, which may be part of the reason why they failed to account for the differentiation of immigrants in the European context. Based on respondents' agreement with the stereotype traits, an improved scale has been proposed also incorporating respondents' suggestions, which will be utilized in the original experimental design which will be laid out in Chapter 6.

5.0 CHAPTER 5: TESTING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK WITH A LARGE-N NATIONAL SURVEY

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In earlier chapters, I suggested that immigration positions are affected by the heterogeneity of immigrant groups and that treating them in an undifferentiated manner is likely to lead to biased results. I further argued that given the importance of symbolic considerations and prejudice in explaining attitudes in this issue realm, it is necessary to separate immigrants into groups and address the specific causal processes in place for each group. Finally, I suggested that, both the differentiation of immigration attitudes based on immigrant's origin and the impact of prejudice on this relationship is likely to be prone to another threat to validity: social desirability bias. I suggested that for a complete blueprint of immigration attitudes, the possible impact of this bias should be detected and controlled for.

In the cognitive interviews analyzed in the previous chapter, I found that when asked about immigration attitudes, respondents tend to think of different immigrant groups. Moreover, they categorize immigrants predominantly along the lines of national or ethnic

origin. This finding confirmed my expectations regarding the heterogeneity of immigrants and validated a separate analysis for these groups.

The cognitive interviews also pointed out that individuals think of some immigrant groups more than others when thinking about immigration. Not surprisingly, those groups are the ones that are seen as more alien and perceived as culturally most different than the majority of the host society and thus seem to pose symbolic threats. This finding further heightened the expectation that symbolic threat variables and prejudice would overshadow economic variables in explaining immigration attitudes. More specifically, most individuals naming Turks/Muslims as the first immigrant that comes to their mind may indicate that symbolic concerns inform opposition to this “defaulted” category but when other immigrants are considered, different causal mechanisms may inform people’s attitudes. All in all, the cognitive interviews verified the need for a rigorous test of these general suspicions with specific hypotheses.

In this chapter, I test these theoretical expectations by applying them to existing survey data from Germany. In doing so, I will address both sources of threats to the validity of existing research on immigration attitudes: *The heterogeneity of immigration attitudes* and *the possibility of social desirability bias*. The first part of this chapter will deal with the former, restate the hypotheses regarding differentiation of immigrants, and examine them descriptively and statistically within the context of survey data. The second part will reiterate the set of expectations regarding the social desirability bias, analyze its impact on respondents’ answers to survey questions, and finally examine the implications of this bias for earlier findings.

5.2 PART I: HETEROGENEITY OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES

In order to offer an improved analysis of immigration attitudes, I propose first differentiating immigrant groups based on their ethnic/national origin, and then explaining the reasons for opposing them. To account for the differentiation and the resulting categorization of immigrants, I put forward the concept of “perceived cultural similarity”. I argued that in the presence of different immigrant groups, the individual will first place them on a continuum in his mind based on how culturally similar he perceives immigrants and the host society to be. And this placement will not only impact the individual’s general level of opposition, but it will also shape the reasons for his preferences regarding immigration.

This leads to the first hypothesis in that,

***H₁:** The less culturally similar a given immigrant group is perceived, the more an individual will oppose immigration by members of that group.*

I further explicated that in addition to its direct effect, “perceived cultural similarity” may play an interactive role in informing attitudes towards immigration. Perceived cultural difference may act as a suppressor of the effects of cost-benefit calculations or evaluation of more realistic threats in opposing immigration of culturally alien groups in that;

H₂: For immigrants perceived culturally different, symbolic variables will inform people's attitudes towards immigration more than economic threat.

Whereas the absence of this difference will allow for more rational calculations in that;

H₃: For immigrants perceived culturally similar, economic threat will inform people's attitudes toward immigration more than symbolic variables.

5.2.1 Data and Methods

In order to illustrate the heterogeneous structure of immigration attitudes, I will utilize the 2006 German Social Research (ALLBUS) survey data, conducted with 3000 random sampled respondents from both (former) East and West Germany. The German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) collects up-to-date data on attitudes, behavior, and social structure in Germany. Every two years since 1980 a representative cross section of the population is surveyed using both constant and variable questions. Since 1992, the sample has been weighted by population such that 2,400 interviews are conducted in the western states and 1,100 in the eastern states.

For the 2006 data a two stage disproportionate random sample is drawn in western Germany (incl. West Berlin) and eastern Germany (incl. East Berlin) of all persons who resided in private households on the day of the interview and were born before 1 January 1988. In the first sample stage municipalities (Gemeinden) in western Germany and

municipalities in eastern Germany were selected with a probability proportional to their number of adult residents; in the second sample stage individual persons were selected at random from the municipal registers of residents. In the current 2006 data, respondents from the area of the new federal states are oversampled.

The fieldwork for this data was conducted between March 2006 and August 2006. A representative cross-section of the population was questioned using face-to-face interviews. The response rate was 40.2% for the Western sample and 42.8% for the Eastern sample, yielding a 41% response rate for the entire sample. Collected biannually, this is a very comprehensive survey instrument inquiring about respondents' opinions on an array of issues ranging from attitudes towards social inequality, assessments of general and personal economic situation, to lifestyles, political views and participation, religiosity and finally opinions on minorities and immigrants.¹⁴

With its breadth of coverage, this data proves indispensable for this dissertation project addressing many of the topics of interest all at the same time. This ALLBUS survey not only employs immigration questions differentiating across immigrant groups, it also includes standard prejudice scales along with general attitudinal questions about these immigrants. Additionally, with its balanced distribution of social, political, and economic topics, it also allows for equally strong economic and symbolic threat assessments. Finally, ALLBUS incorporates multiple psychological assessments, one of which is individual's willingness to give socially desirable answers.

¹⁴ For further information about the sampling and detailed questionnaire of the ALLBUS data, please refer to: <http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/allbus/>

ALLBUS survey asks respondents about their opposition to immigration regarding the following immigrant groups: EU immigrants, ethnic Germans, non-EU immigrants, and asylum seekers. To some degree, it must be argued that these groups do not exactly correspond to the immigrants differentiated along ethnic lines as the way it was theorized and suggested in the previous sections. Nevertheless, especially according to scholars involved with the data collection of ALLBUS, this is an acceptable differentiation in that these groups actually closely relate to another set of questions asking about minority attitudes along ethnic lines (Alba et al 2003). Accordingly, while the word “the EU immigrant” is mainly understood as Italian immigrants due to their historical and numerical presence in Germany, the non-EU immigrant groups correspond to the biggest immigrant group; Turks. While it is harder to suggest exactly who the asylum seekers, they are generally perceived to be illegal immigrants from Third World countries in Asia and Africa. The “Aussiedler” are Germans of ethnic descent, who came from Eastern Europe as immigrants after the end of the Cold War (Alba et al. 2003).

Unfortunately, these groups do not fully exhaust the ones originally suggested in the cognitive interviews as there is no non-German East European immigrant group listed such as Poles or Russians. Nonetheless, ALLBUS still has a more refined approach compared to many surveys by distinguishing across four different immigration groups with the second best alternative only distinguishing across two. More importantly, this survey inquires about the perceived difference of each and every group in question from Germans in terms of their lifestyle, which nicely taps the overall cultural distance assessment. Considering that my theoretical framework exclusively refers to the importance of cultural distance as a direct and indirect influence on the categorization and opposition of

immigrants, even though the groups in question are not perfect, the data allow for a robust and complete test of the theoretical propositions. A more detailed description of the variables employed for this and later stages of the analysis is provided in Appendix A.

5.2.2 Descriptive Analysis:

Before going into the statistical examination, a descriptive analysis will provide some insights into the data especially with regards to the aggregate patterns. This part therefore, will show basic perceptions of these four immigrant groups, illustrate the overall distribution of the respondents opposing these groups and whether or not this categorization corresponds to the cultural distance assessments.




Figure 5-1 Opposition to the immigration of different groups

The immigrant groups in Figure 5.1 are ranked from those least opposed by the public to mostly opposed. The graph illustrates that a much larger group of respondents think the EU immigrants should be allowed into Germany than the rest of the groups. Respectively, fewer people hold the idea of fully banning EU immigration as compared to the other three immigrant categories. Ethnic Germans and asylum seekers are placed in the middle in that, people oppose them less than non-EU immigrants and more than EU immigrants. Still more people oppose asylum seekers than ethnic Germans. Finally, of all groups non-EU immigrants are least wanted with the highest number of people opposing them. All in all, this graph illustrates that there are major differences between immigrant groups in terms of host society's opposition to them, possibly justifying a differentiation when analyzing attitudes towards them.

Having illustrated the potential of heterogeneity of immigration attitudes, the proposed explanation for these differences -cultural similarity- can be explored. Alba et al. (2003) and Wasmer and Koch (2003) suggest that for the earlier version of this data, acceptance of immigrants depends on ethnic origin and declines sharply from Italians to Turks to asylum seekers.

For the purposes of this study, what matters is not the actual cultural distance of these groups from German society, but each individual's perception of how culturally different these groups are. While these two tend to converge, there is still variation across individuals that needs to be accounted for and one must refrain from imposing an arbitrary criteria. Therefore, in order to measure how culturally distant or similar each group is perceived by each respondent respectively; another ALLBUS question inquiring about "similarity of lifestyles" of these groups is utilized. For this 2006 data, the cultural

similarity evaluations of respondents are illustrated in Graph 2, where smaller values indicate more perceived similarity and larger values indicate more perceived distance.




Figure 5-2 Germans' Perception of Immigrant Groups' Cultural Differences

Figure 5.2 suggests that there is a large similarity between ranking of immigration preferences and cultural similarity assessments of - single individual¹⁵. Accordingly, asylum seekers and non-EU immigrants are perceived culturally quite differently than the German population culturally and respectively, whereas EU immigrants and ethnic Germans are perceived comparatively much more similarly. Put together with the exclusivist attitudes towards these groups, data seem to suggest that at the aggregate level, similar groups are more *wanted* and different ones are more *unwanted*.

¹⁵ Note that the number of observations is the same for each of these groups as these are the same respondents evaluation of different groups

5.2.3 Statistical Analysis

1.2.3.1. Heterogeneity of Immigrants

The descriptive analysis illustrated that there are major differences across the way immigrant groups are categorized as well as excluded and this ranking appears to depend on people's cultural similarity assessments. However, a more rigorous technique with individual level data is required to actually illustrate the exact causal relationship between an individual's evaluation of an immigrants' cultural similarity and his opposition to this group. To this end, I will generate an item response model using a multilevel model estimation to assess the distinctiveness of each group and test the role of cultural similarity assessments.

In order to pursue these goals and account for the variation across individuals and across individuals' choices of preferred immigrants in the ALLBUS data, I will estimate a Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) predicting immigration attitudes with ordinal responses. This model is utilized to generate multilevel latent variable models for responses of the mixed type and it is used when observations exhibit clustering, as observations within clusters have a tendency to correlate.

The way ALLBUS data is collected exemplifies a common instance of this clustering as there is a repeated measure of each individual in the sample regarding immigration attitudes with regards to different groups. In this case the cluster consists of the set of immigration preferences/choices of the subject regarding each group and these choices are expected to correlate. This is because an individual's position regarding

immigration in general is likely to cause similarities and hence correlation across that individual's preferences related to the different prospective immigrant groups. And these preferences will exhibit a closer similarity as compared to this respondent vs. other respondents. As mentioned earlier, the ALLBUS data consists of individuals' responses to immigration of different groups and the respective evaluations of these groups in terms of their cultural similarity. At a separate level, like many surveys ALLBUS survey incorporates individual level variables. Due to their modeling structure, GLMM models account for variation at both of these different levels.

A standard OLS-type regression analysis is not appropriate for this data for a number of reasons. As Agresti et al. (2000) illustrate, for many applications of survey data, the observations in the dependent variable are not independent from each other. This is especially true for repeated measures of a variable at different times, or as it is the case for my analysis -when the components of the variable are measured consecutively. To account for the subject level clustering a GLMM introduces unobserved subject-level random effects denoted by u_i .

Furthermore, for continuous variables the multivariate normal distribution provides considerable flexibility for describing dependencies and account for clustering effects. However, for categorical variables like support for immigration in ALLBUS survey, the multivariate normal distribution is not a valid assumption. Much like an item response model, a GLMM model allows the treatment of those different immigration preferences as predictors of a latent immigration attitude variable, while also allowing every separate evaluation to function differently.

The resulting model looks as follows:

LEVEL 1:

$$\text{Prob}(Y_{ij} = \text{ethnic group} | m_n) = \Phi(\alpha_i + \beta_j + z_1 \text{Cultural Distance}_{ij} + z_2 \text{Prejudice}_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij})^{16}$$

and

LEVEL 2:

$$\alpha_i = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \text{Economy}_i + \gamma_{02} \text{East}_i + \gamma_{03} \text{Contact}_i + \gamma_{04} \text{Religiosity}_i + \gamma_{05} \text{Ideology}_i + \gamma_{06} \text{Education}_i + \gamma_{07} \text{Gender}_i + \gamma_{08} \text{Class}_i + \gamma_{09} \text{H.Income}_i + \gamma_{10} \text{Unemployed}_i + u_i$$

where Y_{ij} is respondent i 's ordinal opposition to immigration of each of the j immigrant group. In other words, the dependent variable corresponds to every individual's opposition evaluation for every immigrant group. Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function and α_i is the individual level intercept. β is the general difference in opposition to group j compared to a baseline group. In other words, β indicates whether or not respondents' evaluation of immigration of one group significantly differs from the other one, controlling for all other variables in the model. This part of the analysis will enable me to test if indeed there is a need for accounting for the heterogeneity of immigrants. Z is the ordered probit coefficient with respect to cultural difference perceptions and prejudice measured for each immigrant group. Finally, γ is the ordered probit coefficient with respect to individual

¹⁶ The variables cultural similarity, symbolic considerations (prejudice, social distance, contact), economic considerations (retrospective and prospective sociotropic and pocketbook considerations, income, length of unemployment, worrying about losing one's job), being from the former East, class, ideology, religiosity, education, age, gender will also be included in this model as independent variables in the latter part of the equation.

level variables; u is the individual specific random effect term, and ε is the individual and group choice specific error term.

In the aforementioned equation, β_j will explain the differences in Y_{ij} (the general effect of being a non-EU group, an asylum seeker, an ethnic German, etc.,) due to differences across different immigrant groups. By utilizing the survey analysis this way, I will be able to show that there are differences across immigrant groups and cultural similarity is influential in explaining this relationship. This difference across an individual's evaluation of different immigrant groups will manifest itself as the corresponding “ z ” terms of prejudice and cultural similarity, whereas the differences across different survey respondents will be shown in the respective “ y ” terms.

I estimated a number of item response models using GLAMM ordered logit estimation software package in Stata 9 as a discrete one factor model with random intercept and adaptive quadratures. The reason for the ordered logit estimation is the non-continuous but ordered structure of the dependent variable. As illustrated in the descriptive section, the dependent variable is individuals' opposition to each of these four groups expressed in three response categories.

I initially start with more parsimonious models using only Level 1 variables to evaluate the separate impact of these theoretically relevant variables on their own more clearly. Following that, I move to more complex models incorporating data at both levels and finally interactions of economic and symbolic variables with different immigrant groups.

Table 5.1 below illustrates the results of this first parsimonious model predicting opposition to immigration with the role of immigrant groups and cultural similarity perceptions.

Table 8 Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors for Ordered Logit Model on Immigration Attitudes for Different Reference Groups

Variable	Model 1
Item 1: (EU immigrant)	---
Item 2: (non-EU immigrant)	2.097*** (.073)
Item 3: (Asylum seeker)	1.052*** (.068)
Item 4: (ethnic German)	.853*** (.068)
Condition Number	4.063
Adjusted R ²	.030
N (Level 1)	11625
N (Level 2)	2936

** Indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence

*** Indicates statistical significance with 99% or greater confidence

In terms of the model fit, the R², log likelihood, and easy convergence with a few iterations indicate that the model was easily identified and it is fit to the data at hand. The logit coefficients for the three items –immigrant groups - indicate that they are significantly different from the reference category –EU immigrants - for Model 1 and that

they have a significant separate effect in terms of their prediction of the latent immigrant opposition trait confirming a heterogeneous understanding of immigration.

In addition to the result that being asked about each immigrant group significantly differs from the other in terms of the immigration attitudes, the rankings of the immigrants seems to correspond to individual's overall cultural similarity assessments. The descriptive analysis illustrated that the ordering of immigration from most to least wanted was as follows: EU immigrants, ethnic Germans, Asylum Seekers, and Non-EU immigrants. The results of the ordered logit estimates conform to that ranking in that, compared to EU immigrants, being asked about a non-EU immigrant increases one's likelihood of opposing immigration in a statistically significant way controlling for other immigrant categories.

The highest likelihood of opposition arises in the case of the Non-EU immigrant question, followed by Asylum seekers and finally ethnic Germans also closely corresponding to the aggregate cultural similarity assessments. These results first confirm that the immigrant group in question matters with regards to people's immigration preferences thus supporting the first hypothesis of this study. Furthermore, the high correspondence of the ranking of the immigrant groups with cultural distance assessments illustrates a possible direct effect of these assessments on immigration attitudes as stated by the second hypothesis.

5.2.3.2. Cultural Distance

The previous analysis suggests a possible impact of perceived cultural distance. Nevertheless, it falls short of rigorously testing its impact in the presence of a

heterogeneous understanding of immigrant groups. Furthermore, my initial hypotheses suggest both a direct (H_1) and an interactive (H_2 and H_3) impact of cultural distance in relation to economic and symbolic concerns. In order to be able to account for both of these issues, I estimated an additional set of models first incorporating cultural similarity into the model, followed by the inclusion of theoretically relevant interactive variables. The cultural similarity question is as follows:

“How similar do you think the lifestyle of the immigrant group (each group asked separately) to the majority of Germans”.

Where “1” indicates that the respondent strongly disagrees that the group in question differ from Germans in terms of their lifestyle and “7” indicates strong agreement with the group being different from the majority of Germans.

The GLMM specifications allowed a thorough test of this impact both within respondents and between them by including a separate scale score of cultural distance for each immigrant group into the first level of analysis just as the immigrant group dummies. In other words, there is a cultural similarity assessment of each immigrant group for every individual respondent and separate dummies for every immigrant group referred in the immigration question. Furthermore, this model specification allows for interacting the immigrant group dummies with economic perceptions, available only at the individual level (Level 2) and prejudice, available for each immigrant group at Level 1. Hence, in the following models I will interact economic and symbolic concerns –the latter as manifested in prejudice attribution, with culturally similar and different immigrant groups respectively.

Table 9 : Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors for Ordered Logit Model on Immigration**Attitudes with different Immigrants interacting with Prejudice and Economic Concerns**

	Model 2	Model 3	Model4	Model 5	Model 6
<u>LEVEL 1 Variables</u>					
Item 1: (EU immigrant)	-.302*** (.087)	-1.057*** (.167)	.308*** (.094)	-.706*** (.231)	-.564*** (.173)
Item 2: (Non-EU immigrant)	1.163*** (.071)	1.167*** (.072)	.840*** (.198)	.621*** (.242)	.746*** (.201)
Item 3: (ethnic German)	.108 (.072)	.101 (.073)	.454*** (.064)	.442*** (.079)	.451*** (.078)
Item 4: (Asylum Seeker)					
<i>reference category</i>					
Cultural Difference	.323*** (.022)	.310*** (.022)	.127*** (.023)	.131*** (.023)	.130*** (.023)
Prejudice			.210*** (.010)	.189*** (.011)	.193*** (.010)
Prejudice*non-EU			.034** (.013)	.043*** (.014)	.041*** (.014)
Prejudice*EU				.012 (.016)	
Economy*non-EU				.018 (.029)	
Economy*EU		.136*** (.026)		.148*** (.029)	.148*** (.027)
<u>LEVEL 2 Variables</u>					
Economy		.281*** (.022)		.210*** (.024)	.215*** (.021)
Condition Number	24.742	64.510	104.66	160.310	143.82
Adjusted R ²	.053	.065	.113	.124	.121
N (Level 1)	10970	10734	10641	10437	10437
N (Level 2)	2856	2789	2783	2722	2722

** Indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence

*** Indicates statistical significance with 99% or greater confidence

Model 2 illustrates the ordered logit coefficients for a model incorporating both the cultural distance evaluations as well as background of the prospective immigrant groups in explaining opposition to immigration. Consistent with the fundamental expectations of this project, not only cultural distance perfectly corresponds with immigration opposition at the aggregate level, it also has a statistically significant effect on immigration attitudes across respondents' preferences. In other words, the more culturally distant a respondent evaluates an immigrant group, the more she is likely to oppose them, confirming my first hypothesis.

Model 2 also demonstrates that, even when the impact of cultural similarity assessments is accounted for, there is still a considerable impact of specific immigrant groups on opposition to immigration. The reference category chosen was Asylum seekers as they stand in the middle in terms of their ranking regarding German's preference of them as immigrants. In particular, a mention of an EU immigrant group makes a respondent significantly less likely to oppose immigration compared to an Asylum seeker and controlling for other groups. Contrary to the EU immigrants, when a Non-EU immigrant is considered, a respondent is significantly more likely to oppose immigration than when an Asylum seeker is considered. However, once cultural distance assessments are incorporated into the model, ethnic German condition ceases to have a statistically significant impact on immigration attitudes. These sets of results illustrate that the background of the immigrant group has traits other than the cultural similarity of the immigrant group that seem to be influential on public attitudes (at least with respect to some immigrants).

Having illustrated the separate/direct impact of cultural similarity on immigration attitudes, in Models 3 through 5, I assess Hypotheses 3 and 4 regarding the interactive effect of cultural similarity. While it is also essential to examine the persistence of these relationships in the presence of all the important explanatory variables for immigration attitudes, for a clearer presentation of the consequences of the inclusion of every interaction term, a comprehensive model will be saved for a later stage.

With Hypothesis 3, I suggested that when a group is perceived culturally similar, opposition to this group would be mainly motivated by economic calculations as there is no major unknowns about this group which would create anxiety and suppress the rational calculations. Both the descriptive and preliminary analysis illustrated that, the EU immigrant group was consistently perceived the most culturally similar to German society.. My expectation, therefore, is that economic calculations should be more influential than prejudice in explaining attitudes towards EU immigrants. As shown in Appendix A, the economic variable mainly concerns the prospective and retrospective evaluations of the national economy and personal economic conditions.

Model 3 illustrates results from the first test of this hypothesis. As expected, the model shows a statistically significant interaction effect in the predicted direction, indicating that economic concerns are influential on immigration attitudes for all immigrants but more so when EU immigrants are considered. More specifically, a higher concern with economy predicts higher levels of opposition for immigrants from within the European Union. It should also be noted that the remaining variables continue to have similar effects to Model 2.

Model 4 introduces symbolic considerations, namely prejudice into the explanation of immigration attitudes. Prejudice measured as a standard scale of social distance illustrated in Appendix A exerts a statistically significant influence on immigration attitudes for all groups in that, high levels of prejudice predict higher opposition. But this impact is more pronounced for the Non-EU immigrants evidenced by a statistically significant interaction coefficient. In other words, as predicted, for the non EU immigrants prejudice has an additional impact on increasing likelihood to oppose them, more so than it affects attitudes toward other immigrant groups. This result confirms Hypothesis 4 in that prejudice matters more for the culturally different groups and does not have an interactive effect for culturally similar ones.

Up until this point, the analysis did not deal with the causal impact of symbolic and economic concerns *comparatively*, as far as the perceived cultural similarity of immigrant group is considered. In order to account for this dimension, Models 5 and 6 include economic and symbolic concerns simultaneously.

Model 5 illustrates that the impact of the interaction effects is in line with Hypotheses 3 and 4. Prejudice continues to have an additional negative impact when non-EU immigrants are considered in the presence of economic calculations. On the other hand, economic concerns continue to predict more opposition when the question mentions EU immigrants, controlling for the effect of prejudice. While this model confirms the expected conditional relationships in the existence of both competing explanations, it does not yet address the alternative explanations, which will be evaluated in the following section.

To side with parsimony especially considering the models with interactions, Model 6 incorporates only the interactions of these two competing explanations that were

hypothesized to have an impact on the dependent variable: Economic concerns interacting with EU immigrants and Prejudice interacting with Non-EU immigrants. The following sections of this chapter will treat this as the base model.

So far, I was able to illustrate that indeed economic concerns matter for immigration from within the EU and prejudice matters regarding immigration from outside of the EU. While this is an interesting finding by itself, a much preferable outcome regarding the theoretical framework of this dissertation would be to illustrate that economic concerns matter for groups perceived culturally similar *more* than for those perceived culturally different. Similarly, it would be more desirable to show that prejudice informs opposition to culturally different groups more so than it informs culturally similar groups. The estimation in Model 7 strives to achieve just that by including interactions of both variables with both immigrant groups.

As Model 5 illustrates, when all interactions are considered, the economic concerns continue to have a statistically significant impact on immigration, *however only for immigrants from within the EU*. When Non-EU immigrants are considered, the economic concerns cease to have a statistically significant impact on immigration, perfectly in line with the theoretical expectations outlined in this dissertation.

Prejudice also continues to have both a separate and interactive impact on immigration attitudes. However contrary to the economic concerns and consistent with Hypothesis 4, *higher levels of prejudice predict higher levels of opposition only regarding the non-EU immigrants*. When it comes to the EU immigrants, however, the impact of prejudice does not reach statistically significant level confirming the expectations regarding the implications of a heterogeneity of immigration perceptions.

While this discussion illustrates the interactive impact of cultural similarity perceptions manifested in relation to economic and symbolic concerns, the regression coefficients are meaningful in absolute terms and only in relation to the reference group – Asylum seekers. A graphical illustration of conditional effects based on additional lincom analysis could further illuminate this impact for different levels of economic and symbolic concern and in relation to each immigrant group. Therefore, graphs for the predicted probability of opposition were generated for different levels of these variables being interacted.




Figure 5-3 The Impact of Economic Concerns on Immigration Attitudes as a function of Immigrant Group

Figure 5.3 illustrates the effect of economic concerns on probability of opposing different immigrants, conditional upon immigrant group. The graph illustrates that, first, opposition to immigration is much higher for some immigrant groups ie. Non-EU as compared to others i.e EU immigrants. Furthermore, while higher levels of economic concern predict higher levels of opposition, this effect is mediated by the ethnic group. The predictive impact of economic concern is highest for EU immigrants as evidenced by the steeper orange line while, the relationship between economic concerns and immigration attitudes is weaker for other immigrant groups as evidenced by flatter lines in line with my predictions. More specifically, when economic concerns are low, EU immigrants are opposed the least, compared to the other immigrant groups and when economic concerns increase, they exert stronger influence on attitudes towards this group compared to others.




Figure 5-4 The Impact of Prejudice on Immigration Attitudes as a function of Immigrant Group

Similarly, Graph 5.4 illustrates the effect of the level of prejudice on probability of opposing different immigrants, conditional upon immigrant group. As shown, while higher levels of prejudice predict higher levels of opposition, this effect is also mediated by the ethnic group. The predictive impact of prejudice is highest for Non-EU immigrants as evidenced by the steeper blue line, while the relationship between prejudice and immigration attitudes is weaker for other immigrant groups compared to Non-EU immigrants as evidenced by flatter lines also confirming my predictions. In other words, at lower level of prejudice, there are small differences between people's attitudes towards these groups, but these differences increase markedly especially in disfavor of Non-EU

immigrants with prejudice affecting attitudes towards these groups much more strongly than other groups.

5.2.3.3. Alternative Explanations:

With these models, I was able to show first that immigrants are categorized based on their origin, second that this categorization has an impact on their assessment regarding their exclusion, third that cultural similarity determines this categorization and finally that economic and symbolic concerns interact with this cultural similarity assessment in informing preferences regarding immigration. However, with this analysis, I could only account for the two of the most common –and partly rival, explanations of immigration attitudes. While my analysis laid out the structure of these causal relationships, I did not yet account for the other alternative explanations of immigration attitudes. Neither did I fully test whether these results can withstand the inclusion of these control variables.

A comprehensive model of immigration attitudes includes additional variables: education, household income, class, gender, ideological placement, religiosity, being from the former East, being unemployed and the amount of contact with the immigrants.¹⁷ In a GLMM estimation, these individual level variables can be modeled at a separate level, as

¹⁷ In addition to the variables described below, the initial models I estimated incorporated the following independent variables: age, personal income, dummies for urban and suburban residency, being an unskilled worker, and duration of unemployment. However, they were excluded from the model as they failed to have a statistically significant impact on the dependent variable repeatedly, did not improve the model fit, and their omission had no significant effect on the on other IVs.

was the case with the economic concerns variable. Table 3 illustrates the parameter estimates and standard errors for two comprehensive models on immigration attitudes.

Table 5.3 Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors for Ordered Logit Model on Immigration Attitudes with all Control Variables

	Model 7
LEVEL 1 Variables	
Item 1: (EU immigrant)	-.642*** (.201)
Item 2: (non-EU immigrant)	.712*** (.233)
Item 3: (ethnic German)	.331*** (.089)
Item 4: (Asylum Seeker)	
Cultural Difference	.145*** (.026)
Prejudice	.162*** (.012)
Prejudice*non-EU	.042*** (.015)
Prejudice*EU	
Economy*non-EU	
Economy*EU	.147*** (.031)
LEVEL 2 Variables	
East	.242** (.117)
Contact	-.215*** (.043)
Religiosity	-.159*** (.043)
Left to Right	.145*** (.028)
Education	-.359*** (.049)
Gender (female)	-.020 (.096)
Class	.070 (.083)
Household Income	-.011 (.011)
Unemployed	.280** (.136)
Economy	.108*** (.026)
Condition Number	261.465
Adjusted R ²	.116
N (Level 1)	7837
N (Level 2)	2018

** Indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence

*** Indicates statistical significance with 99% or greater confidence

Model 7 illustrates that, the inclusion of the alternative explanations did not reverse or alter any of the previously shown relationships. In terms of the Level 2 variables though, the analysis unveiled some results of interests. The first of those results relates to the East and West comparison. Accordingly, despite a comprehensive model incorporating all possible explanations of immigration attitudes such as contact, prejudice and socio-economic indicators as well as evaluations, being from the former Eastern Germany still makes one more likely to oppose immigration. This result indicates that even twenty years after the Berlin Wall came down, there are still major differences in people's attitudes between the West and the East . Furthermore, these differences cannot be fully accounted for by inclusion of standard predictors such as economic and symbolic concerns into the models and they may possibly stem from contextual and historical differences that occurred over a long time span. The second section of this chapter will go on to examine this point in relation to some common but consistently ignored measurement biases.

Another interesting result relates to religiosity. According to Model 7, higher levels of religiosity actually predict lower opposition to immigration. As the prejudiced individuals are accounted for with the controls what remains of religiosity possibly refers to universalistic element of religious value system. Nevertheless, the ideological inclination continues to have a significant impact on immigration attitudes despite all the controls, in that, moving from an individual identifying on the left of the political spectrum to one on the right significantly increases his odds of opposing immigration.

Not surprisingly, having more contact with foreigners decreases one's likelihood of opposing immigration, confirming the expectations of Pettigrew and his collaborators on

the contact hypothesis. This result should be seen in light of the variables accounting for symbolic explanations for immigration attitudes such as prejudice and cultural similarity. This significant result may reflect the impact of contact referring to the part of prejudice which does not rest on actual value conflict between the host society and immigrants, but pure fear of the unknown.

Another anticipated result relates to education in that higher levels of education lead to lower opposition to immigration. Considering the wealth and tolerance generating effects of education are accounted for with the other control variables, this result could indicate the knowledge aspect of immigration in that knowing better about immigration may lead to more complex and favorable views of immigration.

Gender, class, and income do not have statistically significant effect on immigration attitudes. Part of this lack of sizable impact especially regarding class and income could be as a result of the detailed pocketbook and sociotropic evaluations used to generate the economic concerns variable overshadowing the effect of these variables. Nevertheless, being unemployed still leads to more opposition to immigration, controlling for both economic and symbolic concerns.

5.2.3.4. Summary

In the first part of this chapter, I attempted to lay out and test a model of immigration attitudes accounting for the way immigrants are pictured in the majority's mind. I argued that asking a single question about immigration without specifying the kind of immigrant groups in relation to their origins may lead to biased results. Upon probing the plausibility

of this assertion with cognitive interviews, I found supporting results validating an analysis of a large-N survey differentiating the immigrant groups based on origin.

While the groups mentioned in the survey did not perfectly correspond to the ones named in the cognitive interviews, the large sample size of this survey, coupled with a meaningful differentiation of immigrants and corresponding cultural similarity and prejudice assessments made this data appropriate for the purposes of this study. A multilevel model accounting for both the differences across respondents and across evaluations of different immigrants within one individual enabled me to perform a rigorous test of my initial hypotheses.

With this analysis, I also showed that my four major hypotheses regarding the heterogeneity of immigrants, the role of cultural similarity on their categorization and the interactive role of symbolic and economic concerns were fully confirmed. I thereby can argue that the pronounced role of symbolic variables in explaining immigration attitudes was due to the truncation of the dependent variable and most people thinking predominantly about culturally different immigrant groups. By disentangling the category of immigrants based on their background and their perceived cultural distance, I could present a more nuanced explanation regarding the variety of reasons for opposing them.

5.3 PART II: THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS

In the first part of this chapter I tackled the measurement of immigration attitudes and the common assumption about the perception of immigrants as an all inclusive group,

demonstrated the perceived differences across immigrant groups, and generated a model to account for this differentiation. However as far as measurement issues go, out-group attitudes suffer from another major threat: social desirability bias.

Briefly defined as the respondents' aspiration to give socially desirable answers and "look good" to the researcher, social desirability bias is a mostly ignored threat to the reliability of explanations regarding out-group attitudes. I therefore suggest that in order to offer a complete blueprint of immigration attitudes and illustrate this heterogeneous understanding of immigrants coherently, the effects of this bias should be demonstrated, and implications of this effect should be discussed. This is also necessary in order to be able to assess the validity of the results from previous sections and discuss the implications of this bias, if not fully attempt to eliminate it yet.

In this part of this chapter, I aim to address this measurement bias as an additional way of refining my explanations for immigration attitudes and illustrate its implications. In order to achieve this, I will generate selected models in the preceding section for two subsamples of individuals separately –those high in social desirability bias and those who are low in social desirability bias. I generate these two subsamples based on individuals' scores on a separate Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability Bias Scale, which will be shortly discussed in detail. I will then compare these two subsamples in an attempt to detect the ways in which this bias operates.

A more efficient way of doing this could be argued to be in terms of introducing additional interactions of social desirability scores with the explanatory variables. However, given the existing interactions in the model specifications for the models from the previous section, this procedure would result in triple interaction terms leading to

difficulties in presenting and interpreting the results substantively. Therefore, to side on the simplicity of presentation, instead of additional interactions I will illustrate the impact of social desirability by generating models for two subsamples.

In the theory chapter, I explicated the way in which I expect social desirability to impact explanations of immigration attitudes in detail. I argued that, their avoidance of disapproval may motivate individuals to hide their real attitudes towards immigrants when their attitudes are asked about. The first way I expected this impact was in relation to acceptance of the immigration of some groups more than others. I expect this bias to be more pronounced in a survey setting like in the ALLBUS, where respondents are asked about their immigration attitudes consecutively, regarding one group after another. In an attempt to hide their favoritism of certain groups or their impartiality to others, they may feel a pressure to be consistent across these groups. In other words, respondents may hide their actually differing levels of opposition stemming from the origin of the prospective immigrant.

***H₁:** For individuals not prone to social desirability bias (low SDB group) the impact of group reference on opposition to immigration will be stronger than the high SDB group.*

I further identified additional mechanisms for the impact of social desirability in relation to the impact of prejudice, and being from the former East.

H₂: For the individuals not prone to social desirability bias (low SDB group) the relationship between prejudice and opposition to immigration will be stronger than the high SDB group.

And I expect this relationship to be even more pronounced with regards to the immigration of groups that are perceived to be different because both of those variables will be contaminated with this bias otherwise. Therefore, I expect a triple interaction in that;

H₃: Regarding attitudes towards culturally different groups, for low SDB prone respondents the explanatory power of prejudice will be higher than high SDB group.

Finally, as I suggested, part of the reason for continued impact of being from the former East could be the lack of the political correctness norms that are widespread in the former West. In other words, admitting to opposition to immigration may be simply more acceptable for the Easterners whereas it may indicate an expression of racist attitudes for Westerners, leading to reluctance to admit unfavorable out-group attitudes and biased responses. Therefore, part of the reason why Easterners appear to have more opposition to immigrants could be because they are not afraid to reveal their true preferences as opposed to Westerners who feel compelled by the norms of political correctness.

H₉: Regarding attitudes towards immigration, the impact of social desirability bias will be larger for Westerners than for Easterners.

5.3.1 Data and Methods

As argued in the theory chapter, the potential problems associated with social desirability bias have been widely acknowledged. However, little has been done to actually detect and analyze the consequences of this bias. Among those limited attempts, sociologists, psychologists as well as political scientists employed a number of methods to deal with social desirable responding (Paulhus 1991). Of these methods, some deal with detection and measurement of social desirability bias, while others focus on eliminating it.

At this stage, we know very little about the potential threats of this bias on immigration attitudes in the German context. Therefore, initially I will focus on detecting and identifying its impact and then attempt to eliminate it. Nederhof (1985) argues that the use of social desirability scales is the most common way to detect this bias in survey analysis. For this analysis, the Marlowe-Crowne scale, undoubtedly the most popular scale used by scholars in multiple disciplines for over four decades, will be utilized.

Marlowe-Crowne is an additive scale created from items that are theoretically unrelated to the concepts researchers want to measure such as prejudice or attitudes towards multiculturalism but drawn from a domain of behaviors which are ‘culturally sanctioned and approved, but which are improbable of occurrence’. In other words, people are presented with statements which emphasize desirable traits of an individual such as

being very hardworking, polite, honest etc. but really hard to fully agree or disagree for negative items for an honest respondent.

One example of a positive Marlowe-Crowne item is “I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake”. Even for a person who takes criticism well, it is really hard to agree with this statement and agree to admit a mistake at all times willingly. There are definitely times for every individual when he is not willing to accept making a mistake. So to give an affirmative answer to this question is highly unlikely. Therefore, anyone who gives this answer scores “1 point” on the SDB scale.

An example of a negative item is: ‘I like to gossip at times.’ It is really hard to think of someone who could disagree with this statement completely. Even people who do not gossip much cannot say they never like to gossip at all. So, to give a negative answer to this question is highly unlikely and anyone who gives this answer scores another “1 point” on the SDB scale. At the end, respondents who continuously give the unlikely but desirable answer will score high and others will score low on the scale.

Some examples of other items are: ‘Before voting, I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all candidates.’ or “I always try to practice what I preach’ or ‘I never called in sick for work, (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964). At the end of taking this survey instrument, the respondents who consistently give the socially desirable response and avoid accepting their imperfections in order to present a better picture of themselves will rank high on this social desirability scale.

As one of the earliest social desirability scales, Marlowe-Crowne scale has been criticized on a number of accounts, but as Nederhof (1985) Paulhus (1991) argue, no

alternative scale clearly supersedes this scale in all respects. Therefore, Marlowe-Crowne continues to be the most commonly used scale in multiple disciplines.

The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale has been translated into numerous languages and its various shortened versions are available (Greenwald and Satow, 1970; Nederhof 1981). German Social Research Survey ALLBUS 2006 employs a German translation of one of the shortened versions of this scale consisting of 10 items that are most likely to approximate what all 33 items would capture statistically.

This comparison will allow me to illustrate first, whether or not this bias actually has a suppressor effect. And if it does, the way variables relate to the dependent variable at low levels of SDB will serve as an ideal case scenario, a sample, which is not contaminated by people's aspiration to hide their true attitudes to conform societal norms.

5.3.2 Statistical Analysis

For this analysis, the individual responses to different items will be added to create a social desirability variable. The sample was divided into two groups, those who have higher than average scores on the social desirability scale (High SDB) and those who have lower than average (Low SDB). In order to have a fuller understanding of the extent to which social desirability affects our results, the same models from the first part are generated.

Table 5.4 The impact of social desirability bias on immigration attitudes

	<u>MODEL 8</u>		<u>MODEL 9</u>		<u>MODEL 10</u>	
	<u>High SDB</u>	<u>Low SDB</u>	<u>High SDB</u>	<u>Low SDB</u>	<u>High SDB</u>	<u>Low SDB</u>
<u>LEVEL 1 Variables</u>						
Item 1: (EU immigrant)	-.294** (.116)	-.305** (.134)	.297** (.124)	.328** (.144)	-.493* (.273)	-.806*** (.300)
Item 2: (non-EU immigrant)	1.032*** (.094)	1.343*** (.110)	.839*** (.262)	.832*** (.304)	.632* (.312)	.801** (.351)
Item 3: (ethnic German)	-.040 (.096)	.309*** (.112)	.328** (.102)	.710*** (.118)	.190 (.120)	.502*** (.134)
Item 4: <i>Reference Cat.</i> (Asylum Seeker)						
Cultural Difference	.340*** (.029)	.303** (.033)	.146*** (.031)	.107*** (.035)	.152*** (.035)	.142*** (.039)
Prejudice			.209*** (.014)	.212*** (.016)	.170*** (.016)	.150*** (.018)
Prejudice*non-EU			.024 (.017)	.050** (.020)	.042* (.021)	.044* (.024)
Economy*EU					.133*** (.041)	.161*** (.056)
<u>Level 2 Variables</u>						
East					.338** (.161)	.139 (.173)
Contact					-.187*** (.062)	-.248*** (-.063)
Religiosity					-.110* (.056)	-.231*** (.067)
Left to Right					.144*** (.037)	.150*** (.040)
Education					-.340*** (.071)	-.388*** (.070)
Gender (female)					.050 (.132)	-.017 (.139)
Class					.079 (.118)	.060 (.121)
Household Income					-.018 (.017)	-.001 (.016)
Unemployed					.314 (.198)	.218 (.186)
Economy					.121*** (.035)	-.090** (.039)
Condition Number	24.326	25.364	102.197	108.071	261.266	263.501
Adjusted R ²						
N (Level 1)	6217	4753	5969	4672	4252	3585
N (Level 2)	1625	1231	1570	1213	1100	918

Table 5.4 illustrates three models portraying the heterogeneous understanding of immigration, estimated for respondents at two different levels of social desirability. High SDB models consist of the subset of individuals (and their consecutive immigration preferences) who ranked high on the Marlowe Crowne social desirability bias and can be assumed to be the ones who are more likely to hide their true preferences given their high need for approval. The Low SDB models on the other hand incorporate individuals who scored considerably low on the same scale indicating they do not feel as much social pressure to hide their feelings.

Model 8 incorporates the basic Level 1 variables of group references and cultural similarity assessments. One striking result is that, for the high SDB condition, in relation to immigration attitudes, being asked about an ethnic German is not statistically significantly different from being asked about an Asylum seeker. However for the low SDB group, ethnic German group's mention increases natives' likelihood of opposition. This may be because those who worry about their desirability may feel compelled to express solidarity with other Germans and thus support this group. Furthermore, both other group references seem to have more distinct effects in terms of magnitude for low SDB sample as compared to the high SDB one, partly confirming the first hypothesis.

Model 9 incorporates both prejudice and its interaction with the non-EU immigrants as a way to test the second and third hypotheses of this section. The direct impact of prejudice does not really differ much across subsamples, failing to support the second hypothesis. However, with regards to the impact of culturally different Non-EU group, there are stark differences between the two subsamples.

With regards to Non-EU immigration, for the high social desirability group the relationship between prejudice and opposition is weak and not statistically significant. Yet, for the low desirability group, higher levels of prejudice predict higher levels of opposition consistent with the third hypothesis. In other words, while the high SDB group hides its prejudice leading to non-significant relationship, the low SDB group reveals the uncontaminated relationship between these variables.

Finally, Model 10 compares the two subsamples for a comprehensive model with all the individual (second) level variables and alternative explanations. This comprehensive model further confirms H1 of this section in that, while group references seem to have either no or weak impact on opposition for the High SDB group, for those who are not constrained by this bias, they have much larger and statistically significant impact on immigration attitudes. In other words, while the highly biased group seeks to be consistent across groups in its immigration preferences, the unbiased group reveals stronger impact of the group in question. Surprisingly, the difference between the interaction term for prejudice in the High SDB and low SDB groups disappear once I control for the Level 2 factors.

With regards to Level 2 variables, this Model allows us to test H₄ regarding East Germans. Accordingly, when highly biased individuals are considered, there seems to be a statistically significant effect of being from the East in that, being Easterner makes one more likely to be exclusivist. In the unbiased group is considered, there is no difference between Easterners and Westerners. In other words, as expected part of the reason why Westerners appear more tolerant regarding immigration attitudes is their desire to be politically correct and give socially approved responses.

Other interesting results relate to religiosity and contact, in that they both seem to have a considerably stronger impact for the unbiased group, both reducing the likelihood of opposing immigrants. These could be due to people's tendency to over report their religiosity as well as their contact with minorities due to their bias and actually not carrying the real characteristics of this trait. In other words, the religious individuals and those with more contact in the low desirability bias condition probably show the uncontaminated impact on immigration attitudes.

To sum up, in this section I hoped to improve my explanation of immigration attitudes by further separating the impact of one of the major potential threats to validity. I illustrated that not only my proposed model of differentiating immigrants holds given the potential threats, but my hypotheses hold when the impact of social desirability bias was cleaned out. I further illustrated that this bias is not only important with regards to a heterogeneous explanation of immigration attitudes but it also biases the existing models as far as many of the important explanatory variables are concerned.

5.4 CONCLUSIONS

Do we need a heterogeneous understanding of immigration or can we treat all immigrants as one when analyzing public opinion? In an attempt to generate a convincing and comprehensive answer to this question, this chapter employed a number of modes of analysis. First of all, the results illustrate that people have a differentiated understanding of immigration. They think of different groups when they are led to think about immigration

and this has major implications for the existing research. In accordance with my predictions, the analysis also suggests that people place immigrants on a cultural similarity continuum and utilize this positioning as a cue to decide on their attitudes regarding this group.

In addition to illustrating this differentiation and what accounts for it, this chapter also attempted to show the different dynamics of attitudes towards these groups. I theorized that culturally different groups would be evaluated through the lens of prejudice and economic concerns would be suppressed because of that. The analysis confirms these findings in that prejudice was influential in explaining opposition to Non-EU immigrants whereas the impact of economic variables did not reach statistically significant levels. I also theorized that regarding the culturally similar immigrants, economic concerns would be the major triggers of opposition. As predicted, for these groups economic variables have a more important explanatory power as compared to culturally different groups, their impact is far superior than those of symbolic variables.

The second part of this chapter asked whether or not social desirability bias contaminates our explanations of immigration attitudes and the specific one generated by this dissertation project. My portrayal of the conditional and suppressive effect of social desirability on immigration attitudes in general and on the measurement of critical values such as prejudice suggests this to be the case.

All in all, this chapter casts doubt about existing literature omitting the differentiation of immigration attitudes and social desirability effects. I pointed out the possible ways this differentiation can be accounted for –such as incorporating the idea of cultural similarity and the interaction of the background of immigrants with economic and

symbolic concerns. Furthermore, I laid out the mechanisms for understanding social desirability in relation to immigration attitudes and showed possible ways for empirically testing this effect.

Therefore, the next step for this dissertation project will be generating a novel research design to account for both the heterogeneity of immigration perceptions and social desirability bias in more refined ways. This is essential partly because the immigrant groups people listed during the cognitive interviews do not fully correspond to the ALLBUS data, suggesting that this survey data probably did not capture the entire picture regarding heterogeneity. Furthermore, having illustrated the ways in which social desirability bias is present in the ALLBUS data, a better design such as an experiment should eliminate this bias and portray a more accurate picture of immigration attitudes.

6.0 CHAPTER 6: TESTING THE HETEROGENEOUS MODEL OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES WITH AN EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapters, I argued that the attempts to improve on the measurement issues related to immigration attitudes remains rather limited. In the previous empirical chapters, I utilized a series of tools such as cognitive interviews and secondary analysis of ALLBUS survey to show that people categorize immigrants based on their ethnicity, and that different concerns inform their attitudes related to these different groups. In particular, I illustrated that economic considerations are important but they motivate opposition to immigrants that are perceived as culturally similar to a larger extent than those perceived as culturally different. However, prejudice and symbolic considerations are the primary causes of opposition to immigrants that are perceived to be culturally different.

In addition to tackling the lack of differentiation in measuring the dependent variable, I also pointed out an important threat to the validity of all explanations of out-group attitudes, namely social desirability bias. I found that the attitudinal structure of people regarding immigrants is overshadowed by to their desire to respond to survey questions in a socially desirable way. More specifically, this bias constitutes a major

problem both regarding people's willingness to differentiate their attitudes towards different immigrant groups as well as their scores on prejudice scales in these surveys.

In this chapter, I propose and execute an alternative method to establish the impact of the ethnicity of immigrants in a superior way in terms of establishing causality, which helps to overcome social desirability bias as well. Specifically, I utilize an original survey experiment, which I conducted in Germany in the summer of 2009 with an embedded priming experiment about immigrant groups. Furthermore, instead of the arbitrary immigrant categories employed by the ALLBUS survey that I previously analyzed, this experiment inquired about immigrant categories generated through the results of the in-depth cognitive interviews. In addition to these benefits, this experiment also allows me to illustrate the impact of issue framing as a situational trigger as opposed to existing predispositions with a careful comparison of Germans' attitudes from the former East and the West. While the last point is not one of the major contributions raised in this dissertation, this distinction may lead to future directions relative to framing immigration attitudes.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will first lay out my specific hypotheses stemming from the theoretical framework illustrated in chapter 3. Following that, I will present my research design to test these specific hypotheses. Upon a detailed description of the priming experiment with a special focus on the instruments used, I will analyze the data in relation to my specific assertions. I will conclude by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of my results.

6.2 WHY AN EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN?

“Could you tell the difference between a conversation in which Italians were talking about the same group of immigrants throughout and another in which, midway through they switched and began to talk about an entirely different group of immigrants?”

(Sniderman et al. 2000:52)

Following the idea that ethnic and racial cues are potent and affect ridden symbols in many societies (Mackie and Smith 2003; Sears 2001), I argue that different immigrants trigger distinct reasoning mechanisms for exclusion, and in the end the ethnic background of the immigrant *does matter*. In other words, I suggest that the arguments used against immigrant groups of a certain ethnic origin are inherently different than those used against other groups, and therefore the answer to Sniderman’s question could be a “yes”.

In this chapter, I will analyze attitudes towards immigrants with special consideration to measurement issues in the face of my earlier results about how social desirability bias afflicts the measurement of these sensitive issues related to out-group exclusion. I continue to argue for a differentiation among immigrants when explaining public opinion towards immigration in Germany, a country where this differentiation is expected to prevail in the presence of immigrant groups with multiple ethnic and religious backgrounds. Borrowing from existing psychology literature, I expect people’s opinions to be primarily informed by “perceived cultural similarity” when it comes to their attitudes toward different immigrants. And I also continue to argue that in addition to its direct impact on immigration attitudes, cultural similarity has a conditional impact via heightening economic and symbolic concerns in different ways.

However, instead of proposing to test these expectations in a conventional survey, this time I propose an alternative method. While a secondary analysis of surveys is very valuable in terms of understanding public opinion towards immigration, it has a number of limitations. An experimental design however, can account for these shortcomings in four major ways.

The first way an experimental design can improve on the existing methods of query relates to the issue of social desirability bias. In Chapter 5, I illustrated in detail the extent to which this bias impacts the measurement of immigration attitudes and the relationships between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. I argued that, given the magnitude of this overshadowing impact of social desirability bias, for a better understanding of immigration attitudes, its impact should be eliminated.

As suggested earlier, a social desirability scale is useful to the extent of detecting and measuring the effect of this bias. However, when it comes to reducing this bias a different set of methods should be employed (Nederhof 1985) and an experimental design will serve this purpose best. In particular, the ALLBUS survey setting puts a number of hard to meet demands on individuals.

The first issue relates to the measurement of the dependent variable. As I suggested earlier, a survey setting puts a very high desirability pressure on respondents with the expectation to express their differing preferences regarding different immigrant groups all listed in a series of questions. In this survey setting, it is virtually impossible to account for respondents' desire to be consistent across each group and eliminate their social desirability bias when it comes to differentiation of immigrants.

An experimental manipulation on the other hand allows for a between subjects

design, whereby one set of respondents are asked about their preferences regarding one immigrant group and a second set of respondents are asked about another immigrant group. This is very different than asking one respondent about different immigrant groups one after the other. In the survey context, respondents may feel the need for consistency as preferring one immigrant group over another one may imply they have racist attitudes.

The actual elimination of social desirability therefore stems from the deception, or omission of the information about the other group's manipulation. As the respondent does not know that while he is asked about attitudes towards Turks, the other is asked about Poles. Having no idea what kind of treatments the other groups get, possible comparisons that can be drawn and having no concerns about appearing racist by preferring one group over the other, the respondent has little to no incentive to hide her true preferences about her opinions on one immigrant group.

A second issue of a survey regarding socially desirable responding is related to the measurement of an important explanatory variable. The measurement of prejudice in ALLBUS falls short of minimizing social desirability bias by simply requiring respondents to agree with statements about immigrants. Even the items in subtle prejudice scales require a fair amount of courage and honesty from the respondent if he were to accept being prejudiced. An alternative way an experiment setting can enable a better measurement of prejudice would be not only to ask their agreement with the stereotypical traits pre-tested in Chapter 4, but also combining this more subtle ways of measuring prejudice such as respondents' response latency.

In addition to the social desirability issues, an experimental design will improve the analysis in a second major way by allowing for inference with high internal validity.

Considered the “gold standard” of causal inference, McDermott(2002) argues a laboratory setting allows investigators to control all aspects of the environment so that only the independent variables differ, and therefore any differences in the dependent variable can be attributed to the manipulation, indicating strong cause-and-effect relationships. Applied to my project, with an experimental design I will be able to isolate the external stimuli and address differences across individuals’ immigration attitudes to the kind of ethnicity manipulation they received.

Furthermore, by randomly assigning subjects to different treatments (i.e. primes, questions) that represent a causal factor of interest enables researchers to reach the conclusion that they have two groups that are equivalent with the exception of the groups’ ethnicity. As argued by many scholars defending more use of experimental methods in the field of politics, no other methodology can offer such strong support for the causal inferences experiments allow with the randomization and control over other independent variables (Mook 1983, Kinder and Palfrey 1993, McDermott 2002).

Third, an experimental design embedded in a survey would grant the flexibility of generating original and better measures of important variables, thereby allowing for a test of the theoretical expectations with variables of high construct validity. In other words, not being dependent on secondary data resources allows for more nuanced considerations of the measurement of variables of interest.

Regarding the dependent variable, attitudes towards different immigrants, there is reason to believe that the immigrant categories included in the German Social Research Survey do not fully correspond to what the majority of the population thinks of immigrants. As already suggested, I expect people to differentiate between immigrants along ethnic

lines more so than a vague EU vs. non-EU vs. asylum seeker. Re-examining my theoretical expectations with new data incorporating more appropriate group of immigrants is likely to provide more efficient models as well as a much better test of my hypotheses.

Last, an experimental design can also demonstrate how strongly people hold on to their attitudes prior to partaking in the experiment, and how open they are to manipulation. This can be gauged with an experimental setting mimicking a real world scenario, where people are exposed to information and reevaluate their positions based on the kind of information they receive. Since immigration is a highly debated issue in Germany, an experimental design will also allow for the testing of different frames of the issue in relation to the main theoretical expectations of this project. Sniderman et al. (2004) argue that opposition to immigration seems responsive to situational triggers such as economic or cultural threats or the salience of national identity (Sniderman et al. 2004). In this vein, an experimental design can gauge the manipulability of people's immigration attitudes and shed light to the debate about predisposing factors and situational triggers.

All in all, testing my theoretical expectations in a solid and causally rigorous way with an experimental design will complement the earlier analyses and strengthen my conclusions. I will be less constrained by the issues of external validity criticized about experiments both due to my previous test of my assertions with large-N data, and my emphasis on approximating a real life situation with my experimental manipulation and non-student sample.

6.3 HYPOTHESES

In order to apply my theoretical expectations and my emphasis on the ethnicity of immigrants to an experimental context, I conducted a priming experiment. With this experimental design, respondents will be presented with an informational text/newspaper article, similar to the one they would be exposed in real life in terms of its themes and framing, but also strongly emphasizing the ethnicity of an immigrant group. The experiment consists of a between subject design where respondents are randomly assigned to these informational texts each incorporating different ethnicity cues. Following the experimental manipulation, respondents will be presented with a question about their attitudes towards immigration. I expect the initial ethnic group they were led to think of, to have an impact on the kind of support they have for immigration.

The main challenge of a priming experiment regarding out-group attitudes relates to the malleability of the respondents opinions on immigration. The cognitive interviews illustrated that when thinking about immigration most Germans have specific ethnic groups and predispositions in mind. In other words, the question really is if immigration attitudes are really manipulable. A control group should shed some light to this aspect by illustrating the attitudes of those who are not exposed to any prime.

Furthermore, certain groups or individuals in a society may be more prone to priming than others. The experimental design assumes that those individuals who are easily manipulated, as well as those more resistant to it, are randomly distributed within each manipulation cell. However, if there is an identifiable group of non-manipulable respondents gathered around a common dimension, such as a specific background variable

or education, this would introduce a non-random error into the models and may necessitate a more detailed analysis regarding these dimensions.

Bearing these issues in mind, with this experimental design I hope to address the following questions:

1. Does making someone aware of one ethnic group rather than the other lead to more opposition to immigration? In other words, does priming with one immigrant group as opposed to the other cause people to have differing opinions on immigration?
2. Does exposure to negative implications of immigration make people oppose immigration more and respectively, does a discussion of benefits of immigration reduce their exclusivist preferences?
 - 2.a. If the ethnicity prime does matter, can this effect be mitigated by the tone of the informational text? In other words, is the favorable information about immigration more influential for some groups in shaping attitudes than the others? Or are people's predispositions so strong that once made aware of an immigrant group, they are influenced by their existing beliefs, rejecting any mitigating impact?
3. Does it matter if the prime focuses on different issues in relation to ethnicity of immigrant groups? In other words, do economic and symbolic arguments work differently for culturally similar ethnic groups as opposed to culturally different ones?

Based on the previous theoretical discussion I propose the following hypotheses:

1. The ethnicity of the immigrant matters in that;

H₁: *Those primed with an immigrant group that they perceive culturally different are more likely to oppose this ethnic group than those primed with an immigrant group that is perceived culturally similar.*

2. The tone of the information piece matters in that;

H₂: *Those primed with a negative information/newspaper article are more likely to oppose immigration than those primed with a positive article.*

2.i The tone should also matter in relation to ethnicity of immigrants in that;

H₃: *The negative information about a culturally different immigrant group will lead to more opposition than the negative information about a culturally similar group.*

and

H₄: *The positive information about a culturally similar immigrant group will lead to more support than the positive information about a culturally different group.*

3. The issue frame should matter in that;

H₅: An evaluation of symbolic costs of immigration will lead to more opposition when it concerns a culturally different group than when it is about a culturally similar group.

H₆: An evaluation of economic costs of immigration will lead to more opposition when it concerns a culturally similar group than when it is about a culturally different group.

6.4 DATA AND METHODS

6.4.1 Participants and Design

Respondents for this survey experiment were recruited from the participant database of the German market research company Schmiedl gmbh. 208 individuals (103 male, 105 female) were recruited to participate in this study. All respondents were residents of the city and suburbs of Berlin. A Schmiedl employee called every participant to set up an appointment for taking the survey experiment in return for a financial incentive. All participants were required to have German born parents to ensure that they are all ethnically German. Half of the subject pool consisted of individuals born and raised in former Eastern Germany. In addition to quotas on gender and East and West background, recruitment was performed to ensure a high variation in age, income, and education. The median subject was 41 years old with some college and a household income of 24,000

Euros. The median interview was 14 minutes and 40 seconds. Recruited respondents were welcomed and seated in the computer lab within the premises of the market research firm and informed that they will be part of an experiment about current social issues.

Via the consent forms all participants were told that they were about to participate in a survey regarding current social issues. They were informed about possible risks associated with this survey experiment and promised to be paid whether or not they complete the survey. All of the subjects completed the survey regardless.

6.4.2 Procedure

Special attention was paid to ensure the privacy of the respondents as they participated because one of the main purposes of the study was to minimize social desirability effects due to the sensitive nature of the topic. In order to achieve this, three subjects were recruited at a time and they were seated around three sides of a square table. The subjects had no way of seeing computer screen of other subjects and becoming aware of the manipulation and guessing the intent of the study. A survey employee seated them, gave instructions with the handling of the computer, and informed them that he will be available throughout the interview if they had any questions. Upon expressing his availability when needed, the survey employee withdrew to his seat which had no visibility of any of the computer screens. Unless approached by a subject, the employee avoided further interaction and direct eye-contact with the subjects, and pretended to read a paper.

The study followed a 3 (ethnic group: Turkish vs. Italian vs. Polish immigrant frame) x 2 (tone: evaluation of costs vs. benefits of immigration) x 2 (issue: on economic vs. symbolic) randomized between subjects design with a control group. 12 subjects were recruited for each condition combination and were presented with the manipulations in the form of a fabricated newspaper article.

Ethnic Group manipulation: The respondents were randomly presented a newspaper article about one of the three ethnic groups. One third of the subjects read an article featuring a Turkish immigrant in the body of the text and also featuring a stereotypical headshot of the immigrant, one third a Polish one and the remaining third an Italian immigrant. The control group did not read any article.

Tone manipulation: The tone of the story is manipulated with half of the articles focusing on benefits/ positive consequences of immigration, and the other half focusing on costs/negative consequences of immigration.

Issue manipulation: The newspaper article either featured economic reasons for or against immigration, or it focused on symbolic issues related to immigration.

6.4.3 Instruments

Why Manipulating with a Newspaper Article?

There are a number of theoretical justifications for the use of a newspaper article for priming individuals. Many scholars illustrate that the way immigration is portrayed in the media plays a significant activating role on attitudes (Brader et al. Sniderman 2004).

Sniderman (2004) further argues that in addition to predisposing factors, attitudes are also shaped by situational triggers as presented in the media. In their time series analysis of monthly German newspaper data between the years 1993 and 2005, Boomgarden and Vlienthart (2009) approach media as a contextual factor and show that both the frequency and the tone of the coverage of immigrant actors in the news significantly influence dynamics in anti-immigration attitudes.

Whether taken as contextual factor or a situational trigger, news media seems to be influential in shaping attitudes in Germany. The salience of the immigration issue can also be deduced from the number of articles allocated to the issue by German newspapers.




Figure 6-1 Average Number of Newspaper Articles on Immigration per Month




Figure 6-2 Total Number of Newspaper Articles on Immigration per Year

Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate the average monthly and total yearly coverage of immigration. The figures are constructed with the data I collected from a Lexis Nexis search of German newspapers between 2000 and 2009 based on a basic search for news articles including the word immigration (*Immigration* and *Einwanderung* in German) as well as two generic concepts referring to immigrants (*Einwanderer* and *Gastarbeiter*).

The graphs illustrate a very frequent reporting on immigration between the years 2000 and 2009 ranging from 350 articles per month on average, to as many as 900 articles. There is a clear upward trend with more and more articles being published on the issue and isolated peaks in some periods due to elections, EU enlargement, passing of the new immigration law in 2008 as well as controversial statements by politicians such as the most recent Sarrazin statements.

Given its presence, frequency, and influence in people's daily life, using a

newspaper as a manipulation tool seems like the most natural course of action in theoretical terms. Nevertheless, there are also a number of methodological reasons for achieving the experimental manipulation via newspapers.

The first reason relates to the external validity of the manipulation. A newspaper article is the kind of prime that an individual can easily be exposed to in real life. As the preceding portrayal illustrates, there is not a day in a German newspaper when the issue of immigration is not mentioned. While most psychological priming is done with more direct tools such as using pictures, positive and negative adjectives or pictures alone, I argue that this is by no means a realistic scenario. In real life, words and pictures only appear in a context, as part of a news story on TV, in a newspaper or over the internet.

In addition to its approximation to a real life scenario, a newspaper article is a better choice in relation to the interaction with respondents. Using single words or pictures as a prime to manipulate respondents is likely to arouse their suspicion. Commonly known as the “*demand*” bias in the methodological literature in psychology, this may pose a number of threats to the study.

Once the subject starts questioning and guessing the intent of the study, he may shape his responses based on a decision about whether to cooperate with the researcher or to challenge him. This problem is particularly present when primed with direct words or pictures rather than an elaborate article on a subject. Therefore using more complicated stimuli for manipulation would pose less of a demand bias and hence less of a threat to the internal validity of the research. As a result, to be able to mimic a real life scenario and ensure external validity, the use of a newspaper article is a sensible decision.


The Manipulation

To better identify the impact of ethnicity on immigration attitudes, it was necessary to control for the effect of other variables that may contaminate this relationship. For that purpose each article contained a picture of a “recent immigrant” who appears to be either Turkish, Polish or Italian. A caption read: “[Ali Yilmaz/ Alexander Kowalski/ Massimo Rizzo] is one of many immigrants who arrived in Germany recently”.

To maximize control, the pictures were selected from the University of Essex face database (Dr.Libor Spacek <http://cswww.essex.ac.uk/mv/allfaces/index.html>). The face database contains 7900 images of 395 individuals with 20 images per individual. The sample face images are of 24-bit 180x200 pixel color JPEG from S-VHS camcorder. Three faces from fifteen possible photos were selected based on the ratings by an independent panel of eight German naïve judges.

Judges rated how much each male appeared ethnically Turkish, Polish or Italian, as well as attractive and friendly. The pictures selected at the end were the ones carrying most characteristics of the ethnicities in question and were similar to each other in terms of the remaining characteristics. All photos were featured with a green background and only showed the head of the immigrant; the outfit was not clearly shown to control for the factors other than ethnicity. An English translation of a sample article illustrating Turkish-Positive-Economic prime –one of the 12 versions is illustrated below.

Immigration Heartens Governors



Ali Yilmaz from Turkey is one of many immigrants who arrived in Germany recently.

Berlin (AP) July 12 - Currently Germany is the number one immigration receiving country in Europe and the growing number of immigrants in Germany clearly has some Germans hopeful about the future.

At the state governors' convention in May, many governors

called for the Merkel administration to protect the flow of immigrants from further restrictions. Several governors said they are encouraged by how immigrants are helping to strengthen the economy, while also contributing to the pensions of aging population in Germany. Governors say these views are shared by many of their constituents.

Sven Buch, shift manager at a large auto parts facility in Stuttgart, says he is enthusiastic about how much the influx of immigrant labor has helped the company keep a lid on costs and remain competitive.

Renate Mayer, a Hamburg nurse, has seen similar benefits for the hospital where she works. "These people take jobs that are hard for us to fill, and they're willing to work shifts that other people don't want," Mayer said. "It was a big help."

Turkey is a country where a large number of immigrants in Germany are from. When asked his opinion, Ali Yilmaz, a recent immigrant from Turkey, says he welcomes the chance for a better life in Germany. "Many of my cousins find work here and now it's my turn. I want a good job and benefits."

While there was agreement in the convention that the federal government needs to do more to help states manage the rising tide of newcomers, few governors agree on exactly why immigration levels have increased. Whatever is bringing immigrants to Germany in record numbers, everyone seems certain that the numbers will continue to grow.

As the sample article illustrates, economic benefits referred to immigrants' contribution to the economy in general as well as specific company productivity and overall pensions: how they do the jobs no one else wants. Economic costs on the other hand evaluated their burden on the economy and unemployment and how they pull wages down.

The symbolic benefits mentioned their role in enriching the society, positive aspects of their life style and traditions, and their willingness to integrate into German society. The symbolic costs mentioned their incompatibility with German values, their different life styles posing threats to the German community, and immigrants' aversion of integration.

For instance, the negative/symbolic version of the article voiced Germans' common complaints about immigrants such as holding different values than the majority, their lack of willingness to learn the German language, German way of life and hence integrate into the German culture. The immigrant being interviewed emphasized his intention to conserve his original culture and not forget who he is, in conjunction with his willingness to immigrate to and work in Germany.

In addition to the picture of the immigrant with the caption indicating his national origin, the article included some policy making on immigration and multiple quotes from random people on the street. Manipulations were obtained for the most part by the quotes of Germans working in different industries about how they feel about immigration and immigrants in general. The frames in this section tried to mimic day to day reporting on the issue and common arguments for and against immigration.

The manipulations were also supplemented with a quote from the immigrant man himself on his feelings about coming to Germany. The national origin of the immigrant as

being from Turkey, Poland or Italy was repeated to ensure ethnicity is made sufficiently salient. These three nationalities were selected in accordance with the cognitive interviews I conducted earlier to tap the groups respondents have in mind as immigrants. The groups were selected based on the frequency they were mentioned in the cognitive interviews and their prevalence in the immigrant population in Germany.

Why independent reporting?

Instead of including the caption of a specific newspaper name as Brader et al. (2007) did, the fabricated article in this experiment was presented only as the reporting of the Associated Press. The omission of a newspaper title was no accident. In this experiment, I wanted to ensure that no particular newspaper's name is associated with the article. There are a number of context specific reasons for that.

A number of experts I interviewed about the experimental manipulation asserted that the ideological orientations of the German and Berlin newspapers are widely recognized by the people and that their political affiliation can contaminate my results. Accordingly, using a specific newspaper would be a threat to the validity of the experiment in a number of ways.

First, when reading the newspaper article a respondent could associate the name of a newspaper with this ideology. Upon this association, based on how concordant it is with her own ideological stand point, the respondent could have either a positive or a negative reaction to the ideology that newspaper is associated with regardless of its content. In other

words, one may negatively react to the article and discredit the reporting as her ideology clashes with the newspaper's or vice versa. This would heavily complicate identifying the reaction to the actual manipulations.

Secondly, this experiment involves a clear tone manipulation which requires both pro and anti immigration reporting. However, the extant German reporting on the issue seems quite biased towards a specific tone where leftist papers tend to have pro-immigrant reporting, whereas rightist ones tend to have anti immigrant reporting. Thus, affiliating a negative article with a leftist paper or vice versa would make the articles credibility dubious and would raise suspicion about its genuineness.

To avoid these issues, the article is presented in the form of a three column newspaper article with an Associated Press byline without any reference to a specific newspaper name.

6.4.4 Describing additional independent variables

Perceived Cultural Similarity

Perceived cultural similarity was measured by replicating the Rohman et al (2006) scale. This is a six item scale which inquired about perceived similarity of immigrants regarding their general similarity, culture, mentality, appearance, religious orientation, and family life. In other words, this scale is superior to the one item measure about "*lifestyle similarity*" ALLBUS employed. A sample item from the Rohman et al(2006) scale is "How similar do you think the culture of the immigrant described in the article to the

majority of Germans? Please indicate on the following scale where 1 means that the two cultures are very dissimilar and 7 means that they are very similar”. Chronbach’s α of the scale was .93 indicating excellent reliability.

Prejudice Scale

Defined as a readiness to belittle minorities, to dislike them, to shun them, to be contemptuous of them, and to feel hostility towards them’ (Sniderman and Haagendoorn 2007), prejudice is not an easy attitude to measure. Three major objectives of this project were to create a new and informed prejudice scale account for the common stereotypes associated with immigrants in Germany, to account for the differentiation across immigrants and finally be unobtrusive at the same time.

Many blatant and subtle prejudice scales incorporate items asking for agreement with statements regarding immigrants. I find this approach problematic as it imposes certain social desirability concerns on the respondent. A respondent may find it highly offensive to agree or being asked to agree about a blatantly racist statement such as: “Turkish immigrants come from less able races and this explains why they are not as well off as most German people”. Hence, asking respondents about their opinion about common stereotypes is much more unobtrusive than asking them to agree with this item.

Furthermore, a number of social psychologists point out to out-group heterogeneity as another aspect of prejudice. Accordingly, those who see differences within out-groups tend to oppose them much less than those who see them all the same. In addition to allowing unobtrusive measurement, my prejudice instrument allows for measuring the

perceived out-group heterogeneity with a slightly changed question wording. Instead of their sole agreement with the stereotype as a descriptor of the immigrant, respondents were asked about the proportion of immigrants within each group they think the stereotype applies to.

Taking the Sniderman et al. (2004, 2007, 2009) scale as a starting point, the cognitive interviews I conducted earlier allowed me to identify additional ways immigrants are portrayed by the host population. Some of these adjectives put forward by the cognitive interviewees were immigrants being conservative, treating women badly, resisting integrating into the German society as well as having a rigid commitment to pre-modern values of the cultures they come from.

By adding these items into the prejudice scale, I am now able to portray an improved list of stereotypes. The new list of items include the four items gathered through the cognitive interviews, in addition to being dishonest, selfish, pushy, lazy, not law abiding, abusive, criminal and rude. Before presenting the list of items respondents were asked to express their opinion about how each adjective would apply to the immigrants. Instead of asking for direct agreement, the respondents were asked what percentage of the total immigrant population they thought the adjective applied. Furthermore, after stating the adjective a separate sentence specified and exemplified the stereotype. For instance:

“In your opinion, what is percentage of the immigrants that are selfish? That is they think of themselves without worrying about others.”¹⁸

¹⁸ In addition to the cognitive interviews, I conducted some elite interviews with academics and policy makers working in the area of immigration and integration in Germany. The elites I interviewed validated this new list of stereotypes and confirmed that these were the most common ways immigrants are portrayed

While people's opinions about stereotypes are informative regarding their prejudices against immigrants, alone they may lead to biased results. This is mainly due to the fact that out group evaluations are only meaningful in relation to the evaluations of the in group. One may think that 80% of the immigrants are lazy, but if he also thinks 80% of the Germans are lazy, this information says nothing about a particular prejudice regarding an immigrant. Therefore, for an accurate picture of how prejudiced an individual is, we need to assess his opinions about immigrants in relation to his opinions about Germans. To that end, upon expressing their opinion about the proportion of immigrants every adjective applies to, respondents were presented with the very same list of adjectives but this time asked about how they would apply to Germans.

To construct the prejudice scale first the reverse coded items were converted. Then to create a prejudice item, the evaluation of Germans on each adjective was subtracted from the evaluation of the immigrants on that same adjective. This way an individual's prejudice score on being lazy item is actually how lazier he sees immigrants from Germans. It is a positive stereotype score if the difference is negative and a negative stereotype if it is positive. After the same procedure was performed for every adjective an additive prejudice scale has been obtained as the summation of these item scores. Chronbach's α of the scale was .92 indicating excellent reliability.

in German daily life. They also argued that the improved list exhausts all major ways immigrants are portrayed and could not come up with any additional items as a common stereotype.

6.5 RESULTS

6.5.1 Preliminary Analysis

Ethnicity of immigrant and immigration attitudes

My first hypothesis was that support for immigration should change across different ethnic groups and this should be a function of their perceived cultural similarity by the in-group, which in this case are Germans. In the context of this experiment, this differentiation is operationalized via newspaper articles. Therefore, I expect to find significant differences across groups (between subjects) that have been primed with newspaper articles about different immigrants (i.e. those primed with an article about Turks vs. Poles).

The dependent variable: The immigration attitudes are tapped via a standard question about respondent's opinion about future immigration into Germany. Respondents were presented with five response categories where 1 indicated that they are very much against immigration, 3 indicated they are neither against nor in favor, and finally 5 indicated that they are very much in favor. I reverse coded the item to indicate opposition to immigration.




Figure 6-4 Immigration Attitudes and Perceived Cultural Similarity as a Function of the Ethnicity of the Immigrant

Figure 6.4 illustrates the means of opposition to immigration after being primed with an ethnic group and how this corresponds with perceived cultural similarity. As predicted earlier, there are visible differences across subjects regarding their opposition to immigration of specific ethnic groups. In particular, respondents demonstrated the highest opposition when primed with a Turkish immigrant, followed by the Italian immigrant and they showed the least opposition when primed with a Polish immigrant. More importantly, confirming my predictions, there seems to be inverse relationship between opposition to the immigration of the ethnic group and how similar this group's perceived similarity to German society. According to the subjects in this study, Polish immigrants are the most similar to Germans, thereby gathering least opposition to their immigration and Turks are the most different from Germans thereby yielding the highest opposition.

While suggestive of the general pattern, an OLS regression analysis is performed to see if these differences reach statistical significance. Table 6.1 illustrates the results.

Table 10 Main effects of Ethnicity and Tone Manipulations on Immigration Attitudes

Prime Type	Model 1	Model 2
<u>Ethnicity</u>		
Polish (ref.category)		
Italian	.186 (.216)	.189 (.216)
Turkish	.218 (.216)	.215 (.216)
control	.008 (.981)	.127 (.372)
<u>Tone</u>		
Negative		.268 (.176)
Positive (ref. category)		
<u>Issue</u>		
Economic		.003 (.176)
Symbolic (ref. category)		
N	208	208
R-squared	.006	.018

Coefficients (standard errors) are estimates from OLS regression, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Ethnicity of the immigrant: I predicted that the ethnicity of immigrant should matter regarding the in-groups attitudes towards immigration. The regression analysis on the dependent variable *opposition to immigration* revealed surprisingly no statistically significant main effect for any ethnic group. Nevertheless, as suggested with Figure 6.1, the directions of the primes were in the expected direction in that culturally similar groups were more favorably evaluated regarding immigration as compared to culturally different groups. The standard errors for all factors regarding all ethnic groups remained below the conventional standards of statistical significance.

Tone of the article: I predicted that the tone of the article should matter when it comes to people's opinion towards immigration. While a positive tone should elicit less opposition, a negative tone should further trigger opposition. Figure 6.5 illustrates the average support.




Figure 6-5 Opposition to Immigration as a Function of the Tone of the Article and Ethnicity of the Immigrant

A regression analysis confirmed the expected direction in that those primed with a negative article were more likely to oppose immigration. However, the impact of the negative prime was not statistically significant.

Table 11 Interactive Effects of Ethnicity and Tone on Immigration attitudes

Prime Type	Model 1	Model2
Italian	0.0287 (0.216)	0.188 (0.216)
Turk		0.0417 (0.289)
Polish	-0.0430 (0.285)	
control	-0.300 (0.376)	0.0723 (0.378)
Economic	0.00173 (0.176)	0.00529 (0.176)
Positive	-0.153 (0.216)	
Negat		0.156 (0.216)
Negat x Turk		0.339 (0.374)
Posit x Polish	-0.347 (0.374)	
Constant	2.833*** (0.204)	3.206*** (0.207)
N	208	208
R-squared	0.022	0.022

Coefficients (standard errors) are estimates from OLS regression, *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Regarding the *tone* of the article, I predicted an interaction effect with *ethnic* group. Specifically, I argued that for the immigrant groups perceived culturally similar, a positive article should yield to a larger impact in reducing opposition as compared to other ethnic groups. And as for the immigrant groups perceived culturally different, a negative article should yield to a larger impact in increasing opposition that other groups.

Models 1 and 2 illustrate the results of the OLS regression for models incorporating the interactions of *tone* with *ethnic group* controlling for the *issue*. Table 6.2 illustrates that being primed with a positive article and Polish immigrant results in further reduced

opposition to immigration. Specifically, while the impact of a positive article in reducing opposition to non poles is .153, it is .5 for Poles. Nevertheless, the effect is not statistically significant. Similarly, being primed with a negative article as well as a Turkish immigrant results in higher opposition to immigration than being primed with other groups. While the impact of a negative prime conditional on Turkish Prime is .495 in increasing opposition, it is only .156 for all other ethnic groups. However the coefficient fails to reach statistical significance. Hence, regarding the interactive effect of tone on ethnic prime, the OLS estimation yields to results in expected direction but failed to demonstrate a statistical significant effect.

Issue of the article: In addition to the ethnicity prime and the tone, the newspaper articles featured a third manipulation regarding the issue the article deals with namely the economic and symbolic issues related to immigration. I did not predict any main effects for the issue of the article; however I predicted mediating/interaction effects with ethnic group and tone. More specifically I predicted that for culturally similar groups, a negative article dealing with economic issues should generate more opposition than symbolic issues. And for culturally different groups, a negative article dealing with symbolic issues should generate more opposition than symbolic issues.

Table 6.3 illustrates the results of an OLS regression incorporating this interaction.

Table 12 The Impact of the Issue Prime on Opposition to Immigration Conditional on Ethnicity and Tone Manipulations

	Model 1a Polish Prime	Model 1b No-Polish Prime	Model 2a Turkish Prime	Model 2 b No-Turkish Prime
Economic	.101 (.569)	-.004 (.975)		
Symbolic			-.023 (.897)	.084 (.592)
Negative	.330* (.067)	.047 (.686)	.158 (.381)	.061 (.592)
Positive				
Econ x Negat	-.219 (.315)	.047 (.740)		
Symb x Negat			.031 (.899)	.026 (.856)
N	64	144	64	144
R-Squared	.058	.006	.031	.017

Coefficients (standard errors) are estimates from OLS regression, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

While Model 1a shows the impact of the negative article evaluating economic issues for Polish immigrants, Model 1b illustrates this effect for the rest of the ethnic primes. Furthermore, Model 2a shows the impact of the negative article evaluating symbolic issues for Turkish immigrants and Model 2b illustrates this same effect for the rest of the ethnic primes. Substantially, the results suggest that being primed by a negative and symbolic framed article creates .162 point increase on opposition to immigrants for Turks, the same effect is negligibly small for all other ethnic groups. However, the OLS regression did not yield to any statistically significant for the main or mediating effects of

issue on opposition to immigration. Also, the interactive effect of economic prime with negative prime does not seem to predict high opposition for Polish immigrants and the effect is also negligible for other groups. Symbolic and Negative prime on the other hand (shown as the coefficient associated with Negative) also leads to opposition to Polish immigration and this effect is statistically significant.

The empirical analysis illustrates that the predictions regarding opposition to immigration are not fully confirmed with the manipulations. While ethnicity seems to have a main and interactive effect on immigration attitudes conditional on the tone of the article in the expected directions, the results obtained did not reach statistically significant levels to refute the null hypothesis that their occurrence is pure chance. The results regarding the issue manipulation seem also inconclusive as to any interactive impact on immigration attitudes.

6.6 WHY DID THE PRIMING NOT WORK AS EXPECTED?

As the preceding analysis illustrates, the majority of the primes did not generate the impact predicted. One answer that comes to mind regarding the lack of satisfactory results is that ethnic primes may not be as visible as the tone prime for the manipulation to occur. As I suspected this while designing the experiment, I augmented the ethnic prime with a visual, a picture of an immigrant group and a number of mentions to the ethnicity. In addition, one of the manipulation checks was the ethnic prime and people mostly seemed to remember the ethnic prime correctly. It may be that individuals may actually not think of

immigrants in terms of different ethnic groups but the previous empirical chapters illustrated that this is not the case either.

Moreover, respondents participating in this study could be thinking about certain immigrant groups when they arrive to the experiment and the ethnic primes cannot sufficiently manipulate these predisposed respondents. Unfortunately, there is not a way to gather if this is the case from the existing research design, which does not involve a pre test post test design. We could only look at the subsets of the sample to see if some demographics are more likely to be predisposed than others. Therefore the second part of this chapter will explore this speculation in detail.

The third possibility relates to the previous aspect in that priming or manipulation may have some minimum requirements that some people in the sample fail to meet. In other words, one way or another they may not have paid the necessary serious attention and commitment to the research study which may introduce high error terms, thereby inflating the standard errors. More importantly, rather than a random error, there may be some systematic errors involved with the sample. Hence, the third part of the chapter will explore this suspicion.

6.6.1 Possible East-West differences?

One of the reasons why I chose Berlin for the fieldwork of this experiment was to be able to recruit respondents from both the former Eastern and Western Germany conveniently. In line with many scholars comparing the attitudes in these two contexts, I

expected to find major differences between these two sub samples regarding their attitudes towards immigration.

Also consistent with the existing literature, I expected to find more complex attitudes regarding the Western population as a result of their long-term coexistence with immigrants. For instance, in line with this expectation, Clark and Legge (1997) suggest that East Germans tend to fuse traditional racism with conservative values while West Germans tend to separate the concepts.

In a similar vein, I expect to find a more blatant strand of exclusion towards out-groups with less differentiation across issues and immigrants in the East. Another set of findings by Heyder and Schmidt(2003) comparing ethnocentrism between East and West Germans further confirm the heterogeneity of the whole German sample with respect to the two regions and suggest analyzing data separately for the East and the West.




Figure 6-6 Opposition to Immigration as a Function of Immigrant Ethnicity, East and West Compared

Figure 6.6 compares the two equal halves of this sample in terms of their immigration attitudes as a function of the ethnicity manipulation. The results are striking in that, the Eastern sample is more exclusivist in general; however, there seems to be more to the story than only heightened levels of exclusivism. There is also a different order of immigrants when ranked from most opposed to least opposed in terms of the attitudes of Germans from the former East and West.

This descriptive illustration along with the theoretical expectations suggests different patterns of attitude formation as a result of priming. At the absolute level, the eastern sample exhibits more anti-immigrant attitudes than the western sample (mean score). Furthermore, Easterners tend to exhibit high exclusion towards Turks and Poles equally and low exclusion towards Italians, whereas for Westerners, Italians are the least desired group, followed by Turks and finally by Poles.

Besides, a sudden change of the levels of immigration opposition once the sample is split into two also suggests there could be similar patterns across different levels of other manipulations which should also be explored in greater detail. To be able to tap these possibly different dimensions of immigration attitudes, the following analysis will lay out a separate test of these two subsamples with the same hypotheses. Table 6.4 illustrates the models from the previous section estimated for former Westerners and Easterners separately with Poles as the baseline group.

**Table 13 Ethnicity and Tone Manipulations in Predicting Opposition to Immigration
for Eastern and Western Sample**

Prime Type	Model 1 WEST	Model 2 EAST
Turk	-0.184 (0.305)	(0.312)
Ita	-0.485 (0.309)	0.340 (0.310)
control	-0.298 (0.476)	0.327 (0.606)
Negat	-0.115 (0.256)	-0.290 (0.243)
Eco	0.175 (0.257)	-0.186 (0.243)
Constant	3.398*** (0.278)	2.873*** (0.288)
Observations	104	104
R-squared	0.036	0.043

Note: Coefficients (and P values) are estimates from ordinary least-squares regressio

Models 1 and 2 in table 6.4 illustrate the direct effect of all primes on immigration attitudes for both Eastern and Western German subsamples. Accordingly, while for the Western sample the Italian and Turkish primes yield to higher opposition to immigration, their effect is somewhat reversed for the Eastern sample. For the easterners, being primed by an Italian immigrant prime yields to lower opposition than Polish prime, while the impact of the Turkish prime is not much different than the Polish prime. Furthermore, being primed by an article that elaborates on negative consequences of immigration leads to a higher opposition to immigration for the Eastern sample, than the Western sample. Nonetheless, these effects still remain below the conventional standards of statistical significance.

The Western sample differs from the previous model in another major way. Confirming my predictions about the interactive role of the tone manipulation, for the Western sample the article's *tone* also functions as a mediator in relation to ethnic cues. Figure 6.7 illustrates this interaction for the Western sample.




Figure 6-7 Opposition to Immigration for Westerners as a Function of Tone of the Article and Ethnicity of the Immigrant

The first observation to be reached from Figure 6.7 is the inexplicable effect of Positive prime about Italians on opposition to immigration. A positive prime about an Italian group produces remarkably more opposition for Westerners rather than reducing it, whereas a negative prime reduces opposition considerably. This inconsistent result is part of the reason why the effect of the Italian prime is controlled for in most of the models.

The rest of the Figure 6.7 illustrates that consistent with my initial expectation, for

the Western sample, a positive prime reduces opposition more for the culturally similar perceived Polish immigrant than the Turkish immigrant. Moreover, a negative prime produces more opposition for the culturally different perceived Turkish immigrant than the Polish immigrant.




Figure 6-8 Opposition to immigration for Easterners as a Function of the Tone of the article and Ethnicity of the Immigrant

Figure 6.8 portrays the abovementioned relationships this time for the Easterners. First of all, the absolute levels of opposition are much higher for the Eastern prime as compared to the Western sample. For all ethnic group primes, a negative article produces more opposition possibly also producing the statistically significant main effect of tone for the entire population illustrated earlier. Furthermore, there seems to be fewer differences across ethnic primes regarding the impact of the tone manipulation.

In order to assess these differences between the Eastern and Western sample regarding the interactive effect of tone and ethnicity prime in a rigorous way, OLS regressions with standardized beta coefficients for both subsamples. Table 6.5 illustrates replications of the models from Table 6.2, hence incorporating this interactive effect for both Western and Eastern Sample.

Table 14 Interactive impact of Ethnicity and Tone on Opposition to Immigration for Western and Eastern Sample

	Model 1a West	Model 1b East	Model 2a West	Model 2bEast
Polish	.043 (.759)	.106 (.432)		
Turkish			.086 (.549)	.097 (.578)
Italian			.064 (.598)	.194 (.373)
Negative			.086* (.099)	-.128 (.313)
Positive	.128 (.300)	-.166 (.146)		
Polish x Posit	-.295* (.066)	-.004 (.978)		
Turkish x Negat			.268* (.071)	-.160 (.369)
N	104	104	104	104
R-Squared	.053	.037	.067	.041

Coefficients (standard errors) are estimates from OLS regression, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Models 2a and 2b evaluate the conditional effect of the tone manipulation on Turkish ethnic prime for both former Eastern and Western German subsamples and the results point out to a major difference. As evidenced in Model 2a, for the Western sample, an article evaluating the costs of Turkish immigrant produces a considerably more opposition compared to other groups, controlling for the main effect of Negative tone, Economic issue, Turkish prime as well as the Italian Prime. In other words, a negative prime has a main effect on opposition to immigration as well as a conditional effect for Turkish immigrants, both statistically significant. However, these effects cease to exist for the Eastern sample yielding to high standard errors and poor model fit. Hence, I can confirm my hypothesis (H₃) regarding the interactive effect of tone and ethnicity for culturally different immigrants for the Westerners but not for the Easterners.

Models 1a and 1b illustrate that for the Western sample, a newspaper article evaluating the benefits of the Polish immigration produces less opposition than other ethnic groups controlling for the separate main effect of the Polish prime and Positive prime. However, this effect is very minor for the Eastern sample and fails to reach statistically significant levels. Therefore, my hypothesis about the interactive effect of tone and ethnicity for culturally similar immigrants (H₄) is confirmed for the Western sample but not for the Eastern sample.

Issue, Tone, and Ethnicity of the article: With hypotheses 5 and 6, I also laid out expectations regarding an issue and tone interaction, conditional on the ethnic prime. I expected negative reporting dealing with economic issues to generate more opposition to Poles and negative reporting dealing with symbolic issues to further increase opposition for

Turks. The OLS regression models for both samples are illustrated in Table 6.6.

Table 15 Impact of the Issue Prime on Opposition to Immigration conditional on Ethnicity and Tone Manipulations for Western and Eastern Sample

	Model 1a Polish Prime WEST	Model 1b Polish Prime EAST	Model 2a Turkish Prime WEST	Model 2 b Turkish Prime EAST
Economic	-.230 (.299)	.430 (.162)		
Symbolic			-.021 (.936)	.025 (.931)
Negative	.323 (.165)	.548* (.050)	.257 (.389)	.060 (.805)
Positive				
Econ x Posit	.099 (.707)	.759** (.049)		
Symb x Negat			-.044 (.895)	.027 (.936)
N	39	25	28	36
R-Squared	.173	.201	.054	.008

Coefficients (standard errors) are estimates from OLS regression, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results in Models1 through 4 did not produce any models confirming my predictions. The Models for Turkish prime did not portray any significant interaction effects while for the Polish primes the results were contrary to expectations for the Eastern sample and inconclusive for the Western sample.

Overall, this second step of analysis incorporating the possible differences between the Eastern and Western sample led to very interesting results. Accordingly, the models

predicted had better fit and statistically significant effects for the Western sample thereby partly confirming my initially suggested hypotheses. However for the Eastern sample, the primes were not quite influential in the expected way predicting opposition to immigration.

Does this mean Easterners hold strong predispositions and are immune to situational triggers? This may be part of the explanation, though Easterners were not fully immune to situational triggers either. As the Tables 6.4 through 6.6 suggest, the negative prime had an impact on their opposition, so much that none of the ethnic primes seemed to matter either directly or indirectly. This may indicate that Easterners in this sample saw immigration more as a cost benefit issue and less as an ethnicity issue. Whereas Westerners were more receptive to different ethnic priming and partly economic priming, which may indicate that they have a more complex understanding of immigration.

Having illustrated that the two subsections of population have different responsiveness to priming, in the next section I will further explore possible obstacles to priming. In particular, by addressing respondents' true commitment to survey experiment; I hope to shed further light on East-West differences.

6.6.2 Analyzing time spent as a proxy for commitment

One of the major obstacles to priming is the respondent's lack of commitment to the survey experiment and careless reading of the survey questions. This is especially common in self conducted surveys due to the fact that respondents are less likely to take the survey serious in the absence of an interviewer. Should this occur, the success of priming is

further threatened because of the researcher's inability to know if the respondent actually read the questions and processed her answers to the following items. A good way to explore into this commitment issue and separate those non-committed respondents from the ones who were committed is analyzing the time they spent on the survey.

In order to separate the respondents based on their commitment, I first constructed a time variable using the total amount of time a respondent spent on answering the survey questions. A more ideal measure would be the time respondents spent reading the actual article.. Unfortunately, the software used for the experiment did not allow for this. As the second best alternative and a good proxy of the time spent on the newspaper articles, I used the survey response time as I expect those two to be highly correlated.

Nevertheless, the time spent responding the survey questions can also be a function of other things. One of these is the respondent's education since those with better educations can read and answer the questions faster than the rest of the respondents. However I found no relationship in my sample between those two based on a Pearson's R correlation calculation ($r=0.09$).

Another explanation for time spent on the survey could be the age of the respondent in that those who are older may read questions slower and take longer time to complete the survey than the rest. Again, I found no relationship between these two variables with the correlation coefficient leading to a mere $r=0.05$. Furthermore, a respondent's income may be related to the time spent on answering the survey questions. For someone who is in need, participating in a study with compensation could be purely seen as a source to raise funds. This may result in the low income uninterested and uncommitted respondents being

overrepresented. However I did not find a meaningful relationship between income and the total time spent on survey either ($r=0.02$).

Yet another variable effecting the time spent on the survey experiment could be the respondent's contextual background; having grown up in the East or the West may lead to different patterns. This may result in Westerners more common exposure to surveys, polling, and market research questionnaires than the Easterners. Again, there is no statistically significant relationship between being an Easterner and time spent on the survey with $r=0.05$.

Defining the cut-point for time

In order to differentiate those committed from non committed a cut-point needs to be defined. The average amount of time people spent on answering questions is 21 minutes with the shortest time 7.7 minutes and the longest time 46 minutes. Considering that the survey consists of 120 questions in total, answering all the questions in 8 minutes means spending 4 seconds on average on each question. Answering questions in a committed way with 4 seconds per question is quite unconvincing even for the fastest reader and opinionated person. Therefore part of the reason why people are not primed the way expected could be that they did not actually read and get exposed to the information properly.

In order to explore the impact of total time spent with the survey question on being primed, I split the data into two parts three different ways. The first way was creating a variable which separates those who spent considerably little time to answer the survey

questions from those who did not and I called those below this cut point “*very low timers*”. The cut point for this variable was spending a total time of 13 minutes on the survey. While it is still unrealistic to properly read and respond to the survey questions with an average of 6 seconds per question, at least this separation excluded 10 percent of the respondents who spent the shortest time.

I employed a second method of separating the sample based on the time allocated to the survey by splitting the sample from the median. This way the sample is divided into two halves, those who spent more time (more than the median) and those who spent less time (less than the median). The median corresponds to spending 20.7 minutes on responding to 120 questions which yields to an average of 10.4 seconds per question.

Finally, I split the data in a third way by grouping those who spent more than 25 minutes on the entire survey which is the amount of time a couple independent judges took to finish the survey. This subsample, which I called “*very high timers*” yields to 25% of the entire sample. *Very high timers* are the respondents who spent at least 12.5 seconds on average on each question.

Overall the preliminary analysis in Appendix B illustrates that as the time spent on the survey increases, the susceptibility to primes increases too. The primes that did not have a significant effect for the models based on the entire sample began to have a statistically significant and larger impact on immigration attitudes for those who spent more time. Furthermore, there is a clear upward trend in the impact of the prime when moved from *very low timers* to *very high timers*.

Departing from this finding I split the sample into two equal halves each yielding to 104 respondents, taking the median as the cut-point: Those who ranked above the median

were identified as *high timer* respondents and those below the median were labeled *low timer*. Similar to the separate models for the East-West differences, I estimated separate models for *high timers* and *low timers* to depict the way I expect the primes to function differently. The results of the first set of results regarding the main effects of primes are illustrated in Table 6.7.

Table 16 Main Effect of Ethic and Tone Primes for Low and High Timers

<i>Prime Type</i>	<i>High Timer</i>	<i>Low Timer</i>
Negative	0.035 (0.249)	0.592** (0.250)
Economic	-0.0698 (0.251)	-0.162 (0.252)
Turkish	0.574* (0.312)	0.219 (0.302)
Italian	0.587* (0.299)	0.339 (0.315)
control	0.376 (0.544)	0.089 (0.507)
Constant	3.376*** (0.290)	3.160*** (0.269)
N	104	104
R-squared	0.049	0.067

Coefficients (standard errors) are estimates from OLS regression, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Models 1 and 2 illustrate that, both the Turkish and Italian primes lead to considerably more opposition to immigration for the *high timers* with a statistically significant main effect controlling for the effect of all other primes. In other words, for those who spent more than median time in answering the survey, being primed with a Turkish newspaper article increases results in opposition to immigration, controlling for the main effect of the other primes. As expected, while the ethnic group cues did not seem to make a statistically significant difference in immigration attitudes for the entire sample and

mattered slightly for the Western sample, they are quite influential in a statistically significant way for those who were attentive and committed to the survey experiment.

Tone of the article: Regarding the negative prime, as evidenced in 1 and 2, just as was the case for East and West subsamples, analyzing *high* and *low timers* separately yields remarkable differences. The same model with the entire sample and Eastern sample had resulted in a statistically significant impact of negative prime in increasing opposition controlling for the effect of economic prime.

Model 2 indicates that for those who were less committed to the survey, reading an article with a negative tone leads to more opposition in a statistically significant way. However, no such effect exists for those who took more time, or were more committed. This is surprising in that it indicates that those who possibly skimmed the newspaper article were influenced by the tone manipulation, but not the ethnicity manipulation.

Having found all these significant differences between *low* and *high timers* regarding the main effects of the primes on immigration attitudes, I now move to analyzing their interactive effect for the two subsamples. Table 6.8 illustrates separate models for the interaction of tone and ethnicity primes.

Table 17 Interactive Effect of Tone and Ethnicity Primes on Opposition to Immigration for High and Low Timers

<i>Prime Type</i>	<i>Model 1 High Time</i>	<i>Model 2 Low Timer</i>	<i>Model 3 High Timer</i>	<i>Model 4 Low Timer</i>
Italian	0.212 (0.172)	-0.214 (0.188)	-0.0167 (0.310)	-0.167 (0.181)
Turkish	0.0796 (0.235)	0.162 (0.240)		
Polish			0.378 (0.398)	0.336 (0.245)
Control	-0.029 (0.316)	-0.001 (0.306)	0.161 (0.560)	-0.216 (0.298)
Economic	-0.106 (0.144)	-0.009 (0.150)	0.079 (0.252)	-0.009 (0.149)
Negative	-0.117 (0.171)	0.423** (0.187)		
Negat x Turk	0.718** (0.313)	-0.405 (0.310)		
Positive			-0.105 (0.306)	-0.102 (0.179)
Posit x Pol			0.420 (0.528)	-0.542* (0.317)
Constant	3.268*** (0.301)	3.182*** (0.285)	2.839*** (0.317)	2.861*** (0.266)
N	104	104	104	104
R-squared	0.082	0.067	0.055	0.075

Coefficients (standard errors) are estimates from OLS regression, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The impact of time on the relationship between the main effect of primes and immigration attitudes were clear-cut in that, all ethnic primes yield to better models for the high timers. Models 1 through 4 on the other hand provide evidence that, the picture is more complicated regarding the interactive effect of the primes for *low and high timers*.

As Models 1 and 2 portray, the main effects and conditional effects of primes fare better for those who spent more time with the survey. Interestingly, for the low timers, the

negative article has a statistically significant effect on those not read an article with the Turkish prime. But more importantly, as illustrated in Model1, the conditional effect of a negative prime on Turkish prime leads to more opposition to immigration compared to other groups and this effect is statistically significant among the high timer group. Substantially, both primes together lead to a .6 point reduction in a respondents support for immigration. Therefore, my hypothesis (H₃) about the negative information about a culturally different group leading more opposition than one about a culturally similar group is supported for the “high time” group.

Models 3 and 4 portray the conditional impact of the positive article on the culturally similar Polish immigrant prime in predicting opposition to immigration. These models reveal that a positive article conditional on Polish prime decreases opposition to immigration and the effect is significant, however this time it is only so for low timers.

Issue, Tone, and Ethnicity of the article: Table 6.9 illustrates the models testing Hypotheses 5 and 6 regarding the issue and tone interaction, conditional on the ethnic prime. The results in Models 1a through 2b did not produce any models confirming my predictions. The Models for Turkish and Polish prime did not portray any significant interaction effects on immigration attitudes.

Table 18 The Impact of the Issue Prime on Opposition to Immigration conditional on Ethnicity and Tone Manipulations for Western and Eastern Sample

<i>Prime Type</i>	<i>Model 1a Polish Prime Low Time</i>	<i>Model 1b Polish Prime High Time</i>	<i>Model 2a Turkish Prime Low Time</i>	<i>Model 2 b Turkish Prime High Time</i>
Economic	-.147 (.536)	-.471 (.237)		
Symbolic			-.380 (.348)	.317 (.183)
Negative	.730* (.011)	-.231 (.535)	-.560 (.287)	.239 (.432)
Positive				
Econ x Negat	-.255 (.345)	.417 (.378)		
Symb x Negat			.550 (.353)	.062 (.861)
N	18	21	14	27
R-Squared	.511	.083	.132	.249

Coefficients (standard errors) are estimates from OLS regression, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The estimations of the initial models for those who spent time below and above the median illustrate that indeed time interacts with priming in important ways. Overall, those who spend more time with the experiment tend to be more aware of and are more easily manipulated by ethnic primes. Therefore, their lack of having a statistically significant impact on immigration attitudes for other subsamples can be attributable to respondents' lack of attention and commitment.

The tone manipulation on the other hand functions differently regarding the time variable in that it is actually those who spend less time with the survey who are more

responsive to the negative prime. Perhaps reading the newspaper article without paying much attention allows the respondent to remember only the negative or positive prime. Therefore, in the absence of full awareness of the other primes such as ethnicity and issue, a respondent's tone related predispositions are more easily accessed and the rest of the information is simply ignored.

Testing the Hypotheses with Additional Controls for the Best Case Scenario

Upon finding that primes largely fail to generate the hypothesized impact on immigration attitudes in the preceding two sections I explored the circumstances under which they function the way they are expected. I found that both being from the former East vs. West and being committed and therefore spending more vs. less time seem to impact the way primes operate in significant ways. In this final section, I will illustrate the estimations that incorporate both those abovementioned circumstances and illustrate the impact of the primes for the best conditions they operate in and test their endurance against other possible explanations.

One of the advantages of an experimental design is the random distribution of the respondents into different manipulations. I put considerable effort in ensuring that by assigning each version of the article to respondents based on randomly generated numbers. However, when a sample is further split into subgroups reducing the number of individuals in each manipulation cell, as I did in this analysis, the randomness assumption becomes dubious. This in turn necessitates incorporating possible explanations of immigration attitudes into the analysis to account for the non random part of the data. In other words, I will try to account for the decreasing number of respondents in every cell of an

experimental manipulation and thereby increasing non randomness by including other ways to account for the dependent variable. The results are illustrated in Table 6.10.

Table 19 The Main Effect of Ethnic and Tone Primes for Low and High Timers with Controls

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Model 1 West & High Timer</i>	<i>Model 2 West & High Timer</i>	<i>Model 3 West & Low Timer</i>
Italian Prime	0.490* (0.271)	0.244 (0.171)	-0.341* (0.185)
Turkish Prime	0.557** (0.274)	-0.124 (0.217)	
Control	1.561*** (0.450)	0.412 (0.292)	-0.194 (0.261)
Negative Prime	0.118 (0.218)	-0.184 (0.164)	
Negat xTurk		0.679** (0.327)	
Polish Prime			0.580** (0.248)
Positive Prime			0.110 (0.186)
Posit x Pol			-0.772** (0.294)
Economic Prime	0.266 (0.239)	0.059 (0.152)	-0.086 (0.139)
Pocketbook Concern	-0.0163 (0.113)	-0.005 (0.070)	0.262*** (0.0809)
Household income	0.137** (0.062)	0.052 (0.039)	0.093* (0.048)
Education	-0.356** (0.143)	-0.110 (0.090)	-0.216* (0.119)
Contact	-0.086 (0.081)	-0.039 (0.051)	-0.067 (0.058)
Prejudice	0.0280*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.0167*** (0.005)
SDB	-0.105*** (0.026)	-0.047*** (0.017)	-0.016 (0.017)
Big 5- Openness	0.023 (0.069)	0.019 (0.044)	-0.017 (0.042)
Constant	0.349 (1.087)	1.728** (0.683)	0.520 (0.808)
Observations	58	58	46
R-squared	0.713	0.632	0.713

Table 6.10 illustrates three models for the main and interactive effect of the experimental manipulations, but this time controlling for the effect of pocketbook concerns, household income, openness from the Big 5 personality traits, contact with immigrants, and finally prejudice and Social Desirability Bias (SDB)¹⁹.

Before discussing the impact of these additional explanations on immigration attitudes, it is important to point out the way in which ethnic and tone primes bear up to the inclusion of these. Model 1 suggests that being primed by an Italian as well as a Turkish immigrant is influential on the immigration attitudes and this impact is statistically significant. More specifically, those primed with an Italian and Turkish immigrant oppose immigration considerably more than those primed with a Polish immigrant and their effect is distinctly different from each other too

Models 2 and 3 explore the interactive effect of ethnic and tone manipulations in relation to immigration attitudes controlling for alternative explanations. The results from the preceding part hold against the inclusion of these usual suspects confirming my initial expectations. Being exposed to a newspaper article evaluating the benefits associated with future Polish immigration continues to reduce opposition to immigration even when controlling for the alternative explanations. On the other hand, reading about the costs

¹⁹ A larger list of control variables have been initially employed for the analysis of the entire sample as well as subsamples. However those variables failed to exert a statistically significant impact on opposition under all possible model specifications were excluded to introduce efficiency into the models. Given the small sample sizes due to the splitting of the sample such parsimony proves essential.

associated with future Turkish immigration increased respondents' opposition to immigration also controlling for the effect of the other variables in the model.

Models 1 through 3 also illustrate a very strong impact of other explanations for exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants and much larger variance explained compared to previous models suggesting that the individuals within the priming groups are not randomly distributed on these variables especially after splitting the sample into smaller subsamples.

The first variables with a strong statistically significant impact on immigration attitudes across all three models is the level of *prejudice* as measured with agreement to stereotypical traits about immigrants. Just like we would expect, an increase in the level of prejudice predicts more opposition to immigration controlling for the impact of all primes and alternative explanations.

As one of the main focal points of this dissertation, social desirability bias also exerts a visible and statistically significant impact on immigration attitudes because as an individual becomes more concerned about her social desirability bias, she reports less opposition to immigration. This is also consistent with the expectations of this project stated in Hypothesis 6 of chapter 3 in that social desirability bias has a direct impact on immigration attitudes.

More importantly though, this result illustrates even after considerable efforts to reduce this bias through a randomized experiment and computerized survey, individuals still feel the pressure to respond to questions that would make them appear less exclusivist/xenophobic. While the experimental manipulation seems to control for the effect of this bias on hierarchically differentiating immigrants, it does not seem to account

for this lack of willingness to express overall immigration attitudes.

Models 1 and 3 also illustrate a statistically significant effect of education and income on immigration attitudes. Accordingly an increase in an individual's education level reduces her opposition to immigration controlling for other variables such as income and prejudice. This result indicates that besides education's role in generating more income and less prejudice, it has an additional role in reducing opposition to immigration, which could be a function of class or tolerance.

However income has the opposite impact on immigration attitudes in that those with higher income oppose immigration more and this effect is statistically significant. While this is surprising, this could be a function of the control variables in our models as after controlling for prejudice, we may end up a group of high income-highly intolerant group of individuals which in turn have more exclusivist tendencies.

Finally, for the first model pocket book concerns have a statistically significant effect on immigration attitudes that is intuitive in that those with more concern about their own finances oppose immigration more, controlling for the alternative explanations.

All in all, this section illustrates that the first four of my expectations hold for the section of the sample that are more susceptible to primes even when controlling for the impact of quite influential explanations as prejudice. Furthermore, it also showed that despite all my efforts social desirability bias still exerts a biasing effect on people's expression of their attitudes about out-groups.

6.7 CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I have shown the impact of the ethnicity of the prospective immigrant for people's immigration attitudes using a priming experiment as a way to eliminate socially desirable responding and ensure higher internal validity. With this, I initially assumed that the immigrant groups and their assessment can be manipulated via situational triggers such as priming. My analyses illustrate that, while part of this is true for a specific subsample, the impact of situational triggers should not be taken as granted.

The results show that part of the reason why the initial models did not yield to similar effects is due to the inability to ensure respondents' commitment to the experiment and carefully read the newspaper article incorporating the prime. While those with low commitment and who subsequently spent a short amount of time taking the survey were more responsive to only tone manipulation but not the ethnic manipulation. On the other hand, those with a higher commitment and who spent a longer time were heavily influenced by ethnicity primes as well as their interactions with tone primes.

Another part of the explanation is more context related, leading to primes operating differently for Western and Eastern Sample. Generally, while the Eastern sample only responded to tone manipulations, the Western sample was responsive to both the ethnicity and tone manipulations all in the expected way. When both of those issues are accounted for, examining "high timers" and "Westerners", the four hypotheses regarding the ethnic and tone manipulations were confirmed and the results held after the addition of a number of control variables as well.

However, while my initial four hypotheses were fully confirmed for this subsample,

they are not confirmed for the entire sample and my predictions about the interactive role of the ethnic primes with symbolic and economic considerations were also not confirmed. Future field research should consider the ways in which primes operate differently across subsamples from different contextual background as well as across different commitment levels to the survey instrument manifested in spending time.

Finally, the final set of models illustrate that despite all efforts to eliminate its effect, social desirability bias continues to have a considerable impact on opposition to immigration suggesting that future studies should not ignore the magnitude of its impact and explore further ways to reduce it.

7.0 CHAPTER 7: IMPLICATIONS OF HETEROGENEOUS PERCEPTION OF IMMIGRATION AND SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS ON EU ATTITUDES

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapters, I laid out a model of immigration attitudes, which accounts for the heterogeneous perception of immigrants and the threats imposed by socially desirable responding to the survey questions. In an attempt to show that the implications of my model extend beyond explaining immigration attitudes, in this chapter, I will explore how people's positions on related public policies are affected by my proposed approach.

One of these policies immigration attitudes has been shown to have close connections is public support for European Union. As outlined in Chapter 2 in greater detail, the literature on support for EU integration and related policies such as enlargement put considerable emphasis on the role of symbolic concerns in informing attitudes. Scholars illustrated that symbolic variables manifested in the form of fear of immigration and a possible cultural invasion resulting from this immigration seem to be major reasons why people oppose the EU, more so than their economic concerns (Hooghe 2004, McLaren 2007).

Public opinion towards European integration is a highly debated and researched issue with policy implications in growing importance. Not surprisingly, the rise in the scholarly research on the issue coincides with the end of the “permissive consensus” -a lack of public interest in European integration, allowing political elites to pursue their own policy interests (Carruba 2001), marking the early years of the EU. In the words of Hooghe, “the permissive consensus that shielded the machinery’s operators from accountability is not just under strain; it is broken” (2007). These growing accountability problems brought about a vivid discussion of “the democratic deficit” in the EU policy making, thereby further increasing the importance of citizen’s preferences.

Given the close relationship between EU attitudes and immigration attitudes as well as related symbolic concerns all prone to social desirability bias, there is reason to believe that my theoretical framework may provide insights into our understanding of public opinion towards the EU. These implications may manifest themselves in terms of providing an improved causal story both because of the ethnicity of immigrant in question being brought in and removal of the systematic biases introduced by socially desirable responding. Furthermore, a substantial part of the scholarly discussion on attitudes toward EU integration revolves around the relative role of these symbolic variables in relationship to economic ones, and the exact causal mechanisms these variables operate in. In this regard, my refined approach to these symbolic variables may bring in a novel perspective, possibly illuminating some contended areas.

Therefore in this chapter, I first hope to lay out a model of support for EU Integration and EU Enlargement incorporating the heterogeneous perception of immigration I illustrated previously. Taking immigration attitudes now as an independent

variable, I hope to address if immigration concerns regarding some ethnic groups matter more than others in relation to the EU, thereby providing a better picture of the causal mechanism taking place. Second, considering the very sensitive nature of symbolic concepts found to be influential in EU attitudes and the difficulty of measuring them in a conventional survey, there is reason to suspect that they are also prone to social desirability bias. To account for this possible measurement bias, I propose an alternative method for measuring both the symbolic variables and the EU attitudes in an unobtrusive way.

In order to achieve these goals, I utilize an original survey experiment, which I conducted in Germany in the summer of 2009 with two experimental manipulations; the first, a priming experiment about immigration, and the second, a “list” experiment about EU enlargement. By addressing these measurement issues, I hope to illustrate the implications of my previous findings in refining the existing explanations of EU attitudes from systematic biases.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the first part, I will explore the repercussions of my model of heterogeneous understanding of immigration attitudes in relation to support for EU integration and Enlargement. Therefore at first, I will briefly reiterate the theoretical framework and hypotheses regarding this part which will be followed by the analysis of my original survey data in relation to my propositions.

The second part will shift the focus to exclusively EU enlargement attitudes as a follow up to the findings from the first part and consider the ways in which social desirability bias overshadows the impact of feelings of cultural threat in informing opposition to enlargement. Upon laying out the theoretical expectations in relationship to social desirability bias, I will utilize a list experiment, which I embedded in my original

survey experiment. Finally, upon discussing my findings I will point out to the theoretical and practical implications of these two parts in relation to my dissertation.

7.2 PART 1: IMPLICATIONS OF HETEROGENEITY OF IMMIGRATION PERCEPTIONS ON EU ATTITUDES

In earlier chapters I found differences in the way public opinion is formed across different immigrants. In this part I will portray the consequences of these findings on EU attitudes, which are shown to be closely related to immigration attitudes. In particular I am interested in finding out if EU attitudes are related to immigration of certain groups more than others. As outlined in the theoretical chapter, clarifying this exact mechanism would go a long way in contributing the literature on this issue, where symbolic concerns is shown to play a major role but the reasons for it have not been addressed sufficiently.

In the remainder of this part, I will reiterate my hypotheses regarding the relationship between attitudes towards the immigration of specific ethnic groups and EU enlargement as well as Euroskepticism. Following that, I will depict the data I will be testing these hypotheses with. Upon a brief descriptive illustration I will analyze the data with OLS regression models estimating EU enlargement and Euroskepticism attitudes with immigration attitudes as well as other alternative explanations. Finally, I will discuss my findings and their implications both theoretically and practically.

7.2.1 Hypotheses

In the cognitive interviews I conducted in the summer of 2007, I presented interviewees with the commonly used immigration question, asking their preference about immigration into their country without specifying any ethnic group. Upon answering this question, I asked the interviewees if there were any specific groups that came to their mind and if they could name these groups. About two thirds of the sample named Turkish/Muslim immigrants as the first group that comes to their mind when answering the immigration question.

Furthermore, in the my experimental survey I conducted in the summer of 2009, I primed respondents with Turkish, Polish, and Italian groups and a group of respondents – the control group- did not get any kind of priming. My analysis illustrates those in the control group had very similar attitudes towards immigration to those primed with a Turkish immigrant. The results of both my cognitive interviews and experimental survey indicate that the default immigrant group for a considerable group of the interviewees in both settings was Muslims.

In other words, when the immigrant group is not specified as it is the case with many surveys scholars analyze; a large group of people think of immigrants outside of the EU member states, which are also those they perceive culturally different than themselves. I therefore argue that the strong relationship between immigration attitudes and EU attitudes -namely integration and enlargement, could actually be between fear of Muslim/culturally different immigration and EU attitudes. This in turn makes fear of EU Enlargement as the main determinant of Euroskepticism as evidenced by people fusing

these two concepts.

When EU enlargement is considered, this expectation is intuitive in that Turkey is a candidate country with a large Muslim population perceived to be culturally different and the public may oppose enlargement because they oppose the Turkish membership out of fear for immigration from this country.

Therefore regarding enlargement,

H₁: I expect a stronger link between immigration attitudes and EU enlargement for people primed with a Turkish immigrant than those who are primed with other groups.

As Italians are entitled to freedom of the movement since the early period of EU integration,

H₂: I expect the relationship between EU enlargement and immigration attitudes to be weakest for those primed with an Italian immigrant.

With regards to EU integration/Euroskepticism on the other hand the relationship is less clear cut as evidenced by the lack of agreement in the literature on the issue. When my previous finding regarding the default immigrant as the culturally different for most is considered in conjunction with the literature illustrating a close link between people's attitudes towards immigration taken as a homogenous group and their support for the EU integration, this could suggest a possible fusion of these two concepts by many

individuals. In other words, it could be that, people associate EU directly and very closely with its enlargement and an avenue for the culturally different out-group's access to their territories, or with certain values that promote the same kind of values which may indicate the same culturally threatening consequences as Muslim immigration.

However, when attitudes towards EU integration is considered and understood as the amalgamation of a range of converging policies across its members, many may disagree with this direction of reasoning. This is because EU is integration measured as individual's perceptions of the EU as an overarching entity, of their country's benefit from the EU, and her opinions regarding membership and pace of integration. Hence when immigration is considered, integration mainly suggests freedom of mobility for citizens of other member states with the great majority of their citizens perceived culturally similar. Enlargement being one of the many aspects of integration may therefore not directly relate to integration.

Therefore there may be two different mechanisms in operation. It is either that people associate EU directly and very closely with enlargement and see integration as an avenue for the culturally different out-groups' access to their territories. In this case, the ethnic background of the prospective immigrant informing their immigration attitudes may matter a lot. As a result,

if EU enlargement is the factor informing attitudes towards the EU, which my empirical analysis so far suggests to be the case,

***H₃:** We would expect the strongest relationship between immigration attitudes and Euroskepticism for those who received the Turkish prime*

and hence a weaker relationship between immigration and Euroskepticism for those who received the Italian or Polish prime.

Or people may see the integration considerably distinct from enlargement and associate it with certain values that promote diversity and multiculturalism. Therefore their opposition to immigration taken as an all inclusive homogenous group may indicate a general threat to the unity of their country. In this case, the ethnic background of the prospective immigrant should matter less as every group would violate their individual's lack of adherence to multiculturalism similarly. If it is a fear of overall immigration as a proxy of multiculturalism informing attitudes towards the EU integration,

H₄: We would not expect one immigrant group to be much more influential on the strongest relationship between immigration attitudes and Euroskepticism than others.

7.2.2 Data and Methods

In order to test the preceding assertions, I will utilize the original priming experiment I conducted in Germany with 208 respondents, which is described in depth in the previous chapter²⁰. This experiment was embedded in a survey, where individuals were asked about

²⁰ The details of the procedures I followed to conduct this survey experiment are outlined in the appendix.

their attitudes regarding politics, social relationships, stereotypes they associate with immigrants, their personality traits as well as about their attitudes towards the EU enlargement and EU integration.

Support for EU enlargement is measured by a sum of the respondents' support for possible membership of the following states: Albania, Ukraine, Croatia, Bosnia, Turkey, Norway and Switzerland on a 1-7 point scale. The ranking of the countries from most supported to the least with the average score of support in parenthesis is as follows: Norway (4.96), Switzerland (4.93), Croatia (3.85), Bosnia (3.65), Turkey (3.34), Ukraine (3.25), and Albania (3.20).

And the second dependent variable is Euroskepticism measured as an additive index of 5 survey items. These are whether or not the respondent is in favor of unification, respondent's preferred speed of the EU integration, respondent's perception of Germany's benefit from the EU, assessment of Germany's membership as a good thing or not, and finally the overall image of the EU for the respondent²¹. The Chronbach's alpha of the scale yielded $\alpha = .86$ indicating very good scale reliability.

Using this data, I will estimate separate models for predicting support for EU enlargement and EU integration. In doing this I hope to lay out the underlying mechanisms linking immigration attitudes to EU attitudes and show the importance of ethnicity of immigrant in question in order to illustrate whether or not this heterogeneous understanding of immigration has any implications on EU attitudes. In other words, I will be able to illustrate if the relationship between support for immigration and support for EU

²¹ To avoid possible ordering effects, the EU integration questions were asked before the EU enlargement questions.

enlargement as well as EU integration are conditional upon the immigrant groups that come to mind.

7.2.3 Analysis and Discussion

For a preliminary analysis of the results in relation to immigration and EU attitudes, first I categorized the sample based on what ethnic group they were primed with. Following that I calculated simple Pearson’s r coefficients to probe the plausibility of my expectations. Graph 1 illustrates the correlations between opposition to immigration and Euroskepticism on the one hand, and opposition to EU enlargement on the other hand, given different ethnic primes. The way the priming was conducted via newspaper articles is illustrated in the previous chapter in detail.




Figure 7-1 Relationship between Euroskepticism, Support for EU Enlargement and Immigration Attitudes when Primed with Different Ethnic Groups

The preliminary results illustrated in Graph 1 confirm that there is a strong relationship between immigration attitudes and EU attitudes and it differs across different immigrant groups. Accordingly, the strongest correlation coefficients for both immigration & Euroskepticism and immigration & Enlargement relationships are obtained when the respondent is primed with a Turkish immigrant. Both these relationship gets weaker for respondents primed with an article mentioning culturally similar immigrants namely Poles and Italians.

In addition, for those not primed with any ethnic group and asked the immigration question directly, the relationship seems to follow a similar pattern to Turkish immigrants, supporting the expectation that when not primed with any groups, respondents think of Turks as the default immigrant category. In the wake of these preliminary results, there is reason to expect a significant interaction effect between immigration and EU attitudes. In order to test this relationship in terms of statistical significance, I will conduct an OLS regression analysis with interaction effects. Furthermore this analysis will allow me to see if this relationship pattern will continue to hold once all the possible explanations of EU attitudes are integrated into a model.

As the purpose of this section is to illustrate the impact of being primed with different ethnic groups on the relationship between immigration attitudes and EU attitudes, the discussion of the results will focus on these variables only. Nonetheless, the models incorporate many of the variables found to have impact on EU attitudes as ideology, education, sociotropic and pocketbook concerns, age and income. These variables were measured with separate survey questions in other parts of the survey experiment. Table 1

illustrates OLS regression models for opposition to EU enlargement.

**Table 20 Explaining opposition to EU Enlargement with immigration attitudes
conditional on Turkish, Polish, and Italian primes**

Independent Variables	Model1	Model2
Anti-immigration	.154* (.080)	.503** (.000)
Turkish Prime	.239 (.131)	-.094 (.547)
Polish Prime	.288* (.085)	---
Italian Prime	---	-.453** (.006)
Immigration*Turkish Prime	.429** (.009)	.010 (.950)
Immigration*Polish Prime	.405** (.020)	---
Immigration*Italian Prime	---	-.539** (.001)
Prospective Socio-tropic Concern	.083 (.207)	.090 (.167)
Prospective Pocketbook Concern	.050 (.445)	.033 (.616)
Household Income	-.038 (.519)	-.028 (.630)
Education	-.086 (.132)	-.098* (.086)
Age	-.007 (.906)	-.012 (.829)
Ideology	.317** (.000)	.307** (.000)
Adjusted R ²	.49	.50
N	191	191

* Indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence

** Indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence

Models 1 and 2 in Table 1 illustrate that (controlling for the impact of alternative explanations as income, education and ideology), when respondents were led to think about Turkish immigrants, the impact of immigration attitudes on EU enlargement is the strongest, closely followed by a prime for a Polish immigrant group. This impact however, gets almost nullified when respondents were primed with an Italian immigrant group

indicating that consistent with my expectations people's opinions towards Italian immigrants have little to do with their attitudes towards EU enlargement.

The conditional impact of ethnic prime on immigration attitudes seems to be statistically significant for every ethnic prime. However, making a more coherent and substantially meaningful interpretation of conditional effects requires an additional analysis. For this purpose I used the `lincom` command in Stata, which computes confidence intervals for linear combinations of coefficients. This analysis enables a more thorough exploration of the conditional impact of one variable at different levels of the other variable -here the effect of immigration attitudes on EU attitudes for different ethnic groups but the way they intervene the impact of immigration differs. To illustrate this effect more clearly, graphs for the predicted probability of opposition were generated for different levels of these variables being interacted for each of these four models.






Figure 7-2 Conditional Effects of Ethnic Prime on support for Enlargement at different levels of Support for Immigration

Figure 7.4 illustrates the effect of immigration attitudes on probability of opposing the EU enlargement, conditional upon ethnicity of immigrants for all three immigrant groups separately at different levels of immigration support. A brief glance at the three graphs confirms the suspicions of this study in that the three immigrant primes lead to different relationships between immigration attitudes and EU enlargement.

The first graph illustrates the conditional impact of being primed with a Turkish immigrant on EU enlargement at different levels of immigration support where the x-axis is the opposition to immigration and the y-axis is opposition to EU enlargement. The red line corresponds to the cases when the Turkish immigrant prime is present and the blue line corresponds to the cases where it is absent. The distance between the two lines indicates the magnitude of the conditional impact.

Accordingly, for those high in opposition to immigration, the Turkish prime leads to even higher opposition for EU enlargement, and for those low in opposition to immigration, the Turkish prime leads to an even higher support for enlargement with its impact getting larger. In other words, if an individual is primed with a Turkish immigrant and signified low opposition to immigration, this makes him or her very likely to support enlargement compared to those who are primed with other groups. In fact, the probability of opposition for the EU enlargement decreases from 40 percent to 34 percent. For those of less supportive of immigration, the conditional impact is smaller in magnitude but still existent.

The second graph illustrates the conditional impact of being primed with a Polish immigrant on EU enlargement at different levels of immigration opposition. The conditional impact of the prime has a quite distinct pattern for the Polish immigrant prime,

in that being primed with a Pole does not seem to exert a conditional impact at any level of immigration attitudes. Finally for Italians, the relationship is completely different from the previous two immigrant groups in that at high levels of immigration opposition, Italian prime leads to lower support for EU enlargement, and at low levels of opposition to, it leads to lower support than being primed by any other group.

Confirming my first and second hypotheses, the kind of immigration that informs enlargement attitudes is from outside the EU, in this case from Turkey. This result also confirms that the ethnic manipulation in the experimental design works correctly. Furthermore, the models illustrate immigration attitudes are quite informative of attitudes towards enlargement for this sample, more so than economic variables.

Having explained the impact of ethnic prime on the relationship between immigration attitudes and opposition to European Enlargement, I now turn to its impact interacting with ethnicity of immigrant on Euroskepticism. Table 2 illustrates the results of an OLS regression estimating support for EU integration.

Table 21 Explaining Euroskeptic Attitudes with Immigration Attitudes Conditional on Turkish and Polish Primes


Independent Variables	Model1	Model2
Anti-immigration	.213** (.016)	.384** (.000)
Turkish Prime	.041 (.790)	-.172 (.271)
Polish Prime	.206 (.213)	---
Italian Prime	---	-.276* (.090)
Immigration*Turkish Prime	.176 (.273)	-.042 (.786)
Pro-immigration*Polish Prime	.226 (.191)	---
Pro-immigration*Italian Prime	---	-.271* (.095)
Prospective Socio-tropic Concern	.112* (.076)	.116* (.066)
Prospective Pocketbook Concern	.083 (.187)	.072 (.254)
Household Income	-.104* (.074)	-.102* (.075)
Education	-.108* (.071)	-.108* (.054)
Age	.011 (.844)	.010 (.854)
Ideology	.444** (.000)	.445** (.000)
Adjusted R ²	.58	.58
N	170	170

*Indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence

** Indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence

Models 1 and 2 in Table 7.2 illustrate that, controlling for the impact of alternative explanations, when respondents were led to think about Italian immigrants, the relationship between immigration attitudes and Euroskepticism becomes weaker. On the other hand, when they were led to think of Poles or Turks, the conditional impact gets stronger. The

conditional impact of ethnic prime on immigration attitudes seems to be statistically significant only for the Italian prime, however the previous lincom analysis illustrated that this impact may differ across different levels of opposition to immigration. Therefore the following section will evaluate this interaction at different levels of the variables.






Figure 7-3 Conditional Effects of Ethnic Prime on Euroskepticism at different levels of Support for Immigration

Figure 7.3 illustrates the effect of immigration attitudes on probability of opposing the EU integration (or Euroskepticism), conditional upon ethnicity of immigrants for all three immigrant groups separately. The conditional impact of ethnic prime on Euroskepticism follows an almost identical pattern to opposition to EU enlargement both in terms of magnitude and in relationship to the particular immigrant groups. This pattern supports the claim that it is actually the fear of enlargement which makes immigration attitudes so important for explaining EU attitudes more so than holding conflicting values with a multicultural EU.

More specifically, while the Polish prime does not seem to have any substantial conditional effect, especially at high levels of immigration support, being primed with a Turkish immigrant increases one's odds of being Euroskeptic considerably. On the other hand, being primed with the Italian immigrant leads to somewhat higher Euroskepticism at

low levels of immigration support and lower Euroskepticism at high levels of immigration support.

This finding disproves Hypotheses 4 regarding immigration attitudes being comparable across all immigrant primes suggesting the influence of immigration attitudes on support EU integration is not because these attitudes are a proxy of a higher value of multiculturalism or immigration from within the EU. Yet, my findings confirm Hypotheses 3 suggesting a close link between support for EU enlargement and Euroskepticism. In other words, attitudes towards Turkish immigration seem to inform both EU enlargement and integration attitudes, so much that the alternative evaluations remain limited in their explanatory power.

All in all, this analysis illustrates that the ethnicity of immigrant matters regarding both the EU enlargement attitudes and general EU integration attitudes controlling for most possible alternative explanations. Moreover, even though the specific conditional impact changes from one immigrant group to the other, the same ethnicity matters similar ways in relationship to these two dependent variables. In other words, even for support for EU integration, being primed with a Turkish immigrant matters a great deal suggesting integration attitudes are filtered through a funnel of enlargement attitudes. The strong Pearson's r correlation of ($r = .80$) between the two variables further supports this argument.

Having illustrated the large impact of the fear of immigration and cultural similarity of the immigrant group both on EU enlargement and integration attitudes, and that the latter two are strongly related, it is timely to address what it is about this fear of immigration that informs attitudes towards the EU this much. This question links the issue

to the second measurement issue I aim to address, which is also related to probably the most important explanation of this out-group exclusion.

7.3 PART II: SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS, CULTURAL THREAT AND EXPLAINING EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT ATTITUDES

As I illustrated in the preceding chapters, when attitudes towards out-groups are considered, one of the central threats to a reliable measurement of our concepts is social desirability bias. To the extent that people think about immigration in racial or cultural terms, respondents may fear that the interviewer would perceive restrictionist attitudes as reflective of racism or ethnocentrism (Janus 2007). I illustrated how some of these threats of social desirability bias function on out-group attitudes in chapter 4.

The first part of this chapter addressed one aspect of these social desirability bias issues that threatening the measurement of immigration attitudes with an experimental design. In a conventional survey setting, respondents' preferences regarding different immigrant groups would be tapped by providing them a list of immigrants with different ethnic backgrounds to evaluate their preferences upon. This however, may bias people's responses and tempt them to give similar responses out of concern to appear consistent across immigrant groups, as favoring one over the other would have openly racist undertones. However, in the earlier experimental design, an ethnic manipulation pointed out a different immigrant for every individual in that condition group and a different one in

another condition group. This way, respondents have no way to know that some other group is asked about a different immigrant group and no incentive to respond in a biased manner.

Nevertheless, in addition to the differentiation of immigrants, social desirability may also impact the explanatory variables explaining immigration or EU enlargement. Given my findings in the previous part of this chapter regarding the importance of immigration attitudes in relation to perceived cultural similarity and the importance of symbolic concerns in explaining EU attitudes, social desirability bias is quite likely to overshadow the actual impact of these variables. Therefore, the second part of this chapter focuses on minimizing the social desirability bias and showing its implications on the role of one of these symbolic concerns, namely feelings of cultural threat. Also, having found consistent results with the existing literature that immigration attitudes are strongly related to support for EU enlargement, exploring this variable will also allow me to address what it is about immigration that feeds this relationship.

In the remainder of this section, I will recap my hypotheses initially laid out in chapter 3 and illustrate the way cultural threat is measured in existing survey research. Subsequently, I will introduce the list experiment I used to illustrate the actual impact of cultural threat on EU Enlargement and immigration attitudes, and finally discuss my findings in comparison to the earlier surveys.

7.3.1 Hypotheses

A variable that has been consistently found to be influential in informing enlargement attitudes and possibly suffering from socially desirable responding is feelings of cultural threat via immigration. However, as many analyses of subtle prejudice scales (Pettigrew 1997, 2002) illustrate, people are more likely to accept and agree with negative consequences of immigration in case an economic and rational argument is presented much so than cultural consequences. In other words, accepting a cultural threat as a justification for exclusivist out-group preferences is a very high threshold to pass especially for an individual who is aware of the political inappropriateness of accepting such a statement. This, in turn, is expected to generate great discomfort.

Due to the concerns mentioned above, one may find it really hard to agree that she is being culturally threatened by the EU enlargement or immigration. And that is not necessarily because the statement does not reflect her preferences, but because it makes the respondent feel uncomfortable to accept an attitude contrary to the norms of the society such as respect for diversity and make her appear xenophobic. Therefore, given the possible social desirability biases inflicting its measurement, I argue that

***H₁:** The proportion of people who feel culturally threatened by immigration and thus oppose enlargement are much larger than what is shown in conventional surveys.*

For instance European Social Survey utilized a similar question to tap with this item. Over three years the survey asked a large sample of European populations if immigration is undermining the culture of a country or enriching it on a scale from 0 to 10. Below are the rates of agreement in Europe, Germany, and the more liberal population in Berlin.




Figure 7.4 Full Agreement with Immigration as Cultural Invasion




Figure 7.5 Full and Partial Agreement with Immigration as Cultural Invasion

Figure 7.4 illustrates those selected 0, 1, and 2 on the 10 point scale, seeing immigration strictly as a cultural threat. EU wide attitudes on that question fluctuate between 6 percent and fourteen percent with the sample from Germany yielding to smaller rates. The sample from the more diverse and tolerant capital seems even more reluctant to agree with this statement with agreement rates ranging from 1 percent to 9 percent. For all the samples, there is a peak in 2006 possibly related to the reaction to big EU enlargement of 2004 and resulting immigration.

Figure 7.5 illustrates those who selected 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4, simply everyone who is on the cultural threat side of the 10 point scale even if it is partial agreement. A similar pattern can be observed for the EU, German and Berlin samples. When we include the partial agreement, the Berlin sample starts off with very small number of respondents who are in agreement, reaching 16 percent in 2006 and maintaining that in 2008 with 15%.

Overall, the results illustrate that even when partial agreement with the statement is included, very few numbers of people actually agree with this statement making suspicions of measurement biases justified. Clearly agreeing with this statement does indicate a certain level of ethnocentrism and the way it is coined by the ESS as a double ended scale, it indicates a disagreement with diversity enriching the society.

This indeed is the kind of statement which takes a lot of courage and self exposure for a lot of people, especially for those who have some feelings of cultural threat but do not want to be labeled as racist because of those feelings. Therefore, utilizing an unobtrusive measure for this question has a lot of potential to reveal the actual percentage of respondents opposing EU enlargement because of their fear of cultural invasion and also

whether or not certain segments of population are more likely to hold these attitudes. Specifically, I would like to explore if being from the former East, being prejudiced, low education, low income, negative evaluations of the economy, and rightist ideological stance makes one agree with this statement more than others.

7.3.2 Participants and Procedure

As this experiment was a part of the same survey described in chapter 6, the sample characteristics are the same as the previous section. The experimental design employed for this section is called a list experiment. This is one of the more common types of experimental designs widely used in political science first proposed by Kuklinski et al. (1997) as an unobtrusive way of controlling for the effect of socially desirable respondent.

The logic of a list experiment is quite simple and the procedure is very straightforward. The idea behind it is to give respondents the impression that the researcher is not interested in their answers to specific items. By introducing a number of items in the same question the respondent is led to think that there is no way that the researcher is able to identify the respondent's agreement with a specific item.

As part of this procedure respondents are randomly assigned to two groups. One half are presented with a list of three items and asked to indicate their agreement (or disagreement) with the number of items in the list, not which specific items. The other half of the respondents are assigned to indicate their preference about the same three items plus an additional item, which is the sensitive issue. This way, as respondents are not pointing

out their preferences about every single item separately, but instead indicate the number of items, they feel more comfortable about giving a socially undesirable answer. This is possible mainly because the researcher or interviewer has no way of knowing which respondent agreed with which item.

In order to adapt the Kuklinski and Cobb (1997) list experiment to EU enlargement attitudes I utilized the following question wording with the * item indicating the manipulation.

“Here is a list of reasons commonly indicated by people for opposing the further enlargement of the European Union. Can you please tell me how many of these items do you agree with?

- EU enlargement will lead to further sovereignty loss for the existing members.
- Through immigration, EU enlargement will lead to further unemployment in the existing states.
- EU enlargement will be very costly for the existing members because of the economic backwardness of the candidate states.
- * Through immigration from the candidate states, EU enlargement will be a big threat to the cultural unity of the existing member states.

Once again as you think of the aforementioned reasons, please indicate with how many you agree with not which ones.

7.3.3 Precautions

Before performing any difference of means tests, to see if some segments of population or respondents at different levels of certain variables are more likely to feel culturally threatened by possible immigration, it is necessary to establish that the baseline and the

treatment groups are not statistically significant from each other. For that purpose, I performed ttests across the two groups based on sex, age, prejudice, education, income, ideology, geography growing up (East or West), immigration and EU enlargement attitudes, Euroskepticism, contact, social desirability bias, concerns with the national and personal economy. The results showed that these characteristics of the respondents assigned to the baseline and treatment groups apriori do not differ from each other in statistically significant ways.

7.3.4 Results

The first stage of the analysis involves estimating the percentage of people who agree with the statement that enlargement constitutes a cultural threat due to possible immigration to the existing member states of the EU. This simple analysis entails calculating the mean number of agreed statements for both baseline and test conditions, and then subtracting the former from the latter and multiplying it by 100. The significance level is calculated by a simple t-test.

Table 22 Estimated Mean Level of being culturally threatened by EU Enlargement

	Baseline Condition	Test Condition	Percent “threatened”
N	1.80(.08) 105	2.06(.11) 103	26(.136)*

Table 7.3 illustrates the mean number of agreed responses in the baseline and test groups as well as the percent against enlargement because culturally threatened by further immigration. As expected, a comparison of the two half samples illustrate that roughly 26% of the respondents agree with the statement that enlargement constitutes a cultural threat for the existing EU member states. The standard error of the difference being at a statistically significant level indicates that this difference is not due to sampling error or pure chance.

This percentage is higher than any poll conducted with a sample from Berlin indicating that there may be social desirable respondent when the question is asked directly. Nevertheless, while the sample of the survey is recruited to be representative of the German population, it is not a random sample survey. Therefore caution should be exercised before reaching conclusions from the comparison of the entire sample to previously conducted surveys.

While the difference of means for the entire sample is interesting, one can gain a lot more information by examining if certain groups of people are more or less culturally threatened by enlargement and these relationships would be less affected by sampling. Furthermore, the overall pattern may mask feelings of threat among smaller segments of the population.

Earlier, I suggested that there may be differences among former Easterners and Westerners, between people with different educational backgrounds, income, evaluations of the economy, and ideological stance. Furthermore respondents' levels of opposition to immigration, prejudice, existing contact with immigrants, their evaluation of the cultural similarity of immigrants and the kind of priming they received at the beginning of the

survey experiment may also be related to their level of cultural threat via enlargement. Finally, there may also be differences across respondents with varying levels of support for EU integration and EU enlargement.

Table 7.4 illustrates the results of comparisons across groups with regards to their likelihood to express cultural threats due to EU enlargement.

Table 23 Estimated Mean Level of Feeling Culturally Threatened by EU Enlargement

Variable	Baseline Condition	Test Condition	Percent “threatened”
Female	1.80(.11) 51	2.08(.15) 52	27(.19)
Male	1.79(.11) 54	2.04(.17) 51	24(.20)
<u>Education</u>			
BA	1.41(.09) 49	1.88(.13) 58	47(.16)**
Less than HS	2.13 22	2.83 12	70
<u>Age</u>			
<42	1.64(.12) 47	2.02(.15) 58	38(.20)*
>41	1.93(.11) 58	2.11(.17) 45	18(.19)
Household income			
<7	1.78(.10) 68	1.96(.13) 72	18(.16)
>6	1.81(.15) 32	2.29(.24) 28	47(.28)*
Prejudice			
<7	1.37(.08) 60	1.65(.09) 69	30(12)**
>6	2.38(.11) 45	2.88(.22) 34	50(23)**
East	1.86(.11) 53	2.20(.17) 51	33(.20)*
West	1.73(.12) 52	1.92(.14) 52	19(.19)
Pro-immigration			
<4	2.06(.10) 69	2.44(.15) 64	38(.18)**
>3	1.31(.09) 36	1.44(.10) 39	13(.13)
Euroskeptic			
<6	1.21(.06) 47	1.48(.09) 50	27(.11)**
>5	2.28(.10) 58	2.60(.17) 53	32(.19)*
Pro-Enlargement			
<28	2.24(.11) 54	2.69(.18) 48	45(.20)**
>27	1.33(.07) 51	1.51(.09) 55	18(.11)
Turkey			
<4	2.14(.10)	2.66(.16)	52(.19)***

>3	1.29(.07) 42	1.42(.09) 50	13(.12)
Ideology			
<4	1.27(.09) 41	1.59(.13) 39	32(.15)**
>3	2.14(.10) 64	2.34(.15) 64	20(.18)
Contact			
<12	2.16(.10) 63	2.34(.16) 58	18(.18)
>11	1.26(.08) 42	1.69(.14) 45	43(.16)**
Pocketbook			
<4	1.68(.09) 73	1.90(.13) 69	22(.16)
>3	2.06(.16) 32	2.38(.20) 34	32(.25)
Socio-tropic			
<4	1.41(.08) 59	1.73(.11) 70	32(.13)**
>3	2.30(.12) 46	2.76(.22) 33	46(.23)*
High SDB	1.76(.11) 58	1.83(.13) 64	07(.16)
Low SDB	1.85(.12) 47	2.43(.20) 39	58(.22)***

Table 7.4 illustrates the results of the t-tests indicating those who are feeling threatened at different levels of multiple variables. Regarding age, a statistically significant difference of means exists between the baseline and test conditions for those below the age of 42, which is the mean of this sample, (38% threatened, *p-value* < .10). Only about 18 percent of those older than 42 indicate feeling culturally threatened by enlargement, and the difference of means test between the baseline and test groups is not statistically significant.

One of the questions interest for this study was how the attitudes of people from former East and West differed from each other. As expected, even 20 years after the fall of Berlin wall, there are still major differences between these two groups and the list experiment further confirms these findings. Similar to the findings regarding the

differences between the Northerners and Southerners in the American context, Easterners in Germany elicit higher exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants and minorities. According to the list experiment 33 percent of the people from the former East feel culturally threatened by enlargement ($p\text{-value} < .10$) as opposed to 19 percent of Westerners (N/S).

Not surprisingly, four times more of anti-immigrationists feel culturally threatened than do pro-immigrationists ($p\text{-value} < .05$). Furthermore, while only 30 percent of those who scored below the mean on a separate prejudice scale were threatened by enlargement ($p\text{-value} < .05$), as much as half of those with a high-prejudice score feel culturally threatened ($p\text{-value} < .05$). This relationship especially constitutes further evidence that the list experiment is working as it should. It also shows that the current prejudice and immigration scales do a fine job of discriminating respondents.

When it comes to the relationship with general attitudes related to the EU, 32% of those who rank above the mean on a Euroskepticism scale are likely to feel threatened ($p\text{-value} < .10$) as opposed to 27% of those who are below the mean ($p\text{-value} < .05$). Not surprisingly, regarding the attitudes towards the EU enlargement, only 18 % of those holding positive attitudes (above the mean value for this variable) are likely to indicate a fear of cultural threat whereas almost half of those who hold negative attitudes towards enlargement also fear a cultural invasion via immigration. Regarding the most contested case of Turkey, of those supporting the country's membership bid only 13 percent feel culturally threatened (N/S) whereas more than half of its opponents are threatened ($p\text{-value} < .01$).

Finally, even though a list experiment seemed like the most unobtrusive way to

eliminate the social desirability bias, those who are high in social desirability bias seem still reluctant to accept to feeling culturally threatened. Of those who scored high on the social desirability bias scale, only 7% admitted that they are culturally threatened (N/S). Whereas for those who are low in social desirability, 58% of them indicated they felt culturally threatened by immigration into the EU (*p-value* <.05).

All in all, the results of this section indicate that social desirability bias has a strong suppressive impact on people's self reports regarding the degree of feeling culturally threatened, one of the key variables explaining opposition to immigration as well as EU enlargement and integration. Asking this question as form of a list experiment leads to a higher percentage of agreement with the statement than conventional surveys. This analysis also illustrates the strong link between feeling culturally threatened and other symbolic concerns and lack thereof between culturally threatened and economic concerns.

Furthermore, even though the list experiment decreases the social desirability bias to a large extent with much larger proportion of people accepting to the cultural fear, the bias seems far from being completely removed from the measurement. The difference of accepting the cultural invasion fear between those who scored low in a Marlowe Crowne social desirability scale and those who scored high is still remarkable, pointing out to the extreme difficulty of measuring these sensitive concepts, the consistent influence of social desirability and room for further improvement in future studies.

7.4 CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding chapters, I laid out a detailed model of heterogeneous perception of immigration attitudes while also paying special attention to social desirability bias. With a variety of exploratory and confirmative methods, I tested and validated my expectations. In this final empirical chapter of my dissertation, my goal was to illustrate the importance of this heterogeneous understanding of immigration attitudes and closely related social desirability bias in understanding EU attitudes. In other words I first illustrated why we should differentiate across immigrants based on ethnicity for a better understanding of immigration attitudes and following that I depicted the use of this model in demystifying a related phenomenon.

My findings from the first section illustrate that first, regarding attitudes towards EU enlargement, the ethnicity of immigrant in question interacts with immigration attitudes in a significant way. For those primed with the Turkish immigrant group, the relationship was stronger, whereas for those primed with the Italian immigrant it was the weakest. Second, this relationship was almost identical when Euroskepticism was considered. This finding indicated that, it is predominantly a fear of enlargement rather than immigration from within the EU or a related anti-diversity attitude.

In the latter section, I addressed the basis of this fear in relation to a second dimension of immigration attitudes of my dissertation. In particular, I explored an additional way to eliminate social desirability bias in illuminating the relationship between immigration and EU attitudes with a list experiment. In my comparison with the existing surveys I showed that the actual percentage of people who would agree with feeling

culturally threatened due to EU enlargement may be much higher than indicated earlier. Finally, I identified the groups of people who are more likely to feel threatened by this immigration.

All in all, the analysis in this chapter indicates that the findings of my dissertation regarding immigration attitudes have indeed important implications on other areas. In this chapter I explored the way these findings improve our understanding of Euroskepticism and EU enlargement attitudes. Potential areas for further exploration range from attitudes towards social/welfare spending to vote for extreme right parties, as well as European identity.

8.0 CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS

8.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This dissertation project aimed to address a large gap in the literature of public opinion towards immigration by addressing one of its core assumptions; whether or not the host society perceives immigrants as a homogeneous or a heterogeneous group. More specifically, I was set to explore how immigrant groups with different ethnic backgrounds are categorized by members of the host society and the implications of these classifications on attitudes towards immigration and on globalization.

To tackle this issue in greater detail, in my dissertation, I explored how immigrant groups with different ethnic backgrounds are categorized by members of the host society and the implications of these classifications on attitudes towards immigration and on globalization. Specifically, I challenged the assumption of people's perception of immigrants as a homogenous group as evidenced by the widespread use of a single survey question inquiring about support for overall immigration. I argued that public's perception of immigration is highly heterogeneous, resulting in a hierarchical categorization of immigrants mainly based on ethnicity. In particular, I examine Germans' views towards different immigrant groups from Western and Eastern Europe as well as from outside the

European Union(EU), using German General Social Survey data, original in-depth interviews and survey experimental data that I collected in Berlin between 2007 and 2009. Supplementing this framework, with an additional list experiment also embedded in my original survey, I further demonstrate the causal link between immigration attitudes and attitudes towards EU integration and EU enlargement.

As part of my theory building process I conducted in-depth cognitive interviews with Germans in the summer of 2007 and show that for the majority, immigrants are categorized based on their ethnicity with the most common categories being Muslim/Turkish, East European/Russian and West European immigrants. Upon establishing that immigrants are not perceived as a homogeneous group, I developed a refined and generalizable theory to account for this heterogeneity following the emerging literature in social psychology based on assessments of cultural similarity of immigrants. I further argued that economic considerations are important but they mainly motivate opposition to immigration of ethnic groups that are perceived culturally similar. However, prejudice and symbolic considerations are the primary cause of opposition to immigrants that are perceived culturally different.

I provided strong evidence for the applicability of this model with German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) data from the year 2006. I further show that skill and education level of the prospective immigrant seems to have a minor effect when culturally different immigrants are considered but are much influential when culturally similar groups are considered. Using a Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability Scale, I also was able to demonstrate how these relationships are shadowed by social desirability bias –the respondent’s aspiration to give socially desirable answers to “look good” to the researcher-,

leading to systematic biases by inflating the impact of economic variables while also suppressing the impact of prejudice and respondents differentiation across immigrant groups.

To complement my analysis and combat the biases presented by the ALLBUS data, I designed and conducted an original survey with two embedded experiments in the summer of 2009. This experiment not only allowed me to minimize the effects of social desirable responding with experimental manipulations, but it also enabled me to increase internal validity with random assignment to different conditions and a resulting between subject design.

The first one of these experiments was a priming manipulation utilizing fabricated newspaper articles featuring pictures of and information about one of three major immigrant categories: Turks, Poles, and Italians. By incorporating an evaluation of costs versus benefits as well as economic versus symbolic issues into the experimental design, I was able to illustrate the separate and combined effect of these primes on immigration attitudes and prejudice.

My results in this section did not fully confirm my expectations, which I later illustrated could be due to the mechanics of priming and its limitations on predisposed attitudes. My analyses illustrate that, while specific subsamples of the respondents attitudes towards immigration were malleable to framing, the impact of situational triggers should not be taken as granted. Specifically, the priming experiment suggested large differences between the samples from the former East and West not only in terms of exclusionary attitudes but also in terms of responsiveness to priming providing new avenues for future research.

Upon illustrating how my theory holds up against multiple methods of enquiry, I went a step ahead and illustrated the implications of my original theoretical framework on a specific policy realm, namely public attitudes towards European Integration. I found that separating immigration attitudes by ethnic group reveals that fear of EU enlargement is actually a more important motive of Euroskepticism than it has been shown so far even when economic aspects of market integration is considered.

To be able to better account for social desirability bias regarding the role of immigration on EU attitudes I also employed a list experiment. My results suggest that, when social desirability bias is accounted for, the perceptions of cultural threat due to an enlarged Europe play a much larger role in explaining EU attitudes than conventional survey data suggest. I also show that this fear is directly linked to the ethnic primes respondents received initially and that it is mitigated by the level of prejudice, ideology, and respondent's education and geographical background (East versus West), but has little to do with the respondent's skill level and income.

8.2 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS

My both theoretically and methodologically in depth interdisciplinary query points out to two important findings: One, when studying opposition to immigration, the homogeneity of immigrant groups in the host society's perception cannot be taken for granted. I provided both quantitative and qualitative evidence suggesting that, this assumption leads to biased results.

Furthermore, my findings illustrate that we should approach studies that do not take this heterogeneous perception of immigration with caution. This has implications for both the political behavior work conducted on immigration attitudes as well as the social psychology work I am widely utilizing.

For the literature of social psychology, my analysis illustrates a one of a kind attempt to consolidate multiple theories dealing with out group attitudes for a grand theory of out-group attitudes applicable to real life out-groups. I test the applicability of this theory on a very important topic –attitudes towards immigration with major policy implications with a great sensitivity to measurement issues. Furthermore, I perform my analysis with experimental methods but one with representative samples as well as a large N survey generating better external validity than many in this literature would do.

For the literature in political behavior on the other hand, my results suggest that what is needed at this point is, better pretests of survey questions on immigration attitudes and multiple questions regarding different prospective immigrants with varying ethnic origin, preferably each asked to randomly selected groups.

People seem to have different reasons for opposing the immigrant groups at different levels of perceived cultural similarity to them and they use ethnicity as a cue to categorize immigrants on this basis. Nevertheless, only after numerous analysis of survey and experimental data can we exactly pinpoint the exact inconsistencies of this ongoing homogeneity assumption.

Another very important finding of my dissertation relates to social desirable responding and the biases introduced by this responding pattern. Throughout my chapters I first suggested a way to detect this kind of responding, then I illustrated its actual biasing

impact with regards to out-group attitudes, and finally I proposed ways to eliminate it. This project illustrates that, despite the triangulation of multiple methods I employed, social desirability continues to exert a biasing effect. Furthermore, with chapter 7, I illustrated that this bias goes beyond out group attitudes and impacts related policy positions of individuals.

Therefore, the immediate theoretical and methodological implication of this finding is a need for paying more attention to measuring and minimizing this bias. A simple way of addressing the magnitude of this bias is clearly including a simple Marlowe Crowne social desirability scale in the large N studies conducted. Currently, the only large context within which surveys conducted is Germany. Therefore primarily surveys conducted in Europe and the US and secondarily in other contexts where norms of political correctness are spreading need to incorporate this scale. Without a doubt, upon illustrating its biasing effect, unobtrusive measurement of these sensitive out-group traits such as experimental methods and randomized survey experiments such as CATI should be adopted for more reliable analysis.

In terms of policy implications, my results suggest that, to better understand public discontent towards immigration, we need to understand attitudes towards different groups separately. Clearly, my results suggest that immigrant groups that are perceived culturally differently pose major cultural threats and the host society's reactions to them are mainly grounded in symbolic, prejudice related reasons. That is not to say the economic benefits they provide or costs they pose have no effect on individual's opposition to them. Nevertheless my analysis implies that, if a policy maker aims to reduce opposition to these

culturally different groups, framing the immigration issue with regards to the economic benefits these groups provide will not fully achieve this goal.

If the goal is mitigating tension towards the existing immigrant groups or reaction to future immigrants that are culturally perceived differently, any attempt of persuading the public will need to address the symbolic threats these groups pose and/or believed to pose. For that, different frames such as an emphasis on diversity and multiculturalism or the potential inclusiveness of the social identity need to be utilized. Clearly, constructing identity is a much longer process than assuaging economic concerns. Therefore, it would be fair to suggest that a very long term commitment to these positive symbolic frames need to be foreseen.

Furthermore, my findings from especially chapter 6 indicate that media continues to exert a major influence on framing and priming attitudes towards immigrant groups. Negative evaluations of culturally different groups create a lot more opposition to the culturally different perceived groups as compared to others. This implies that when individuals receive information consistent with their predispositions, they respond to it more readily than when the information is inconsistent with what they used to believe about these groups. In this regard, the way these immigrant groups are portrayed in the media and various negative and symbolically informed frames used to depict them carries a lot of weight in galvanizing public discontent.

8.3 LIMITATIONS & CAVEATS & FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Despite its numerous contributions, the current study also suffers from some shortcomings which future work should address.

The first set of limitations relate to the methodologies employed. As illustrated with the cognitive interviews, the ALLBUS survey did not employ the exact ways German categorize immigrants. In order to deal with this issue, I utilized an experimental design with the exact immigrant groups suggested by the cognitive interviews. Nevertheless, due to limitations in material resources, I could not recruit as many respondents as I would like to each experimental manipulation to increase the power of the experiment. While the initial number was acceptable, splitting the sample into subgroups such as Easterners and Westerners or High and Low Timers resulted in lower number of respondents in each cell of the experimental conditions. Therefore, my results from that section should be approached with some caution and future research should include larger samples and preferably a random sample experiment with an embedded experimental design.

The second set of limitations relate to the social desirability bias. Despite all efforts, chapters 5,6, and 7 illustrate that social desirability continues to exert biasing effects into out-group attitudes. Even the list experiment could not inhibit the large differences incurring between respondents of high and low social desirability. At this point, alternative ways of minimizing this bias should be explored.

Having tested my theoretical framework explaining the categorization of immigrants and what accounts for it with an unprecedented methodological rigor for Germans, it still remains to be seen how this framework would apply to other contexts. There is a burgeoning literature in the United States (Brader et al. 2008) and the United Kingdom (Ford 2010) questioning the same assumption of homogeneous perception of immigrants by the host society. Nevertheless, most of this research only accounted for the possible reasons for immigrants' categorization. My nuanced approach in taking a step further and theorizing on the impact of the interaction of economic and symbolic concerns on opposing these immigrant groups as a function of their perceived cultural similarity remains to be *terra incognita*.

An important finding of my dissertation based on the analysis of my original survey experiment is that, there are major differences between the subgroups of German population in their readiness for persuasion regarding immigration via media exposure. More specifically, I found that priming was strictly conditional on the time the individual spent on reading the article which was not surprising, but also that it is a function of the background of the respondent. While former Westerners were prone to manipulation through different news frames, former Easterners held onto their initial positions despite manipulation, showing signs of stronger predispositions.

During the brief interviews conducted with the respondents after the experiment and the cognitive interviews I conducted earlier in the process, Easterners expressed their reluctance to trust media outlets as a function of their past exposure to communist propaganda. Therefore, in my near future work, I would like to focus on the differences

between former East and West Germans, in their perception of and reaction of media coverage during critical periods such as elections. For this project I will predominantly utilize European Election Study but also would like to complement this framework with additional field experiments.

Furthermore, during my fieldwork, I developed a more context specific prejudice scale involving additional items to Sniderman et al (2004; 2007) scales and incorporated the response latency as an interactive effect to this scale. Due to my larger focus on exclusive attitudes, priming and their implications on EU attitudes, in my dissertation I could not explore the implications of this new prejudice scale as much as I would like. Therefore, in my postdoctoral work, I would like to explore this new prejudice scale in relation to subtle and blatant prejudice scales. For this, my existing experiment will be a good starting point which I hope to supplement with additional experiments.

Finally, more research is need to establish further linkages with specific policy realms. How do immigration attitudes understood based on this heterogeneous framework relate to voting behavior especially for right and extreme right parties. How does it specifically relate to attitudes towards welfare policies? Are attitudes towards culturally different immigrants more explanatory of individuals positions than similar ones?

Another possible direction for future research is related to the much debated idea of European identity? Can the relationship between tolerance and immigration attitudes on the one hand and European identity on the other illuminate what is understood by Europeaness? Is it more compatible with an idea about a modern political Europe based

on values of secularism and multiculturalism or one defined by more traditional and culturally bound Europe not open to Islam?

APPENDIX A

A.1 APPENDIX A VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS

Dependent Variables

<i>Opposition to immigration from EU member states</i>	1	Entry of EU immigrants into Germany should be unrestricted
	2	Entry of EU immigrants into Germany should be restricted
	3	Entry of EU immigrants into Germany should be banned
<i>Opposition to immigration from Non-EU states</i>	1	Entry of Non-EU immigrants into Germany should be unrestricted
	2	Entry of Non-EU immigrants into Germany should be restricted
	3	Entry of Non-EU immigrants into Germany should be banned

Opposition to immigration of Ethnic

Germans from Eastern Europe

- 1 Entry of Ethnic German immigrants into Germany should be unrestricted
- 2 Entry of Ethnic German immigrants into Germany should be restricted
- 3 Entry of Ethnic German immigrants into Germany should be banned

Opposition to immigration of Asylum

Seekers

- 1 Entry of Asylum seekers into Germany should be unrestricted
- 2 Entry of Asylum seekers into Germany should be restricted
- 3 Entry of Asylum seekers into Germany should be banned

Independent Variables

Easterner

- 0 If born and raised in (former)West Germany
- 1 If born and raised in (former)East

Germany

Unemployed

0

If the respondent has not been unemployed in the last 10 years

1

If the respondent has been unemployed in the last 10 years

Class

1

If the respondent thinks she belongs to
lower class

2

If the respondent thinks she belongs to
working class

3

If the respondent thinks she belongs to
middle class

4

If the respondent thinks she belongs to
upper-middle class

5

If the respondent thinks she belongs to
upper class

Total *economic concerns* as an additive index of the following:

Current Sociotropic concern

0

Current national economy is “very good”

Current Pocketbook concern	1	Current national economy is “good”
		Current national economy is “neither
	2	good, nor bad”
	3	Current national economy is “bad”
		Current national economy is “very
	4	bad”
		Current personal economy is “very
	0	good”
	1	Current personal economy is “good”
		Current personal economy is “neither
Prospective Sociotropic concern	2	good, nor bad”
	3	Current personal economy is “bad”
		Current personal economy is “very
	4	bad”
		Future national economy is “very
	0	good”
	1	Future national economy is “good”
		Future national economy is “neither
	2	good, nor bad”
	3	Future national economy is “bad”
Prospective Sociotropic concern	4	Future national economy is “very bad”
	0	Future personal economy is “very

		good”
	1	Future personal economy is “good”
		Future personal economy is “neither
	2	good, nor bad”
	3	Future personal economy is “bad”
		Future personal economy is “very
	4	bad”
<i>Contact</i> (as an additive index of the		
following items:)		
	1	If the respondent has a contact with a
		foreigner in her family
		If the respondent has a contact with a
	1	foreigner at work
	1	If the respondent has a contact with a
		foreigner in her neighborhood
	1	If the respondent has a contact with a
		foreigner in her friend circle
<i>Ideology</i> (Ten item left-right scale)		
		Ranges from “1” for very left to “10”
		for very right
<i>Religiosity</i>		
	1	If the respondent never goes to church
	2	If the respondent goes to church less

		than many times a year
		If the respondent goes to church many
	3	times a year
		If the respondent goes to church 1 to 3
	4	times a month
		If the respondent goes to church once
	5	a week
		If the respondent goes to church more
	6	than once a week
<i>Age(categorical)</i>	1	If the respondent is 18 to 29 years old
	2	If the respondent is 30 to 44 years old
	3	If the respondent is 45 to 59 years old
	4	If the respondent is 60 to 74 years old
	5	If the respondent is 75 to 89 years old
		If the respondent is 90 years and over
	6	old
<i>Education</i>	1	Dropped out without a degree
		Lowest formal degree of Germany's
		tripartite secondary school system
	2	after 8 or 9 years of schooling
		(Hauptschule)

- | | |
|---|---|
| 3 | Intermediary secondary degree after
10 years of schooling (Real schule)

Degree fulfilling entry requirements to |
| 4 | an Applied Sciences University

(Fachhochschulreife) |
| 5 | Higher degree fulfilling entry

requirements to a University (Abitur) |

Gender

- | | |
|---|------------------------------|
| 0 | If the respondent is male. |
| 1 | If the respondent is female. |

Prejudice/Social

Distance

Scale(Additive index of the following
items for each a score of “1”
indicates no distance, and “7”
indicates high distance.

- | | |
|-----|--|
| 1-7 | How comfortable would you feel to
have a Turk/Italian/Ethnic
German/Asylum seeker as a neighbor? |
| 1-7 | How comfortable would you feel to
have a Turk/Italian/Ethnic
German/Asylum seeker marry into
your family? |
| 1-7 | All Turks/Italians/Ethnic |

Germans/Asylum seekers who live in Germany should have the same rights as Germans.

<i>Dummy for immigrants from EU member states</i>	1	If respondent was asked about an EU immigrant
	0	If respondent was asked about a group other than an EU immigrant
<i>Dummy for immigrants from non-EU member states</i>	1	If respondent was asked about a non-EU immigrant
	0	If respondent was asked about a group other than a non-EU immigrant
<i>Dummy for immigrants of Ethnic German origin</i>	1	If respondent was asked about an ethnic German immigrant
	0	If respondent was asked about a group other than an ethnic German immigrant
<i>Dummy for immigration of Asylum</i>	1	If respondent was asked about an

seekers

Asylum seeking immigrant

If respondent was asked about a group

0 other than an Asylum seeking immigrant

If respondent strongly disagrees that

Cultural Difference 1-7 scale

1 the group in question differ from Germans in terms of their lifestyle.

If respondent strongly agrees that the

7 group in question differ from Germans in terms of their lifestyle.

***Independent variables** excluded from the model due to N/S, no improvement in model fit, no effect on other IVs*

Respondent's personal income in

Income (Personal) cont

1-22 brackets

Residency ranging from rural(0) to

Urban (Continuous)

0-4 urban(4)

Urban (Dummy)

1 If residency in a city

0 If residency not in a city

Suburban (Dummy)

1 If residency in the suburbs

	0	If residency not in the suburbs
Unskilled worker	1	If unskilled worker
	0	If not an unskilled worker
Age		The respondent's date of birth
Unemployment duration(replaced with being unemployed)		Length of recent unemployment in weeks

APPENDIX B

TESTING THE ETHNIC AND TONE MANIPULATION AT DIFFERENT CUT-POINTS

B.1 THE IMPACT OF POLISH PRIME INCREASES AS TIME SPENT INCREASES

Table B 1 Predicting Opposition to Immigration with the Polish Prime for Different Subsamples

	Coefficient	P Value	N
All Sample	.181	.326	208
Very Low Timer excluded	.202	.294	189
Above Median Timer	.526	.028	104
High Timer	.770	.039	53

B.2 THE IMPACT OF NEGATIVE PRIME DECREASES AS TIME SPENT INCREASES

Table B 2 Predicting Opposition to Immigration with the Negative Prime for Different Subsamples

	Coefficient	P Value	N
All Sample	-.271	.111	208
Very Low Timer Excluded	-.203	.260	189
Above Median Timer	.020	.933	104
High Timer	.069	.844	53

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